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Abstract 
This thesis starts from the following question: Why, after 16 years of receiving 
Structural Funds, do some regions still have difficulties in spending their allocated 
resources? Empirical evidence shows that Funds implementation rates have varied 
widely among European Union Objective 1 regions. The overall performance of Italian 
regions, in particular, has consistently lagged behind other countries. However, an 
investigation into individual Italian Objective I regions reveals that not all follow this 
general trend. Indeed, some regions have outperformed others remarkably. Why is this 
the case? 
I explore these differences and identify potential variables that may account for 
such regional variation. My central hypothesis is that differences in implementation are 
strongly dependent on the degree of administrative capacity that exists in the recipient 
regional government. Due to the deficiency in the existing literature of a clear definition 
of administrative capacity, I attempt to fill this gap by introducing a novel 
characterization that allows me to operationalize and measure the concept. 
The core of the methodology is an in-depth case study supported by field 
research based on personal interviews and documented questionnaires. I investigate two 
contrasting southern Italian regions, Sicily and Basilicata, measure their respective 
degrees of administrative capacity and provide evidence to suggest that this latter 
variable is positively correlated to Structural Funds implementation. 
Answering my first query has prompted a further question: if it is trite that the 
variation in implementation of resources between regions can be explained by different 
degrees of regional administrative capacity, then what is it that determines the degree of 
administrative capacity at the regional level? In studying this second question I further 
test the hypothesis that the level of administrative capacity is influenced by three key 
political factors: namely, political interference, government stability and political 
accountability. 
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PART I 
RESEARCH QUESTION, LITERATURE REVIEW 
AND 
METHODOLOGY 
14 
Chapter 1 
What determines the variation in the regional implementation of 
Structural Funds? 
1.1 Introduction 
This introductory chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section, introduces the 
research puzzle. Retrospective data on the rate of Structural Funds expenditure across 
the European Union (EU) Member States show strong variation and Italy appears to be 
among the worse performing Member States. Interestingly, though, a closer look at the 
individual performance of each Italian region reveals that some of them perform 
extremely well. Thus, in a national context where there has been a lower than average 
ability to implement allocated funds, there has, in contrast, been a higher than average 
ability on the part of some southern Italian regions to spend the resources. How can we 
explain these differences in regional performance? 
The second section sets the rationale for the study and introduces the research question 
and hypothesis (cf. Section 1.3). Sections 1.4 and 1.5 form an interpretative framework 
that provides an analysis of the main institutional and administrative challenges faced by 
regional governments in implementing Structural Funds. Section 1.4 summarizes two 
contrasting theories, namely multilevel governance, and the intergovernmental 
perspective; the former argues for a change in the significance of regional governments 
within the Nation State. The multilevel governance theory has gained considerable 
credence in recent years and is strongly supported by the 1988 reform of Structural 
' In this thesis the word regional government, regional level and subnational level will be used interchangeably. 
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Funds, which is described in detail. The key point that emerged from this reform was the 
introduction of a new approach to regional development policies, based on the 
increasing role of sub-national governments: this had consequences in terms of both 
institutional and administrative changes required within Member States to enable them 
to implement Structural Funds. 
Section 1.5 addresses the process of institutional adjustment that was triggered, with 
institutional frameworks converging towards a two- or multi-tier system of governance. 
However, it became clear that not all regions were able to become active partners with 
the national government and the European Commission, because of the differences in 
their administrative roles, decision-making autonomy, and policy-making and 
implementation capacities. This enables us to place the southern Italian regions within 
the European context and to analyse their reactions to the introduction of Structural 
Funds and the evolving new policy-making and implementation scenarios. Italy 
experienced strong initial difficulties in adapting to a multilevel governance system due 
to the traditional centralized form of intervention, which did not leave much space for 
the role of regional governments (Desideri and Santantonio, 1997). The Italian case 
undoubtedly reveals that while some regions (e. g. Basilicata) have been able to 
successfully implement the funds, others (e. g. Sicily) have registered long delays. By 
focusing on the characteristics of the Italian case, I will clarify the potential reasons 
underlying inter-regional variation in Objective 1 regions. 
Section 1.6 reviews the existing literature on Structural Funds implementation and 
highlights the limitations of current explanations. The existing arguments on resource 
implementation do not fully explain the variations observed. Furthermore, the literature 
that analyses Italian regions focuses on explaining different regional economic 
developments (final stage) rather than looking at the implementation stage. The social 
and political explanations provided by this branch of the literature, when applied to my 
case studies, do not fully answer my initial question. Therefore, my search for an 
alternative explanation seems valuable since it can contribute to the still limited 
literature on policy implementation. 
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Section 1.7 introduces my central hypothesis, which has two component parts. The first 
part tests whether differences in implementation are strongly connected to the degree of 
administrative capacity existing in a regional government. I expect to find that high 
administrative capacity is positively correlated to Structural Funds implementation. The 
lack in the existing literature of a clear definition of administrative capacity is a gap that 
I attempt to fill by introducing a novel characterization that allows us to operationalize 
and measure the concept. 
Section 1.7 will reveal that the process of analysis that has led us to formulate the first 
part of the central hypothesis has also stimulated a further and more analytically 
complicated question: if it is true that the variation between regions in implementation of 
resources can be explained by differences in regional administrative capacity, then what 
is it that determines the degree of administrative capacity at the regional level? Here, I 
introduce the second part of the central hypothesis: the four features constituting 
administrative capacity can be influenced by political factors, namely political 
interference, government stability, and political accountability. Section 1.8 presents the 
overall structure of the thesis. 
In summary, the aim of my thesis is two-fold. First, I intend to investigate the role of 
administrative capacity in determining implementation performance, and in order to do 
so I will assess administrative capacity in the selected case studies; therefore I will 
suggest a definition of administrative capacity and a way to measure it. Once I have 
assessed administrative capacity in the selected case studies, I expect to find that 
administrative capacity is higher/lower in the region where there is a higher/lower 
implementation of the Funds. Second, I aim to study the role of factors in influencing 
different degrees of regional administrative capacity, in order to answer the correlated 
question - i. e., why does administrative capacity vary across regions? 
The period of investigation covers the three consecutive cycles of Structural Funds: 
1988-1993,1994-1999 and 2000-2006. The latter period is covered until 2004 -i. e. the 
end of the first half of the planning period - because the information available for 2005 
and 2006 is still very limited. 
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1.2 The research puzzle 
The Structural Funds, 2 as the instruments of the European Union's (EU) cohesion 
policy, were redefined in terms of their rules and regulations in 1988 and began to 
operate in a coordinated fashion. The main targets for Structural Funds are Objective I 
regions, defined as those whose development is lagging behind - i. e. where the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is at or below 75% of the Community average. ' 
From the beginning, there have been significant differences between regions in the way 
they have implemented their allocation of funds. The European Commission (EC) 
defines implementation as 
"[t]he operational process needed to produce expected outputs" (CEC, 
1999c: 55). 
Implementation, therefore, is that part of the cycle by which inputs are converted into 
outputs. The outputs produced can be of two kinds: (1) quantitative implementation, i. e. 
spending the allocated resources in the given time span; or (2) qualitative 
implementation, i. e. investing the resources in "good" projects in order to generate 
economic growth and job creation. 
2 There are four Structural Funds: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which is intended 
to help reduce imbalances between regions of the Community. It was set up in 1975 and grants financial 
assistance for development projects in the poorer regions. In terms of financial resources, the ERDF is by 
far the largest of the EU's Structural Funds and it is the main financial instrument of EU Regional Policy; 
the European Social Fund (ESF), established in 1960, is the main instrument of Community social policy. 
It provides financial assistance for vocational training, retraining and job-creation schemes. The actual 
goal of ESF is that of improving the functioning of labour markets and helping to reintegrate unemployed 
people into working life; the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) finances the 
EU's common agricultural policy. Its purpose is to provide market support and promote structural 
adjustments in agriculture. The EAGGF is divided into two sections: the Guarantee Section finances price 
support measures and export refunds to guarantee stable prices to farmers, while the Guidance Section 
grants subsidies for rationalization schemes, modernization and structural improvements in farming. The 
Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG), the last Fund to be created, in 1994, draws together 
the Community instruments for fisheries. It is applied in all coastal regions; its main task is to increase the 
competitiveness of the structures and develop viable business enterprises in the fishing industry while 
striving to maintain the balance between fishing capacities and available resources. 3 All of these regions have a number of economic signals/indicators "flashing red": a low level of 
investment; a higher than average unemployment rate; a lack of services for businesses and individuals; 
and poor basic infrastructure. 
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This thesis starts by scrutinizing the first aspect - i. e. by asking the question: why do 
some regions spend more funds than others? This question is relevant for two main 
reasons. First, unspent resources are lost and this has a negative impact on, among 
others, the society, which sees the loss as a failure of the government. Second, the future 
allocation of Structural Funds is determined, among other factors, on the basis of a 
region's spending capacity. Therefore, a Member State which does not spend its 
allocation risks losing future funding and opportunities to foster regional development. 
This aspect is currently of particular importance since the EU redefined its budgetary 
allocations for cohesion policy for the next policy cycle, 2007-2013, after the 2004 
enlargement brought into the EU nine Member States whose national GDP per capita is 
below the 75% threshold. 4 Although the newly joined countries have already begun to 
receive Structural Funds, it remains to be seen whether all will be able to utilize these 
resources as prescribed by the rules and regulations. 
By investigating the reasons behind the difficulties faced by the former EU-15 Member 
States in their implementation of Structural Funds, it is possible to isolate impeding 
factors and, hopefully, to provide indications of what the new Member States need to do 
in the future to improve current implementation strategies and avoid the mistakes made 
in the past. Furthermore, an inquiry into why these differences in regional performance 
exist can throw new light on factors which have not been previously considered by 
scholars and by policy makers. 
Nonetheless, the aspect of qualitative implementation is also relevant, but has to be 
tackled separately, since it requires a different methodology and the identification of 
indicators for assessing the quality of a project, a somewhat contentious process, rather 
than the relative objectivity of resource expenditure. 
° The ten new Member States are Malta, Cyprus and eight Central and Eastern European Countries: Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia The only exception 
to this rule is Cyprus which, given that only the Greek part has entered, has a GDP per capita of 77.8% 
(EU15) and 85.4% (EU-25). See European Commission, 2004: 200. In 2007 two new member states 
joined the EU, Bulgaria and Romania, and their GDP per capita levels were also below the 75% treshold. 
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Empirical evidence on the expenditure rate of Structural Funds in EU Objective 1 
regions shows that the overall performance of Italian regions has consistently lagged 
behind that of other countries. Table 1. la shows that in the first period (1989-1993) of 
EU cohesion policy, Italian regions had the lowest implementation rate (73%) in terms 
of how much they spent (Payments) compared to total allocations (Commitments). In the 
second period, 1994-1999 (Table 1.1b), Italy remained tied for last, and it appears that 
there has been little improvement during the third period (Table 1.1 c). 
Table 1.1 Percentage of Structural Funds expenditure* - European Union Objective 1 regions 
a. Period 1989.1993 b. Period 1994-1999 c. Period 2000.2006** 
% % 
Ireland 95 Portugal 89 Portugal 8 
Portugal 91 Ireland 87 Ireland 44 
Spain 87 Spain 82 Spain 1 
Greece 84 Denmark 81 Austria 38 
France 84 Austria 7 Germany 38 
United Kingdom 83 Greece 3 Finland 34 
Italy 73 Belgium 2 Sweden 34 
France 67 France 29 
Netherlands 7 Belgium 27 
United Kingdom 7 Greece 27 
Italy 67 litaly 26 
United Kingdom 25 
Netherlands 16 
Ireland 95 
Portugal 91 
Spain 87 
Greece 84 
France 84 
United Kingdom 83 
Italy 73 
Source: European Commission - Respective Annual Report on Structural Funds 
*% of expenditure is calculated as expenditure/total allocation 
**Expenditure is calculated until December 2004 
However, an analysis of each of the Italian Objective 1 regions, all of which are located 
in the southern part of the country - best known as the Mezzogiorno - shows that not all 
followed the same general trend. Retrospective data suggests that Structural Funds 
implementation over the past two planning periods has varied markedly between these 
regions (Table 1.2). Indeed, during the first period (1989-1993) there were eight 
Objective I regions in the Mezzogiorno, namely Abruzzo, Molise, Puglia, Campania, 
Calabria, Basilicata, Sicily and Sardinia. In the second and third periods, Abruzzo and 
Molise were placed in "phasing out" because they had surpassed the minimum GDP per 
capita required (75% of the average Community GDP per capita). The EU 
Commission's Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (2004: 5) suggests that 
Portugal 89 
Ireland 87 
Spain 82 
Denmark 81 
Austria 7 
Greece 3 
Belgium 2 
France 67 
Netherlands 7 
United Kingdom 7 
Italy 67 
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Sardinia and Basilicata will be the next Italian regions to exit from Objective 1 in the 
fourth phase of Structural Funds 2007- 2013, leaving four of the original eight southern 
Italian regions in Objective 1. 
Table 1.2 Percentage of Structural Funds expenditure - Italian Objective 1 regions 
a. Period 1989.19 93 b. Period 1994-1 999 c. Period 2000-200 6** 
Basilicata 92 Basilicata 100 Basilicata 38 
Abruzzo 80 Abruzzo* 100 Molise*** 35 
Molise 77 Molise 99 Sardinia 32 
Sardinia 77 Sardinia 92 Calabria 31 
Calabria 80 Calabria 84 Puglia 26 
Campania 62 Campania 80 Campania 26 
Puglia 64 Puglia 77 Sicily 23 
Sicily 57 Sicily 75 
Source: Author's elaboration on Italian Ministry of the Treasury data. 
*Abruuo is in "Phasing-out" stage - i. e. it exits ob. I status at the end of 1996 
** The data for this period are updated at December 2004 
*** Molise is in 'Phasing-out" - i. e. it exits ob. 1 status at the end of 2003 
Although originally all regions began to implement Structural Funds with no prior 
experience, some regions such as Basilicata have consistently performed well: in the 
period 1989-1993 Basilicata implemented 90% of its allocation; in 1994-1999, it 
implemented all of its available resources; and it currently has the best Funds 
implementation record for the period 2000-2006. Conversely, other regions such as 
Sicily have shown constant delays in the pace of expenditure over the three periods. So, 
although on the national level there has been a lower than average ability to implement 
allocated funds, in contrast, some southern Italian regions have demonstrated a higher 
than average ability to spend the resources. Why is this the case, and what has been 
happening in some Objective 1 regions vis-ä-vis others? How can we explain these 
differences in regional performance? 
This research explores these differences and aims to identify potential variables that may 
have influenced the evident variations in implementation. Southern Italy can no longer 
be treated as one homogenous zone, as it has been by many authors in the past 
(Pescatore, 1962; D'Antonio, 1979; Ammannati, 1981; Cercola, 1984; Barone, 1986; 
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Tamburino e Villari, 1988). Indeed, intra-southern differences are extremely relevant 
and when analysed in detail may identify internal factors that account for the successful 
performance of some regions relative to others. 
1.3 The rationale for the study 
Although we have observed that variation exists at the regional level, it remains to be 
seen whether a common set of causal factors can be found. Only if this proves to be the 
case will it be possible to speak of a potentially generalized "hypothesis". It is possible 
to eliminate at the outset a number of plausible causes of the observed variation. 
Whether or not regions implement Structural Funds does not depend on absorption 
capacity, economic factors, or socio-cultural factors. Neither does it directly depend on 
political factors (cf. Section 1.6). 
The originality of this thesis is two-fold. First, it suggests an alternative explanation of 
the variation in regional performances instead of the powerful social capital variable 
advocated by Robert Putnam (1993) (cf. Section 1.6.3). Secondly, it investigates 
whether regions within the EU-15 Member States possessed an adequate level of 
administrative capacity to implement the Funds according to the stipulated rules and 
regulations. This is a novel investigation not yet tackled in the literature, which has in 
fact significantly overlooked the whole issue of the implementation of EU policies. 
Indeed, while there is a rich case study literature looking at the Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs), there is no systematic comparative research able to test 
the administrative capacity explanation among the EU-15. This thesis attempts to fill this 
research lacuna by first identifying the component elements and measures of 
administrative capacity, and then testing the existence of this capacity in two selected 
case studies. Moreover, the interest of this question is strengthened by the following 
declaration of a Commission source: 
"We never found a way to judge administrative capacity among the existing 
Member States. It was only in the case of the CEECs candidates knocking on 
our door that we erected the barrier of administrative capacity" (as quoted in 
Dimitrova, 2002: 178). 
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1.3.1 The existing literature on Structural Funds 
My study starts with a review of the literature on Structural Funds, which finds that very 
little attention is given to the implementation phase. Indeed, all the studies and analyses 
that have been developed in the past can be classified into two main areas. The first 
focuses on the design of the decision-making process and is dominated by 
intergovernamentalism theory (Moravcsik 1993,1995) versus multi-level governance 
(Hooghe 1996; Jeffery 1996a). Intergovernamentalists argue that national governments 
perform the role of "gatekeepers" between supranational institutions and their domestic 
system. The latter suggests that a new form of policy-making is developing in the EU. 
According to this perspective, central governments remain vitally important but do not 
hold a monopoly on decision-making powers. Instead, policy-making responsibility is 
now shared among a number of actors at European, national and sub-national levels. The 
second area of studies investigates the economic impact of Structural Funds. It is divided 
between the supporters of negative results (Rodriguez Pose, 1998) - i. e. the view that 
Structural Funds do not succeed in backing economic growth - and the advocates of 
positive results - those that corroborate that a process of regional convergence has been 
taking place since the Structural Funds reform of 1988 (Leonardi, 1993; 1995a; 2005). 
Indeed, the discussion of whether the different growth of the regions is related to 
Structural Funds implementation has been the object of a large-scale debate (Betutel, 
2002; Keating, 1995; Basile, De Nardis, Girardi, 2001). 
Throughout the literature little attention has been paid to the implementation of the 
resources. Therefore, I suggest that there is a significant need to change the focus of the 
analysis. Indeed, previous authors confirm that mismanagement or lack of 
implementation of Funds has no economic impact (Ederveen, De Groot and Nashuis, 
2002). They argue that without implementation problems, the EU's Structural Policy has 
beneficial effects with regard to economic and social cohesion. In the case of the 
Mezzogiorno, this assertion is supported by the fact that before Structural Funds 
implementation in 1989, GDP per capita in Basilicata was lower than in Sicily, a 
situation that has now changed dramatically (Table 1.3). 
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Table 13 GDP per capita (PPS) EU15=100 
1989 1995 1998 2000 
Abruzzo 89 88.3 84 83.7 
Basilicata 63 70.4 72 73.4 
Calabria 60 61.2 61 62.1 
Campania 69 65.3 64 65.3 
Molise 77 77.4 79 78.8 
Puglia 73 66.7 65 67.1 
Sardinia 73 76.0 76 75.5 
, Sicily 65 65.9 65 , 65.4 
Source: ISTAT 
In the light of the above considerations, it is clear that the significance of the 
contribution made by Structural Funds to economic development is still controversial. 
Furthermore, so much has already been said that I do not wish to contribute to this 
debate. Instead, I want to tackle the implementation phase, positioned in the less visible 
back-end of the process, which is completely neglected. Indeed, since implementation 
constitutes the last major and most important component of a policy - that is, it 
determines whether a policy is effective or not -, it is important to understand the factors 
that encourage or prevent its occurrence. If resources are not spent, then they will 
definitely not have any impact. 
1.3.2 The research question and hypothesis 
This thesis seeks to analyse the role played by administrative capacity in determining 
variation between regions in the implementation of Structural Funds. If it is true that 
administrative capacity plays a determinant role in implementation, then it would 
therefore be interesting to understand what can account for the variation in 
administrative capacity among regions. This question introduces the second part of the 
central hypothesis, which will test the role of three political factors in influencing 
administrative variation: namely, political interference, government stability, and 
political accountability. 
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The main research questions posed in order to test the two parts of the central hypothesis 
will be: 
1) What determines variation in the regional implementation of Structural Funds? 
2) Why does administrative capacity vary at the regional level? 
At this point, in order to answer my two central questions I propose three additional 
research questions that will help to structure the argument: 
a) How have the national and regional governments reacted to the innovation 
introduced in 1988 by the Structural Funds development method - i. e. have the 
national and regional institutions changed and reorganized their structure in order 
to comply with the dictates of cohesion policy? (cf. Section 1.4; Chapter 3 and 4) 
b) Did the regional government possess adequate capacity to perform its role in the 
multi-level form of governance? (cf. Section 1.5; Chapter 5) 
c) Has there been a process of institutional, administrative and political adjustment 
or learning - i. e. can we identify any virtuous/vicious pattern of interaction 
between the administrative and political areas which favours/compromises the 
regional performance? (cf. Chapter 6) 
In order to answer these questions I will choose two regional case studies from southern 
Italy, namely Sicily - and Basilicata. Italy provides some pertinent examples for 
investigating the administrative capacity at the regional level. First, it adopted a 
centralized approach to regional policy prior to the intervention of the Structural Funds, 
so in 1988 the regional governments were all starting from the same (low) level. Second, 
the Italian case is characterized by very different regional responses to the reform, which 
provides the opportunity to conduct a comparative analysis between the best (Basilicata) 
and worst (Sicily) performers and to single out the intervening variables. 
I will argue that: 
1) Italy came into line with the dictate of cohesion policy far too late: it retained an 
old-fashioned, traditional, approach to regional policy that has only recently been 
modernized; 
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2) This delay, coupled with a long history of centralization, has left the regions with 
a poor capacity to administer regional policy; 
3) In this setting, the regional political class has pursued personal agendas and 
monopolized the activities of the administrative class. 
The situation I have described above does not apply to all Italian regions. Indeed, some 
of them, such as Basilicata, have been able to outperform the others. I will argue that this 
has happened due to: 
a. the ability of the region to develop an adequate level of administrative capacity 
in relation to regional policy in line with the dictates of the EU cohesion policy; 
b. the virtuous interaction between the political and administrative sphere at the 
regional level; 
c. policy learning - the ability to change institutional performance over time to 
keep up with the changes in the rules and regulations applied to the Structural 
Funds. 
The following sections will look at the main events of the period of analysis and 
identify the process that has lead to the emergence of the sub-national level, in order to 
justify my interest in this particular unit of analysis. Indeed, regional units have become 
central to the implementation of cohesion policy: they are now responsible for 
managing, programming and monitoring Structural Funds. Therefore, it is vital to 
understand why they have difficulties in performing their new central role. 
1.4 The creation of Structural Funds and the rise of the sub-national level 
Historically, the political debate over policy-making in the EU has been dominated by 
two competing theories: intergovernamentalism, sustained by realists (Hoffmann 1964, 
1966), and neofunctionalism, developed by pluralists (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963). The 
former argues that national governments perform the role of "gatekeepers" between 
supranational institutions and their domestic system. The latter theory, in contrast, 
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claims that European integration proceeds in cycles and each increase in the level of 
integration creates the dynamic of spill-over, thereby producing further demands for 
integration in civil society, the economy and administrative structures. Recently this 
traditional debate has been replaced by the contemporary competing of liberal 
intergovernamentalism and multi-level governance. Precisely, in the realist tradition, 
Andrew Moravcsik (1993) and Mark Pollack (1995) continue to emphasize the role of 
national authorities in decision-making and implementation of policies. On the contrary, 
the pluralists, such as Gary Marks (1992,1993) and Liesbet Hooghe (1996,1998), have 
advanced the concept of multi-level governance, which suggests that a new form of 
policy-making is developing in the EU, where the responsibility is now shared among a 
number of actors at European, national and sub-national levels. 
1.4.1 The reform of 1988 
The institutionalisation of cohesion policy with the reform of the Structural Funds 
(ERDF, ESF, EAGGF-Guidance, FIFG) in 1988 changed the state-centric regulatory 
model of the European institutions. Cohesion policies prompted the gradual evolution of 
a "multi-level governance" form of decision-making and implementation, which became 
increasingly focused on the programmatic approach and partnership model. The latter 
broadens the scope of many aspects of economic policy by means of a co-decisional 
body comprising the EU, national governments, and regional and local authorities. The 
reform did away with the old didactic intergovernmentalist bargaining model in regional 
policy by admitting sub-national actors into a tripartite decision-making and 
implementation process. In addition, the new approach required the active participation 
of both public and private actors at various levels of policy-making. 
The major reform adopted in 19885 radically changed the largely isolated way in which 
the Structural Funds had previously operated into a global system of integration of their 
respective roles, where they worked together towards the goal of economic and social 
S The reform was achieved through five Council Regulations: the framework Regulation (2052/88) and the 
implementation Regulations (4253/88,4254/88,4255/88,4256/88). It became effective on 1 January 
1989. 
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cohesion. The Brussels European Council of February 1988 approved the principles 
under which the Structural Funds would operate; namely concentration, programming, 
additionality and partnership. Concentration was intended to direct funding towards a 
limited number of objectives, focusing on spatially defined areas of greatest need, on the 
severest problems and on certain thematic areas. Programming was a process intended to 
lead firstly to the diagnosis of problems, then to the formulation of a strategy to address 
them, and, lastly, to a definition of the specific measures or projects necessary to 
implementing the strategy. Additionality provides that the expenditure of Structural 
Funds on a programme shall be additional to and not a replacement of what would 
otherwise have been spent by the relevant national public authorities on that area of 
activity. Partnership suggests that the broad plans for using the Structural Funds are 
achieved through 
"[c]lose consultations between the Commission, the Member States 
concerned and the competent authorities designated by the latter at national, 
regional, local or other level, with each party acting as a partner in pursuit of 
a common goal". (Council Regulation n. 2052/1988)6 
At the broadest level, partnership is seen, at least by the Commission, as an application 
of the principle of subsidiarity7 in public policy, reflecting the value of decentralisation 
and the involvement, at all levels, of the relevant authorities in lower tiers of 
government, from the preparatory stage to the implementation of the measures. 
Partnership, both institutional - between different levels of government and within the 
same government level - and social, is deemed necessary at all stages (planning, 
implementing and monitoring) in order to allow the transfer of knowledge needed to 
produce a framework programme - defined as the Community Support Framework 
6 Art. 4 Regulation n. 2052/88 says: "Community operations shall be such as to complement or contribute 
to corresponding national operations. They shall be established through close consultations between the 
Commission, the Member State concerned and the competent authorities designated by the latter at 
national, regional, local or other level, with each party acting as a partner in pursuit of a common goal. 
These consultations are hereinafter referred to as the 'partnership'. The partnership shall cover the 
preparation, financing, monitoring and assessment of operations. " 
The subsidiarity principle is intended to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the 
citizen and that constant checks are made as to whether action at Community level is justified in the light 
of the possibilities available at national, regional or local level. Specifically, it is the principle whereby the 
Union does not take action (except in the areas which fall within its exclusive competence) unless it is 
more effective than action taken at national, regional or local level. 
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(CSF)8 - that would subsequently be translated, at regional level, into multi-Fund 
Operational Programmes. 
This innovation opened the way for a completely new approach to regional development 
policies within the EC, based on multi-year integrated programmes that were no longer 
centred on the exclusive role of one institutional level (i. e., the national). Instead, the 
new regulations required the participation of several levels - i. e., the Community, 
national, and regional/local levels (Leonardi, 2005). 
1.5 The regional challenge to the implementation of Structural Funds. 
The creation of the Structural Funds and the strengthening of an EU regional 
development policy through the adoption of the CSF approach has significantly changed 
the nature of relations between institutions and has led to the emergence for the first time 
of regional institutions as significant policy actors. This is true with regard to 
participation in the formulation and implementation of Structural Funds. Policies are no 
longer structured in an exclusively top-down approach. Instead, they now combine both 
top-down and bottom-up characteristics. 
The implementation of the new decision-making mechanisms associated with multi- 
level governance proved to be far more complex and difficult to carry out than was 
initially expected. Adaptation to the new EU rules and regulations was not automatic. 
The new approach required both political and administrative changes at both the national 
and sub-national level. In order to create modem efficient forms of governmental 
activities, the institutions involved needed to develop (Tommel, 1987): (i) differentiated 
s The Community Support Framework (CSF) is a document approved by the European Commission, 
accordingly with the Member State, on the basis of the evaluation of a Development Plan presented by the 
State itself. The CSF contains a summary of the existing socio-economic context, the strategy planned to 
improve the context, the priorities, the specific objectives, the division of the financial resources, and the 
conditions for implementation. The CSF is implemented through Operational Programme (OP), which is 
elaborated by each Region and approved by the European Commission. The OP describes in detail the 
priorities set by the CSF and it is composed through operational interventions implemented through 
pluriannual measures. 
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vertical and horizontal distribution of powers and responsibilities; and (ii) considerable 
planning, programming and coordination capacities. 
Since 1988, two more reforms, in 1993 and 1999, have changed the rules and regulations 
of the practical operation of Structural Funds. Both placed a strong emphasis on the 
monitoring and evaluation aspects. 
In each Member State, national government and sub-national actors have different 
degrees of participation in decision-making. This reflects factors such as the distribution 
of competencies between national, regional and local levels, political interests and 
linkages, the amount and scope of co-funding available, the number and scope of 
programmes to be dealt with at each level, and administrative experience of managing 
economic development. It follows that practical arrangements for programming also 
vary, including the approaches to programme development, project generation, selection, 
monitoring and evaluation, and the extent to which these tasks are subsumed within the 
existing administrative structure or whether parts of the implementation are carried out 
by dedicated administrative structures and how these are organised (Bachtler et 
aL, 1999). 
It is clear that, with the 1988 reform of Structural Funds, the regions gained a key role in 
the design and implementation of EU regional policy. Indeed, one of the main elements 
of the reform was the principle of partnership, which for the first time entitled sub- 
national governments to participate in the making of regional policies, posing a 
challenge to existing national practices. In this respect, the 1988 reform in theory 
represented the introduction of a "bottom-up" approach to regional policy design, 
management, implementation and monitoring in that it was a move towards the 
involvement of different tiers of government and partnership between different actors, 
both public and private. 
However, several authors (Bailey and De Propris 2002; Keating, 1995) argue that 
differences in the forms and structures of local governance throughout Europe have 
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weakened the aim of structural policies to achieve economic and social cohesion. More 
precisely, as Hooghe (1998) pointed out, the 1988 Reform obviously intended to change 
the role of regional government within the EU institutions, but not all regions were able 
to become active partners with the national government and the Commission because of 
the differences in their administrative roles, in their decision-making autonomy, in their 
policy-making and in their implementation capacity. As Bailey and De Propris (2002: 9) 
put it, 
"[s]ome regions had never before been involved in European policies and 
thus had never started or developed a dialogue with European institutions, in 
other cases regions did not even exist as geographical, administrative and 
political entities". 
This was the case for the Italian regions (cf. Chapter 3). 
1.5.1 The Italian scenario: constraints and policy changes in southern Italy 
It seems clear that the success of EU cohesion policy is heavily dependent on the 
conformation of both national and regional administrative bodies to the Community's 
framework conditions, if they want to benefit from the available financial aid. 
In Italy the evolution of regional and cohesion policies has been deeply influenced by 
the presence of continuing macro territorial differences between the north and south. The 
national authorities have always treated the southern Italian regions - the Mezzogiorno - 
as a single territory with the same difficulties, cultural problems and political obstacles. 
In 1950 a special fund, the Intervento Straordinario per il Mezzogiorno (Extraordinary 
Intervention for the Mezzogiorno), was created to provide a "massive intervention of 
public support in those regions which were lagging behind" (Cafiero, 2000). The fund's 
' In all EU countries "regions" exist as geographic and statistical entities. However, they do not 
necessarily exist as administrative or political entities. With the exception of Germany, Austria and 
Belgium, which had federal structures (in Belgium's case since 1995), other European member states 
started this process of institutional adjustment from different points. Of these, we can identify three groups 
according to their governance structures in 1988: (i) those with no regional tier of governance (Greece 
and Ireland); (ii) those with some form of subnational institutions (UK, Portugal, and the Netherlands); 
and (iii) Spain, Italy and France with a full system of regional bodies but with varying responsibilities for 
regional policy. 
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management was assigned to a newly created and highly centralized state agency, the 
Cassa per il Mezzogiorno - Casmez (Fund for the South). This acted as an autonomous 
entity, having the sole responsibility to implement the country's regional policy between 
1950 and 1992. During this period various reforms gave the regions broad legal powers 
in territorial planning and economic intervention (cf. Chapter 3) but, as Smyrl 
(1997: 293) notes, "the means to carry out these policies were generally lacking". 
Therefore, until 1992 the southern regions were the beneficiaries of a national regional 
policy that was basically a sectorial development policy. It lacked many of the features 
that were subsequently adopted by the EU's cohesion policy approach: there was no 
provision for long-term planning; a lack of individual regional knowledge led to a 
generalized distribution of expenditures over southern Italy rather than one that targeted 
particular areas; monitoring or evaluation procedures were deficient (Trigilia, 1992). 
Indeed, from 1989 to 1997, i. e. from the beginning of the first programming period to 
the middle of the second, each successive Italian government was barely interested in 
Structural Funds and totally incapable of managing them, on the one hand because the 
ministerial machinery was unable to handle such a complex policy, and on the other 
because national leaders preferred to reject the binding procedures of European funds in 
favour of the loose provisions attached to national sources of financing (Dyson and 
Featherstone, 1999: 464). 
The changes took time to produce results. As shown by the Structural Funds ex-post 
evaluation 1994/1999, 
"[t]hese instruments faced a series of obstacles in their implementation 
mostly due to the ongoing inadequacy of their administrative 
management... the increasing efficiency required by the new structural 
policies, the break-up of the traditional relationship between national and 
local government, and progressive devolution highlighted the necessity in 
some regions of re-designing and building new capacities" (Ismeri, 2002: 
220). 
Therefore, with the beginning of the CSF 2000-2006 the Dipartimento per le Politiche 
di Sviluppo e Coesione (DPS) (Department for Development and Cohesion policy), 
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which was set up in 1998, launched a campaign to promote regional administrative 
capacity: 
'The success of Structural Funds implementation requires a general 
upgrading of Public Administration. Complex programming requires a deep 
modernization of the regions' administrative structure. In order to guarantee 
the actual implementation of Funds at the regional level, it is necessary to set 
the conditions for the use of resources, to build the required capacity. " 
(Ministero del Tesoro, 2003: 207) 
The DPS played a significant role in re-orienting the Italian attitude towards European 
matters: its members for the first time saw the procedures ruling Structural Funds as an 
opportunity to promote and foster a process of administrative modernisation, rather than 
as being too binding and constraint, especially in southern regions where problems of 
ineffectiveness were more serious. More precisely, the DPS adopted a sort of 
"paternalistic" strategy, by which they helped and co-operated with regional 
administrations, but at the same time exercised strict control over them. Thus in 1998, 
nine years after the introduction of the EU's cohesion policy, Italy came into line with 
the dictates of the new approach in attempting to develop its less favoured regions - i. e. 
Objective 1 areas (cf. Chapter 4). 
The level of response, in terms of spending the available resources, has differed widely 
between regions, although they are placed within the same national context, from the 
consistently strong performance of Basilicata to the consistently weak one of Sicily 
(Table 1.2). How does the literature explain such a variation? 
1.6 The limitations of the existing literature 
The phenomenon of variation in Structural Funds implementation among the southern 
Italian regions has not previously been investigated. As I have already outlined, most of 
the established literature on Structural Funds overlooks the implementation stage and is 
more concerned with the final effect - i. e. the economic development. Recently, though, 
some studies have respectively highlighted factors such as "absorption capacity" (NEI, 
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2002; Horvat and Maier, 2005) and infrastructure deficit (Noetzel, 1997)as eventual 
reasons for the difference in regional implementation. 
As concerns specifically the Mezzogiorno, the most powerful established study focuses 
on social capital as the determinant variable (Putnam et al., 1993; Putnam et al., 1985, 
Leonardi et al., 1987). More recently, attention has also been paid to 
institutional/political factors (Piattoni, 1997,1998a, 1998b; Smyrl, 1997; Piattoni and 
Smyrl, 2002). These are the only studies that look at the implementation of policy. 
However, since they do not fully explain the variation we observe, I have identified the 
need to search for an alternative variable. 
1.6.1 Absorption capacity theory 
"Absorption capacity refers to a country's/region's ability to spend its 
allocated resources to meet the programme requirements, within the 
established timeframe" (CEC, 1999c: 74). 
Studies on absorption capacity ask whether countries/regions are in a position to spend 
their funds allocation (NEI, 2002; Horvat and Maier, 2005). Their argument justifies 
poor implementation by suggesting that the volume of resources exceeds what can be 
spent, given the existing economic structures. 
The above studies seemed to be based on the incorrect notion that Structural Funds are 
distributed equally among countries. Instead, in calculating the allocation for each 
country, the EC follows objective statistical criteria. These include 
"[e]ligible population, regional prosperity, national prosperity and the 
relative severity of the Structural problems, especially the level of 
unemployment" (Art. 29, Council Regulation n. 1260,1999). 
In the case of Italy, in order to deal with the complexity of underdeveloped areas, the 
Ministry of the Treasury takes into account additional criteria, including regional 
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infrastructure deficits, insularity, and size. " This suggests that the assignment of funds is 
meticulously calculated to avoid excessive or inadequate allocations. Furthermore, if we 
look at regional distribution per capita (Table 1.4), it is clear that Basilicata receives 
more than Sicily. Therefore, absorption capacity would suggest that Sicily, since it 
receives a smaller allocation of funds, should be able to spend more, but this is not the 
case. 
Table 1.4 Structural Funds allocations 
1989-1993 1994 -1999 2000 -2006 
Overall 
allocation 
in Meuro 
Per capita 
allocation in 
Meuro 
Overall 
allocation 
in Meuro 
Per capita 
allocation in 
Meuro 
Overall 
allocation 
in Meuro 
Per capita 
allocation in 
Meuro 
Basilicata 257 413 599 958 743 1,227 
Sardinia 265 160 967 576 1946 1,180 
Calabria 30 200 871 404 1994 974 
Sicily 759 147 1,557 294 3,858 759 
Campania 836 144 1,542 258 3,825 662 
Puglia 586 144 1,223 296 2,639 646 
Molise** 120 359 292 864 181 552 
Abruzzo* 167 132 234 182 
Source: Author's elaboration on IG«UL' data 
*Abru o in 1994/99 received funds until 1996; 
**Molise in 2000/06 received f Inds until 2003 
1.6.2 Economic conditions 
I am aware of just one study on the factors influencing the spending of structural money, 
namely the one carried out for the European Parliament's Directorate General for 
Research by R. Noetzel (1997). The study hypothesized a positive correlation between 
the expenditure rate and the regional infrastructure indicators: if the latter are low, then 
the region's need would be greater and promot more expenditure (and vice versa). The 
author concedes 
"... this condition is by no means a sufficient one to explain regional 
implementation" (Noetzel, 1997: 9). 
10 The dimension of the area is calculated in terms of the size of the population and the size of the territory 
(Ministero del Tesoro, 1999: 174). 
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Looking at my chosen case studies, the infrastructure grid of Sicily is low" when 
compared to that of Basilicata. Therefore, according to Noetzel's suggestion, Sicily 
should implement more resources, but, as Table 1.2 shows, this is not the case. 
A further explanation of differences in institutional performance has been economic 
development. By increasing the types of physical assets available to policy makers, by 
spreading education across the population and by eroding pre-modern, clientelistic ties, 
development should reduce the incentives on public officials to divert public resources 
and facilitate the management of public affairs (Lipset, 1960; Dahl, 1971). What is clear 
in the case of Basilicata is that, though the region started the pre-regionalist period 
(1950-70) from a level of economic development lower than that which existed in Sicily 
(Table 1.5), it is now, as shown previously in Table 1.3, among the regions with the 
highest GDP per capita. Leonardi (1987) believes that this is because it has been able to 
use the opportunities presented by the existence of the regional institution: that is, it has 
used the region's planning powers to begin a process of sustained economic growth that 
has outstripped the performance of Sicily and other southern Italian regions (Figure 1.1). 
Table 1.5 Gross Domestic Product per capita in 1950,1960,1970 ($US, EU=100) 
1950 1960 1 1970 
Basilicata 35 29 6 
Sicily 41 37 52 
Source: Leonardi (I 995), p. 90 
1.6.3 Social capital 
Many studies have tried to capture the meaning and measurement of institutional 
performance (Huntington, 1965; Gurr and McClelland, 1971). But in the context of my 
research, one of the most powerful studies on institutional performance is that carried 
out by Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti in three different periods: 1985,1987 and 1993. 
What do they mean by institutional performance? 
" In 1995, according to Confindustria data, the average index of infrastructure endowment was 66.3 in 
Sicily and 70.5 in Basilicata, against a figure of 100 for Italy as a whole. 
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"Institutions are devices for achieving purposes, not just for achieving 
agreements.... governments have to do things, not just decide things..... A 
high-performance democratic institution must be both responsive and 
effective: sensitive to the demands of its constituents and effective in using 
limited resources to address those demands" (Putnam et al., 1993: 8). 
The conception of institutional performance in their study relies on a very simple model 
of governance: 
"Government institutions receive inputs from their social environment and 
produce outputs to respond to that environment. " (Putnam et al., 1993: 9) 
A broader definition of institutional performance would therefore define it as the outputs 
of the institutions - i. e. the policies that are produced. 
In this framework, Putnam et al., who studied the difference in performance between 
northern and southern Italian regions over the period 1970-1990, ask a similar question: 
what can account for the variation in performance among the regions? The answer they 
reach is that it is based on the different social capital present in each region. Thus, in line 
with the finding of Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America (1969), Putnam et al. 
show that the different levels of economic development in the south and the north part of 
Italy are shaped by the local social context. The presence of strong social capital, 
defined as trust, norms and networks engagement, differentiates a civic community - 
found in the north - from an un-civic one - found in the south. The study claims that the 
lack of development of the southern regions compared to the northern part is down to the 
incapacity of the southerners to engage in collective enterprises because of their lack of 
trust in one another, whereas the mutual trust of the northerners has enabled them to 
engage in collective action, which is characteristic of a healthy and dynamic society. The 
main difference between collective and dyadic structures of interaction in the public 
sphere is that the first behaviour is based on deferred rewards whereas the second aims 
to gain immediate rewards. In economic terms the benefits of development must be seen 
in the long run and not in a short-term period. Looking for immediate rewards cannot 
create the basis for sustainable development. 
The cultural reason Putnam et al. (1993) find to explain the differences between north 
and south does not fully explain the even more marked differences among the regions of 
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the Mezzogiorno. Indeed, they claim that poor development affects the whole southern 
area and none of the southern regions is considered to be emerging. These claims appear 
incorrect when the decrease in the number of Objective 1 areas in 2000 confirmed there 
had been structural changes in southern Italy and showed that developing areas existed 
within its boundaries. The data presented in Table 1.2 clearly show that there are 
differences in implementing capacity between southern Italian regions, which cannot be 
disregarded when referring to "southern" underdevelopment. The findings of Putnam, et 
al. on social capital do not offer an explanation of the variation we observe. Indeed, their 
analysis reveals that, accordingly with their definition of social capital, civic tradition 
over the period 1860-1920 and civic community in 1970s in Sicily and Basilicata are 
similar (Putnam et al. 1993: 150-151 and Figures 5.2 and 5.3). If anything, the data show 
that Sicily has a slightly higher civic tradition than Basilicata. Therefore, the social 
capital explanation cannot account for the marked differences we have observed 
between those two regions in the Mezzogiorno. 
1.6.4 Political factors 
Simona Piattoni (1997) uses political factors to explain the economic success of some 
southern areas. Piattoni's extensive studies on some southern regions, e. g. Abruzzo and 
Puglia, clearly reveal that 
"the economic development of the former has depended on the ability of the 
political class to help the local economies tackle the necessary 
restructuring"(Piattoni, 1997: 314). 
Indeed, Clientelismo - the southern mode of political integration - is defined in two 
main different ways: "virtuous" and "ineffective" (Piattoni, 1997). The former applies to 
the "local political classes which are stable and cohesive and which also face a compact 
and sizeable opposition", and therefore decide to support economic development to 
maintain their position. The latter definition of clientelismo - i. e. "ineffective" - 
describes local political classes which are "unstable and fragmented and face a fissured 
and negligible opposition", and consequently inhibit any form of development. 
Piattoni's conclusion on the performance of political institutions suggests the following: 
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"It is not dictated by the structural context in which they are embedded, but 
is rather the result of the strategic and creative choices of the political actors 
who mould structural and contingent circumstances to their ends and, in so 
doing, redefine the context in which they operate. Southern economic 
development is possible if only the political class could find the internal 
cohesion and the external incentives to operate for its promotion. "(Piattoni, 
1997: 337) 
Likewise, Smyrl (1997) suggested that the success of some Italian regions in 
implementing cohesion policy was due to the "entrepreneurial" approach of regional 
elected authorities: 
"In successful regions, political leaders gave public priority and invested 
administrative and political resources to European programs in the hope of 
reaping future political gain. " (Smyrl, 1997: 289) 
These claims were supported in subsequent work (Piattoni and Smyrl, 2002) comparing 
two northern regions, Tuscany and Liguria, with Puglia and Abruzzo. 
I argue that an explanation of regional performances based only on political factors is 
limited. When we analyse the regional government we can distinguish the administrative 
machinery from the political class. The former's tasks are related to implementing daily 
procedures and policy decisions, while the role of the latter is instead to act as a leader 
in setting the goals the institution should reach. Therefore it is necessary that the 
regional government possesses adequate capacity to implement policies. The question 
here is, then, what capacity does the region need in order to improve its performance? Is 
it only a matter of having an efficient political class or it is necessary to improve 
administrative behaviour? Ultimately, how has the interaction between these two areas 
influenced the output? 
1.7 An alternative explanatory variable: administrative capacity 
The above review of the literature has shown that some factors -- social capital, 
absorption capacity, and economic factors - do not explain the variation we have 
observed in the implementation of the Funds. On the other hand, the political argument 
39 
supported by Piattoni's finding gives us a valid path to follow. In the current debate on 
regional development, political factors, especially the role of leadership, have gained in 
importance against over-deterministic cultural and economic approaches (Stolz, 2001). I 
do not dismiss the-relevance of these factors, but argue that political factors need to be 
analysed within the context of the administrative capacity of the regional machinery. 
Indeed, it is for the political level to make the right choices, but it is up to the 
administration to undertake actions correctly. The lack of administrative capacity in 
performing actions cannot be substituted by the willingness of the political class to do 
well. Research suggests that in most instances non-compliance with international 
agreements is not intentional but due to lack of state capacity (Brown, Weiss and 
Jacobson, 1998). 
Therefore, in explaining the emerging implementation differences among the southern 
regions, my argument is based on the importance of one variable: the administrative 
capacity of the regional administration. I suggest that administrative capacity relates to 
the ability of the institutions to fully and effectively carry out its duties and 
responsibilities. In this context, I refer to the management of Structural Funds policy 
according to their rules and procedures. Hence, I contend that administrative capacity is 
defined by four key actions: (1) Management; (2) Programming; (3) Monitoring; and (4) 
Evaluation (cf. Section 2.2.3). 
My hypothesis regarding the relevance of administrative capacity as the determinant 
variable is based upon the positive relationship outlined in Figure 1.1: regional 
governments have a Set of capacities and the degree to which they exist determines 
output (the quantitative implementation of resources measured by the expenditure rate). 
In order to improve output, existing capacity needs to be strengthened (first 
relationship). Consequently, once the resources are implemented they should produce a 
result (institutional outcomes) measured in terms of GDP growth (second relationship). 
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Figure 1.1 Administrative capacity -Output - Outcome 
Ist 2nd 
relationship relationship 
ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION Impact 
CAPACITY (output) outcome 
Management 
Programming % of expenditures GDP growth 
Monitoring 
Evaluation 
What we need to distinguish in this context, though, is the difference between outputs 
and outcomes. Putnam et al. (1993: 65) clearly explain this difference: 
"... While our evaluation of government must measure actions, not just 
words, we must be careful not to give governments credit (or blame) for 
matters beyond their control. In the language of policy analysis, we want to 
measure "outputs" rather than "outcomes" - implementation of programs 
rather than business profits. Profits are surely important but the reason for 
excluding them from our evaluation of government performance is simple: 
many things besides government influence socio-economic outcomes - i. e. 
profits represent entrepreneurial skill, worker diligence, world economic 
conditions and so on, that are beyond the control of any government". 
Therefore, the outcomes, in terms of "the socio-economic impact of policies", are not to 
be directly attributed to the regional government. Once the distinction between 
institutional and socio-economic outcomes is made clear, I can explain how it fits into 
my research. I will refer to institutional outputs (performance) in terms of 
"implementation of resources", whereas socio-economic outcomes are related to the 
increase of regional GDP per capita to reach the 75% of the EU average and therefore 
exit from the status of Objective I region. The regional government is responsible for 
the correct implementation of the resources, which if implemented appropriately have a 
greater chance of producing a positive economic impact, although the government can 
not be blamed for a lower growth of GDP because this can depend on many other 
factors, such as international economic trends. 
The model described in Figure 1.1 emphasizes the importance of capacity in explaining 
the policy output (expenditure rate) and ultimately the outcomes (GDP growth. ). I want 
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to clarify, though, that I am interested in establishing and investigating the first 
relationship. I leave the second link to be discovered and answered by the economists. 
My consideration of this aspect is simple: the Structural Funds have a greater chance of 
being effective and of promoting economic development if they are correctly 
implemented. Indeed, the fact that a region has an allocation of extra resources does not 
necessarily lead to any economic impact. If resources are not spent or are spent badly, 
they will not produce positive results (Leonardi, 2005: 79-86). 
At this point, a further and more analytically complicated question arises: if it is true that 
the variation in implementation of resources between regions can be explained by a 
different regional administrative capacity, then what is it that accounts for the different 
degree of administrative capacity at the regional level? Here, I introduce the second part 
of the central hypothesis, which is that administrative capacity might be influenced by 
political factors, namely political interference, government stability, and political 
accountability. This aspect will be thoroughly discussed in Section 2.3 
1.7.1 Finding implications 
There are three main areas that relate to my study: (i) administrative capacity; (ii) 
regional policy and cohesion policy; and (iii) public administration and regional 
performance. At the end of the study, if the two parts of my central hypotheses are 
correct, then I hope to identify: (1) a potential variable to explain differences in regional 
performance - i. e. administrative capacity; and 2) the role of political factors in 
eventually determining the features aquired by the four key components of 
administrative capacity. The implications of the findings will be thoroughly discussed in 
the concluding chapter (cf. Chapter 7). 
As well as the eventual contribution this study will make to the existing literature in the 
three areas identified above, there are also three sets of stakeholders potentially 
interested in the findings: (i) EU policy makers; (ii) national policy makers; and (iii) 
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regional government personnel at administrative as well as political levels in both old 
and new Member States (cf. Chapter 7). 
If I am wrong, and there is no correlation between administrative capacity and 
implementation of the Funds my research will still have provided valid evidence to the 
debate over which factors explain the different levels of institutional performance. 
Proving my hypothesis wrong will leave more space for other explanations of a purely 
economical nature. 
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
The body of the thesis is structured in three parts. The first part, which includes this 
chapter and Chapter 2, sets out the research question, the literature review and the 
method of analysis. 
In Chapter 2, I discuss extensively the process leading to the suggested definition of 
administrative capacity, the method of analysis and the indicators used to measure the 
existing degree of administrative capacity at regional level. I will present the case 
studies selected for testing the hypothesis. The method chosen for measuring the degree 
of each key action, based on the selected indicators, is by progressive stages: Absent; 
Starting; Developing; and Consolidated. This is an adaptation of the Institutional 
Development Framework (IDF) method used by the Centre for Development and 
Evaluation of USAID (2000). 
The core of my methodological approach is an in-depth case study of two regions. These 
regions were chosen to ensure that two contrasting performances were considered: Sicily 
provides an example of low implementation of Funds and Basilicata demonstrates one of 
high implementation. I expect to find a positive correlation between administrative 
capacity and Structural Funds implementation rates. 
After assessing the existing degree of administrative capacity I will further my study by 
investigating why administrative capacity varies between regions. In answering this 
second, more challenging, question I will investigate the interaction between the 
administrative and the political areas in order to, test the second part of my central 
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hypothesis that three main political factors, namely political interference, government 
stability, political accountability, might influence the performance of the administrative 
area. The corollary theory I aim to prove is two-fold: 
(1) each political factor has some bearing on each one of the administrative key 
components as follows: (a) the political interference influences the management; 
(b) the government stability determines the programming; and (c) the monitoring 
and evaluating is tied to the political accountability; and 
(2) the three political variables are correlated to eachother, as exemplified in the 
case studies investigated. 
Before embarking on the analysis of this second relationship, I will briefly test the 
competing explanations we find in the established literature, namely education, 
corruption, and centralization. 
Chapters 3 and 4 constitute the second part of the thesis. They present a retrospective 
analysis on the different phases of Italian regional policy and the political and 
administrative reforms that have taken place over time, and are structured to provide an 
interpretative framework for the case studies. 
Chapter 3 investigates the first period of regional policy in Italy, which covers the years 
1950-1992. It presents an historical analysis of the establishment of the regions as 
administrative and decision-making units. It characterizes the Italian approach to 
regionalization, which was strongly centralized and left little autonomy to the regions, 
thereby representing one of the causes of the accumulated inefficiency in their level of 
performance. 
Chapter 4 investigates the second period, 1992-2004, where profound changes were 
made in the approach taken to the economical and societal development of the 
Mez: ogiorno. These changes followed three concurrent events: the end of a 40-year top- 
down economic policy; the beginning of radical reform of the Public Administration 
(PA); and the devolution of political and administrative powers. I try to illustrate these 
changes with my regional case studies and to analyse how these changes led to a policy 
shift with regard to Structural Funds. 
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The third part of the thesis presents and discusses the results of the fieldwork. The 
investigation is performed over the three periods of implementation of the EU cohesion 
policy and the expenditure of Structural Funds - i. e. 1989-1993,1994-1999, and 2000- 
2006.12 Chapter 5 focuses on testing the first part of my central hypothesis by measuring 
the degree of the existing administrative capacity in the selected case studies. The data 
collection uses three techniques to ensure the reliability of the findings: (1) document 
analysis; (2) interviews - i. e. questionnaires and semi-structured interviews; and (3) 
direct observation. The investigation presented in this chapter provides evidence towards 
answering my first question; i. e., what determines the variation in Structural Funds 
implementation? 
Chapter 6 will tackle the second question, which asks why administrative capacity varies 
across regions, and will test the second part of my central hypothesis. In order to 
undertake the analysis I use the same three techniques as in Chapter 5 to examine the 
three political factors - political interference, government stability and political 
accountability - which I hypothesize influence the feaures that constitute administrative 
capacity. The chapter will examine the relation between political interference and 
management, between government stability and programming outputs, and between 
political accountability on monitoring and evaluation. It is hoped that this analysis will 
identify factors that have contributed to the high degree of administrative capacity in 
Basilicata and the low administrative performance in Sicily. 
Following my research, the concluding chapter (Chapter 7) positions my findings in the 
literature by discussing their limitations and their added value. There are three main 
areas that relate to my study: (i) administrative capacity; (ii) regional policy and 
cohesion policy; and (iii) public administration. Finally I will suggest future steps 
forward for the continuation of research in the area. 
12 This last period will be analyzed until 2004 
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Chapter 2 
Administrative capacity: hypothesis and methods of analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the research question - why some regions implement 
more Structural Funds than do others? - and presented empirical evidence of the marked 
regional intra-south variation. Secondly, it reviewed the existing literature in search of 
an explanation. It established the lack in the literature of an in-depth analysis of the 
implementation process, given that the vast majority of authors have been more 
concerned with the policy-making process or the final economic impact of the resources 
on the regional socio-economic structure. After suggesting and showing the importance 
of the implementation stage, I have demonstrated that the observed regional variation in 
terms of expenditure is not fully explained by social capital theory, absorption capacity, 
or economic factors, which makes room for research into other possible explanations. In 
doing this, my investigation aims to further the hypothesis that suggests administrative 
capacity as a means of explaining regional differences in performance. 
Answering this query has, however, prompted a further question: if it is true that the 
variation in implementation of resources among regions can be explained by a different 
regional administrative capacity, then, what is it that determines the degree of this 
capacity at the regional level? As anticipated in Chapter 1, I believe that the features 
aquired by the four key components that constitute administrative capacity are 
influenced by political factors, namely political interference, government stability and 
political accountability. 
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The aim of this chapter, which is divided into three sections, is to develop the two parts 
of the central hypothesis, the methodology and the case studies for answering my two 
main questions. 
Section 2.2 discusses the first part of the central hypothesis and introduces the definition 
of the terms used in the research. Firstly, it explores the concept of administrative 
capacity and its relevance to cohesion policy; secondly, it reviews the literature on 
administrative capacity, examining the various definitions and approaches which have 
been suggested by other authors; thirdly, it reviews the various approaches to the study 
of administrative capacity that exist in the established literature; and finally, it concludes 
with the characterization I give to the term. 
In exploring and reviewing the concept and substance of administrative capacity, there is 
one main problem to overcome, and this needs to be declared from the outset in my 
analysis. It is, simply, that what the literature offers is too general and too broad. This is 
an obstacle to attempts to find an assessment of administrative capacity with the aim of 
developing a common understanding across countries of what capacity actually is and 
what capacity would be required for various forms of implementation activities. 
Therefore, my characterization of administrative capacity aims to be more specific in 
order to be operationalizable and applicable across countries. Naturally, some of the 
specification will be related to resource implementation, but it will be easily applied to 
any financial resource and not merely to Structural Funds. 
Section 2.3 discusses the second part of the central hypothesis. It introduces the question 
of why administrative capacity varies among regions. Many authors seem to agree on 
the role played by three variables in determining administrative capacity variation, 
namely education (North, 1992; Berg, 1993), national government configuration 
(Gualini, 2004; Marks, 1996) and corruption (Mauro, 1998). Firstly, the educational 
level seems to be similar in both of my case studies. Secondly, although a centralized 
approach to regional policy such as the one adopted by the Italian government has acted 
as an external constraint on building regional capacity, this has affected all of the 
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southern regions equally, and so it is far from being an explanatory variable. Instead, 
what is relevant to understand is why regions have reacted to this top-down approach in 
different ways (this will be extensively discussed in Chapter 3). Finally, I am not 
considering corruption as a valid explanation due to the uncertainty concerning the 
corruption index and its impact. Indeed, the vast literature on southern Italy and on 
Sicily in particular looks at corruption related to mafia as the sole or primary reason for 
the institutional output, but again this affirmation is close to being speculative rather 
than constituting a generalizable or measurable variable. 
Finally, Section 2.4 identifies potential indicators to measure the degree of 
administrative capacity in regions and presents the selected case studies, namely Sicily 
and Basilicata. As discussed in Chapter 1, these two regions represent two extremes of 
Structural Funds implementation, from very low in the case of Sicily to very high in the 
case of Basilicata. 
2.2 Defining administrative capacity 
2.2.1 Administrative capacity in the existing literature 
My review begins by analysing a new trend of thought that has recently developed and 
focuses on building administrative capacity in order to improve Structural Funds 
implementation in the CEECs (Shoylekova, 2004; Kun-Buczko, 2004). Studies on the 
EU-15 are rare, which seems unfair given that administrative capacity is an issue for all 
EU countries. 
It was during the negotiations with the CEECs for EU accession that interest in 
administrative capacity first emerged (Bollen, 2001). It became clear that 
"[s]tates with weak administrative capacity at the regional and local levels 
were more likely to have serious problems with the mismanagement of 
funds, or even with accessing them" (Hughes et al., 2004a: 532-533). 
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The EC recognized that the allocation of Structural Funds to new Member States had to 
be underpinned by a capacity building programme, in order for these countries to 
develop adequate administrative and management skills (CEC, 1999b). Chapter 21 of 
the acquis communautairc states that 
"[t]he candidate countries have to define clear tasks and responsibilities of 
all the bodies and institutions involved in Structural Funds preparation and 
implementation, and have to ensure appropriate administrative capacity" 
(CEC, 2004a: 68). 
As enlargement progressed, administrative capacity requirements grew in importance 
and complexity - from "administrative capacity" to "institution building" (Dimitrova, 
2002; Hughes et al., 2004b: 85-118). To help achieve these goals the CEECs were 
supported by the Phare programme whose first priority, "institution building", was 
defined as the process of helping candidate countries to develop the structures, 
strategies, human resources and management skills needed to strengthen economic, 
social, regulatory and administrative capacity (Papantoniadou, 2004). However, neither 
a clear definition of administrative capacity nor a strong and coherent assessment model 
can be found in the existing literature (Dimitrova, 2002; Hughes et al., 2004a: 534). 
Current thinking on capacity is significantly broader than the definitions applied ten 
years ago. Capacity is closely linked with performance. Improvement and development 
of capacities is in turn linked with strategic management to ensure that performance 
directly reflects the objectives of the organization and the system (Milen, 2001: 4). In 
recent years, many authors have focused on the weakness of the institutions in 
responding either to the goals set by policies or to the demand of the society. 
In general, capacity has been defined as 
"the ability to perform appropriate tasks effectively, efficiently and 
sustainably" (Hilderbrand and Grindle, 1994: 15), 
or as 
"the ability to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve 
objectives" (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2002: 3). 
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What makes a country able to perform a function, solve a problem or achieve an 
objective? This is very country-specific, since a country's approach to a particular 
problem will be embedded in its complex history, institutional setting and social fabric. 
The approach that Fukuda-Parr suggests is that a country should determine the actions 
that it is willing to take, and then assess what capacity such actions require. Indeed, 
research suggests that most instances of non-compliance with international agreements 
are not intentional, but are caused by lack of state capacity (Brown Weiss and Jacobson, 
1998). If the gap between existing capacity and the capacity that is required is too large 
for a-particular policy option, it could become virtually impossible for a country to abide 
by what it has committed to do, either domestically or internationally. In this framework, 
the level of existing capacities in a country is likely to define the next step it can take. 
However, it is also hoped that, with each step, capacity will grow, so as to allow for a 
progressive strengthening of actions over time. 
Other authors (Mentz, 1997; North, 1992) argue that administrative capacity is related to 
personal capacity, since any administration is staffed with civil servants, and therefore it 
is their capacity that ultimately determines service delivery. Similarly, Cohen's (1993) 
definition of capacity in the public sector is linked to the strengthening of human 
resources (managerial, professional and technical), particularly institutions, and to 
provide 
"[t]hose institutions with the means whereby these resources can be 
marshalled and sustained effectively to perform planning, policy 
formulation, and implementation tasks throughout government on any 
priority topic" (Cohen, 1993: 10). 
Cohen's approach to capacity appears to be narrower, more operational and more 
oriented towards problem solving. Still, it does not tell us what capacity is required, or 
how we are to assess administrative capacity. The question here is: what capacity does 
the region need in order to improve its performance? 
As I will discuss in the next two sections, I believe that regional government 
performance has to be considered from two points of view: first, with regard to the 
administrative capacity necessary to implement a policy; once this is established and 
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assessed, the second step is to isolate those factors that cause variation in administrative 
capacity. 
In order to find more answers I must review the literature on institutional capacity, 
which encompasses the whole organization rather than just the administrative sphere. 
Although this latter is a broader concept than administrative capacity, it is worth looking 
at the existing defintion of institutional capacity, in order to have some support in 
formulating my definition of adminstrative capacity. How capacity is defined determines 
what kind of strategies and actions should be taken in order to improve its output. 
2.2.2 The road to a definition of administrative capacity 
"Although many have become increasingly aware of the importance of 
institutional capacity in achieving development, there is certain despair on 
what can be done to improve it. That despair derives from the difficulty of 
improving a country's public administration or of getting certain agencies to 
perform adequately" (Israel, 1987: 2). 
The international development community is increasingly focusing on institutional 
capacity as one of the missing elements in any successful development strategy. This 
was inevitable in light of accumulating evidence that development programmes failed 
because of institutional and managerial weaknesses (World Bank, 1983). Broadly, the 
literature views institutional capacity as a means to achieve higher-level program results 
(USAID, 2000). 
The concept of institutional capacity is constantly changing. Institutions are not just 
discrete organizations (e. g. government agencies), but also, more generally, are sets of 
rules, procedures or practices that prescribe behavioural roles for actors, constrain 
activity, and shape expectations (Keohane, 1988). Institutions are durable; they are 
sources of authority (formal or informal) that structure repeated interactions of 
individuals, companies, civil societal groups, governments and other entities. Thus, 
institutional capacity represents a broader "enabling environment" which forms the basis 
upon which individuals and organizations interact. In this context, training individuals 
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and strengthening organizations can only succeed in the long term if it is consistent with 
existing institutions, or if it helps transform these institutions, so that actions are based 
on rules, processes and practices that can be sustained over time (Willems and Baumert, 
2003). 
The existing approaches to defining and studying institutional capacity can be classified 
under three main headings: systemic approach, functional approach, and constituent 
approach. I have used a combination of these three approaches to define my 
operationalisation of administrative capacity. 
The systemic approach is based on the notion that institutional capacity has developed 
over time: 
"the concept of institutional capacity is a moving target since the field has 
evolved over the years from an initial focus on building and strengthening 
individual organizations and providing technical and management training to 
support integrated planning and decision-making processes between 
institutions. [.... ] Today, institutional capacity often implies a broader focus 
of empowerment, social capital, and an enabling environment, as well as the 
culture, values and power relations that influence us" (Segnestam et al., 
2002: 10). 
This approach is characterized by the assumption of the inherently systemic nature of 
institutional capacity and conduct into a broader definition that distinguishes between 
three levels of institutional capacity (Forss & Venson, 2002 as quoted in Willems and 
Baumert 2003: 11): a micro level, i. e. the individual; a meso level, i. e. the organization; 
and a macro level, i. e. the broad institutional context. The broad institutional context 
itself includes three distinct levels. This means that there are five distinct levels of 
capacity, as shown in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 A broader definition of institutional capacity 
j The broader context 
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Source: Willems and Baumert 2003 adapted from Forss & Venson 
Willems and Baumert warn that such a broad definition of institutional capacity, which 
includes social norms, values and practices, could be viewed as "blurring any distinction 
between ability and willingness to implement a particular policy or international 
commitment" (Willems and Baumert, 2003: 15). They continue with a clear example of 
how this could happen: 
"... a Party could argue that it has in a narrow sense the ability of taking on a 
particular commitment, because it has sufficient human and financial 
resources to do so, but that its own civil society is not ready to accept this 
particular policy, because of its own values or way of life. Is this national 
government not willing, or not able, to implement a particular policy or 
commitment? " (Willems and Baumert, 2003: 17) 
My research focuses on assessing the capacity an institution needs in order to implement 
a policy, and what factor causes variations in that capacity. In my definition of 
administrative capacity I do not include social norms, values and practices so as to avoid 
any of the "blurring" suggested by Willems and Baumert. 
A second approach to institutional capacity, labelled a functional approach, is to analyse 
the functions that need to be performed in order to achieve a policy objective. Any 
policy process must include different functions in order to be successful. These functions 
can be grouped into three distinct phases of the policy process: (1) national assessment, 
strategies and goals; (2) policy design and implementation; and (3) monitoring, 
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reporting, review and enforcement. These phases may overlap in time, but essentially 
follow a logical order. The challenge of any policy process is to be able to perform all 
such functions in an efficient manner, given that they are interdependent. Thus, capacity 
is needed for each of these functions if the policy process is to be sustained over time 
(Willems and Baumert, 2003). 
Willems and Baumert argue that in most countries there is often an imbalance in the 
capacities devoted to each of these clusters of functions. In some cases, most capacity 
development is devoted to the actual implementation of policies, with little capacity left 
for strategic assessment. This may result in the lack of a long-term view and in badly 
designed policies. A lack of capacity in the monitoring and reporting area may lead to 
difficulties in sustaining policy efforts, given that information that might improve 
policies over time would be lacking. In other cases, it may be that a sophisticated 
strategy has been formulated, but there are no means to implement it. 
The constituent approach is the third approach that appears in the literature. It defines 
the concept of institutional capacity through a list of constituent elements. This is the 
case for, among others, Loubser (1993) and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID, 2000). The former compiled a list of the elements of capacity: 
"specified objectives, including vision, values, policies, strategies and 
interests; efforts, including will (motivation, drive) energy, concentration, 
work ethic and efficiency; capabilities, including intelligence, skills, 
knowledge and mental sets; resources, including human (for collective 
participants), natural, technological (infrastructure), cultural and financial; 
and work organization, including planning, designing, sequencing and 
mobilizing" (Loubser, 1993: 23). 
USAID, defines institutions as an organization, or a system of related components that 
work together to achieve an agreed mission. It therefore identifies a list of organizational 
components (Table 2.1), which is neither all-inclusive nor universally applicable to all 
organizations. Rather, the components are representative of those of most organizations 
involved in development work and will vary according to the type of organization and 
the context in which it functions. Consequently, the institutional capacity of the chosen 
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organization13 is given by the combination and performance in the areas which are 
fundamental for the organization to succeed in its task. 
Table 2.1 List of components 
AREAS KEY COMPONENTS 
Administrative and Administrative procedures and management systems; Financial management 
Support Functions (budgeting, accounting, sustainability), Human resource management (staff 
recruitment, placement, support), Management of other resources 
Resources Human; Financial; Other 
Technical/Program Service delivery system; Programme planning; Programme monitoring and 
Functions evaluation, Use and management of technical knowledge and skills 
Structure and Culture Organizational identity; Vision and purpose; Leadership capacity and style; 
(Political Organization) Organizational values; Governance approach, External relations 
Source: USAIU Center for Development [njormatton ana Gvatuanon f cuvv). 
Finally, some authors have suggested that institutional capacity might be the result of the 
combination of two or more areas/dimensions. Joseph White (2003) argues that 
"[g]overnment institutional. capacity has two dimensions: whether the 
instruments of government per se are adequate to a task, and whether a 
specific government has the necessary powers and resources" (White, 
2003: 6). 
Defining institutional capacity as the result of instrument/tasks and power creates a 
tautological process that does not leave space for intervening variables. Indeed, if both 
the political power and the administrative tasks are incorporated in the definition as 
being equally important, there will be nothing left to hypothesize what influences the 
functioning of the government instruments. This is the main reason why my 
investigation is divided into two parts, which disentangle the administrative sphere from 
the political (cf. Section 2.3). 
13 Local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society organizations 
(CSOs); Community-based membership cooperatives, such as a water users group; Networks and 
associations of organizations; Political parties; Government entities (ministries, departments, agencies, 
subunits, policy analysis units, health clinics, schools); Private sector organizations (financial institutions, 
companies, small businesses and other for-profit organizations); Regional institutions 
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2.2.3 Administrative capacity in my study 
As shown in the previous section, the definitions of administrative capacity found in the 
literature are too general and do not tell us very much about which activities should be 
performed. However, while investigating the broader concept of institutional capacity, I 
have found useful benchmarks and inspirations that will help formulate a novel 
definition of administrative capacity, which will allow us to measure the concept 
empirically. 
In the context of Structural Funds policy, as in any other policy area, reaching a 
definition of administrative capacity requires an understanding of what it is that we are 
trying to achieve. Bearing this in mind should allow us to achieve a definition that is 
narrower, more operational and more oriented towards problem solving than the existing 
ones. Indeed, as Honadle points out, 
"[djeiinitions of capacity vary to the extent to which they specify the 
activities that should be performed versus the results that are sought. It is 
unlikely that a consensus definition of "capacity" will ever be reached. 
Nevertheless, a reasonably integrated framework for pursuing this Holy 
Grail would help capacity builders map a sensible course" (Honadle, 1981: 
575-576). 
In pursuing such a goal, I suggest that administrative capacity is related to the ability of 
institutions to manage Structural Funds policy according to their own rules and 
procedures. I therefore propose that administrative capacity should be defined as being 
characterised by four key actions: (1) Management; (2) Programming; (3) Monitoring; 
and (4) Evaluation. As I have already stated, this choice is based on a combination of the 
three approaches emerging from the literature review, a thorough scrutiny of the 
principles and structures of Structural Funds, '4 and an analysis carried out by Boijmans 
(2003). The four actions are defined in the following section. 
The four key components of administrative capacity 
I believe that high performance in the administrative area is determined by the 
functioning of the four key determinants defined above. Therefore, the intra-south 
14 The relevance and part of the definition of the four key components are suggested by Council 
Regulation n. 1260/99, n. 2052/88, n. 2081/93. 
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variation we observe in Italy could be explained through the analysis of each key 
determinant within the regional government. 
I will outline below the definition of, and the expectation associated with, each key 
component, in terms of improving Structural Funds implementation. I will also introduce 
the indicators suggested to measure the performance of each action. These indicators 
will be thoroughly discussed in Section 2.4.1 
1) Management covers overseeing the correct implementation of the overall 
programme. In the case of the Structural Funds development programme, the 
responsibility for each single Operational Programme is allocated to the Managing 
Authority (MA), which are appointed by the Member States (Council Regulation 
n. 1260/99, Art. 9). The responsibilities and power of the MA have increased over 
time. Their tasks cover the implementation, correct management and effectiveness 
of the programmes (collection of statistical and financial data, preparation and 
transmission to the Commission of annual reports, organization of the mid-term 
evaluation, etc. ). The establishment of a MA at the regional level, which is in 
charge of the overall management of the funds, is necessary given that there are 
many actors and departments involved. Indeed, each department will pursue the 
implementation of the funds allocated to it. In fact the funds cover various areas of 
intervention - natural resources, human resources, cultural resources, local 
development, agriculture, transport, environment, etc. - so it is necessary that the 
most appropriate departments are in a position to manage them. This could lead to 
a department acting in an isolated fashion and dealing only with its own part of the 
funds, without an overall vision of the whole programme. It is necessary that the 
funds are implemented following an integrated logic among the various 
departments. This is possible if the regional MA provides an efficient horizontal 
coordination. 
A second element that emerged from a thorough examination of primary and 
secondary sources15 is the unclear division of responsibilities in day-to-day 
" Documentation used includes the evaluation reports of other European Union Objective 1 regions. I 
have been working for a consultancy firm appointed by the European Commission to carry out the 
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activities. This uncertainty leads most of the time to a duplication of workload and 
confusion. Indeed, a survey carried out in 2003 by ÖIR, Managementdienste 
GmbH, provided evidence to suggest the following: 
"When management structures are clearly defined, with roles and 
coordination processes well implemented, the system works well. 
In the case studies that have been completed for this survey, this is 
the situation in Alentejo, Burgenland, Ireland, Saxony, Spain, 
Valencia, Portugal POE, Italy, France, Lorraine, East Midlands, 
Bavaria, Veneto. This is not to say that there are no problems in 
these regions, but there exists a solid basis on which to resolve the 
practical problems as they emerge. Where management structures 
are not clearly defined, as for example in cases where newly 
devolved structures are just being implemented, there are problems. 
This is clear from the case studies of Wales, Greece Transport, 
Finland, Central Macedonia. " (ÖIR, 2003: 129) 
Taking into account the above observation, I propose two indicators, which can 
measure the functioning of the Managing Authority, namely: 
a) coordination between each level involved; and 
b) clarity of the roles carried out by personnel. 
Through the measurement of these indicators, we can understand the degree and 
quality of management present in each region. 
2) Programming is conducted on a multi-annual basis and involves the determination 
of objectives to be achieved against the background of an analysis of the socio- 
economic context, SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and 
Threats), and the identification of priorities and measures capable of converting 
these objectives into projects, in which to invest the available funds. If the 
identification of the priorities is incorrect, it will be difficult to spend the 
resources. Programming is not just at the heart of the Structural Funds 
implementation system, but is a key factor in any public policy. Although the 
principles and the main concept of programming have not changed over the three 
periods considered, the demands on the quality of the programme documents have 
Assessment of Mid-Term Evaluation Report of Spain, UK, and Ireland. This appointment has allowed me 
to familiarize myself with the problems encountered by these countries in administrating the funds. 
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increased significantly. A primary factor that influences the implementation of 
resources is the preparation of the multi-annual development plans, 16 based on 
national and regional priorities, which include two fundamental requirements: 
program design and program decisions. In the first case it is necessary to have: a 
precise description of the socio-economic context of the region (disparities, lags, 
potential development) based on a SWOT analysis; a determination of the most 
appropriate strategy for achieving the previously identified objectives; and 
indications as to the use and form of the contribution from the Funds. Secondly, it 
is important that the time lapse between the approval of the national document and 
the regional document is as short as possible to avoid wasting time. '? 
In light of the above remarks, I suggest the following two indicators, in order to 
measure the functioning of the programming activities: 
a) program design; and 
b) program approval. 
3) Monitoring aims to ensure that projects are implemented according to agreed 
strategic priorities. It involves an exhaustive and regular examination of the 
resources, outputs and results of public interventions, based on a system of pre- 
established indicators. It verifies the sound management of the interventions and 
produces a regular analysis of the progress of programme outputs (Council 
Regulation n. 1260/99, Art. 36). 
The logic behind monitoring is two-fold. First, it gives the MA updated 
information on the pace of expenditure, so that it can intervene and adjust the 
implementation in progress in case of problems or delays. The need for a 
monitoring system has always been stated in the regulations, but in the first two 
16 The Member States submit programming documents to the Commission following its general 
guidelines. Programming documents can take the form of Community Support Frameworks (CSFs) 
translated into Operational programmes (OPs), or Single Programming Documents (SPDs), comprising a 
single document approved by the Commission, which combines information on the overall plan and the 
indication of how the OP will be implemented. For Objective I regions a CSF is required at the national 
level which is then translated into operational programmes at the regional level, i. e., Regional Operational 
Programmes (ROPs). 
17 This is because the national development plan is set for a period of five years (or more), and so the 
regional plan needs to respect that timeframe in terms of start and end dates. 
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planning periods its role was not clearly defined. It was in the latest planning 
period, 2000-2006, that it became a crucial element in the implementation of the 
funds. Detailed monitoring of a multitude of indicators measuring the output, 
results and impact of each measure has resulted in a significant data management 
challenge for programme implementation. Where the monitoring activities have 
been carried out properly this has favoured the implementation of the programme 
and expenditure of resources. 
I suggest the following indicators to assess the functioning of the monitoring 
system: 
a) Introduction of a system of indicators and of monitoring procedures 
responding to nationally agreed standards. 
b) Guaranteeing the availability of financial, physical and procedural data. 18 
4) Evaluation judges programme implementation on the basis of the outputs, results 
and impact on society. 
"The purpose of evaluation is to check the raison d'etre of a public 
intervention, to confirm both reproducible success stories and 
failures not to be repeated. " (CEC, 1999c: 55) 
The capacity to evaluate the results of the implemented resources is relevant at 
three different stages: ex-ante, in itinere, and ex post (Council Regulation n. 
1260/99, Art. 40). Ex-ante evaluation serves to clarify the needs of the territory and 
The three monitoring types are as follows: 
1) Financial data: Monitoring of the financial indicators concerning the effective costs incurred by final 
beneficiaries. The data, collected for each project and gathered by measure, are benchmarked with the 
financial plan (as detailed in the priority axis and measure) of each OP, both Regional and Sectoral, and 
Programme Complement. The financial indicators of performance are monitored on a quarterly basis. 
2) Physical data: Monitoring of the project physical data, collected into a grid of shared indicators as 
stated by the CSF Managing Authority. Monitoring activities concern implementation, performance and 
impact indicators reported in the OPs and Programme Complements. 
The performance and impact indicators are estimated during the evaluation on the basis of monitoring data 
available for each project and measure. The physical indicators of performance are monitored on annual 
basis. 
3) Procedural data: Monitoring provided for all OPs, both Regional and Sectoral, up to the launch round of 
projects, and implemented through the definition of survey sheets by activity type and measure-based 
data-collection models. Data collected at project level (through a significance limit and the choice of the 
procedural pathway to be monitored). The procedural indicators of performance are monitored twice a 
year, on a six-monthly basis. 
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to verify the existence and nature of the problems within the territory; it helps to 
ensure that the final programme is as relevant and coherent as possible. The mid- 
term evaluation (in itinere) is performed halfway through implementation of the 
interventions, and it serves to highlight and adjust eventual deficiencies. An ex- 
post evaluation serves to examine whether the needs or problems still exist and 
whether the programme has achieved the expected results. Ex post evaluation 
provides exceptional support and guidance to the administration in programming 
future financial interventions and organizing the implementation of actions so that 
subsequent programming cycles are successful. Therefore, where such a task has 
been carried out internally, the regional government is in a much better position to 
learn from past mistakes increase the rate of implementation in future 
programming efforts. 
From my perspective, it is fundamental that the regional MAs have the capacity to 
evaluate - collect and analyse data - on a continuous basis. At present, evaluations 
are contracted out to private independent companies according to the dictates of 
the EU regulations. Thus there is a large reliance on the outside professional 
community for evaluation skills and competencies in providing independent 
analysis and aiding the regions in the process of institutional learning. 
In light of the above remarks, two benchmarks appear to be adequate to gauge the 
functioning of the evaluation system: 
a) Production of evaluation reports accordingly to the three stages in time; 
b) Integration of the evaluation method and culture in the implementation 
system. 
It can be argued that other components of the administrative arena should be taken into 
account, but I will demonstrate that the ones included here are not only the most relevant 
in accounting for variation in the implementation of resources, but are also the tools the 
institution needs to deal with any public policy. 
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The cutminist Yltii'e capacity loop 
My definition of administrative capacity encompasses both the activities that the 
regional government should he performing and the results it should he achieving. 
Taken as a whole these actions create a framework which operates as a system - i. e. the 
key components are related to each other so that the outcome of' each one is closely 
related to the other. This creates a loop where if every action is performed correctly, a 
high level of Structural Funds implementation occurs (Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2 .2 Administrative capacity loop 
1. Management 
" Ex-post 
4. Evaluation " Ex-ante 
" Initinere 
2. Programming 
uutrui- 3. Monitoring 
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uclmiIli. wruti%'e c'upuc'ii\'. 
In sum, a conceptual framework for administrative capacity should include all cif these 
components. Individually, none can provide a sufficient definition of capacity. 
2.3 Interlocked question: what determines the degree of administrative capacity? 
Once I have tested whether the variation in Structural Funds implementation is 
determined by the regional administrative capacity (cf. Chapter 5) - i. e. the first part of 
the central hypothesis - my subsequent aim will he to find out which factors determine 
the degree of administrative capacity of a region, i. e. why administrative capacity varies 
across regions (cf. Chapter 6). 
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2.3.1 The definition of political factors 
The second part of my central hypothesis concerns the role of internal political factors in 
contributing to variation of administrative capacity. In this context, my work finds 
strong support in two publications by Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, namely La Pianta e 
le radici (1985), and Il Caso Basilicata (1987). 
The starting question of their research was: why do some institutions (regions) succeed 
and others fail? What they meant by "succeed" was the capacity of the institution to 
fulfil its goals in an efficient way in order to satisfy the various interests (Putnam et al., 
1985). The two studies answer this question by examining, respectively, contextual 
factors and endogenous factors. 19 They do not only examine the socio-cultural aspects, 
but highlight the influence of the political factor on regional performance: 
"Responsible for the weakness of the regional administrative performance 
was the political class, which in recruiting the staff was driven by clientelism 
and party affiliation criteria rather than expertise and qualification criteria. " 
(Putnam et al., 1985: 347) 
'The higher performance of Basilicata over the period 1970/1984 is due to 
the extraordinary role played by a small group of regional dirigenti, who 
have collaborated with unusual solidarity. " (Leonardi et al., 1987: 32) 
Hence, we must examine the behaviour of the relevant individuals within the institutions 
to understand how they may influence the degree of administrative capacity. Much of 
the literature on public institutions is concerned with how politics and political interests 
with competing agendas constrain institutions' technical capacity: 
"It is rare to encounter a significant instance where political leaders make 
serious and concerted attempts to structure institution for the explicit 
purpose of increasing its capacity to design and implement policy in a 
particular domain. " (Desveaux, 1995: 7) 
The above was the case for southern Italian regional government. As I mentioned in 
Chapter 1, Simona Piattoni (1997,1998a; 1998b; 2002), among others, has extensively 
studied political aspects and reached the conclusion that 
19 Contextual factors are: socio-economic development; political culture; and social stability. Endogenous 
factors are: conflict within the regional government (giunta); conflict within the regional legislative body 
(consiglio); and external conflict with the national and local government. 
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"the explanation of the differentiation in policy efficiency among various 
regional governments does not lie in their formal institutional layout, which 
is identical, nor in their informal institutional capacities, be they embodied in 
civicness or strong regional identity. Rather, it lies in the different capacity 
and willingness of the regional political class to promote the adequate 
requirements for implementing the funds.... Politics, far from being 
irrelevant or altogether deleterious for southern development, has played a 
fundamental role in the development of the most successful southern 
regions" (Piattoni, 1998b: 50). 
Similarly, Felia Allum and Marco Cilento (2001) successfully tested the hypothesis that 
the charisma, personality and commitment of politicians can have a genuine effect on 
the improvement of regional performance. In their article, "Parties and Personalities", 
which recounts the case of Bassolino, former Mayor of Naples, they show how the 
charismatic leader carried out the so-called "Bassolino revolution" to change the city 
fundamentally. He introduced a new form of leadership, a new style of governing and a 
new style of policy-making, which demonstrated the novel form of development that 
was possible in Naples. 
On the specific issue of regional policy implementation, Mark Smyrl (1997) has 
identified two factors that seem to improve the effectiveness of regional empowerment 
in the implementation process: political engagement within and on behalf of the region, 
and the institutional capacity to build and sustain a Regional Policy. 
Regional empowerment required political engagement in two senses. Firstly, regional 
political leaders had to be prepared to act as animators on European issues, mobilizing 
economic and social interests. Secondly, national state actors working with the region on 
CSF programmes had to define their function as a proactive "bridge" linking to Brussels 
rather than as a "gatekeeper" barring the way. They too needed to recognise their role as 
mobiliser (in this case of state services on behalf of the region) and as external 
spokesperson, and to identify in those roles a greater potential for influence than derives 
from the more formal, "gatekeeper" function. 20 According to Smyrl, the empowerment 
20 An example is the Scottish Highlands and Islands Objective I program prior to and after 1997 
(Leonardi, 2004). 
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of the regions heavily depends on whether, and if so how, opportunities are perceived at 
the regional level and on the constructive (or unconstructive) way in which regional 
political leaders and regional state officials respond to those opportunities. 
Following this strain of literature, my hypothesis on the relevance of the political factors 
suggests that the political component exercises an impact on the administrative 
machinery and consequently on the policy output and outcome. Therefore, the aim of my 
study is to characterize a model of political behaviour that influences the key actions of 
administrative capacity and eventually determines its variation across regions. The 
political aspects I will consider - i. e. political interference, government stability, and 
political accountability - are defined as follows. 
Political interference refers to the restrictive or disruptive and invasive action of the 
political class towards the administrative sphere. It is benchmarked by the formal and 
informal separation of powers and responsibilities between the two spheres of activities. 
In order to be capable of saying what a public organization will do (and how it will do 
those things) we must first have some conception of who will perform its tasks and for 
what purposes. There should be a clear distinction between administrative 
responsibilities and the political arena of power. In Chapter 4I will discuss the 1990 
reform of public employment in Italy. Indeed, recognizing that a major source of delays 
and inefficiency was the working methods and general attitude both of the political class 
and the civil service, in 1993 (D. lgs. 29/1993) Italy embarked on a series of reforms, 
which it has pursued more strongly since 1998, whose aims were three-fold: (1) to de- 
politicize the civil service; (2) to separate the political sphere from administrative tasks; 
and (3) to instil new management practices across the Public Administration (PA) 
system. The outcome of these reforms was a formalization of the separation of power, 
under which the political leader cannot, in any circumstances, revoke, reform, reserve 
for himself, remove to a higher level, or otherwise adopt provisions or actions which are 
the responsibilities of an administrator. These reforms were first implemented at the 
national level and then put into practice at the regional level, although not all of the 
regions adopted it at the same time. 
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Government stability2' through the entire period of tenure - i. e. five years - ensures 
continuity and coherence in the programming process. I define a government as stable 
when it has an average of one or two cabinets for each five-year legislature. Conversely, 
a government is unstable if it has witnessed more than three cabinets in each five-year 
legislature, or if the assessori are turned over mid-way through the government's tenure. 
Political stability firstly acts as the basis for the credibility of the administrative context 
within which the efficiency of the implementation system is determined, and secondly 
creates the "glue" that unites civil servants in their pursuance of a common goal. 
Recurrent changes of government can negatively affect the programming of a long-term 
development plan in administrative systems that depend on political appointments to key 
policy-making positions. This is even more relevant in the case of the Structural Funds, 
whose use is based on a multi-annual programme. Regional governments that change 
constantly have more difficulty in maintaining a strong commitment to multi-annual 
programmes. Additionally, unstable governments are more likely to witness change, not 
only in the political class, but also in the civil servants responsible for sustaining 
development programmes. This is likely to cause a significant amount of discontinuity 
and delay in the overall administrative system. A multi-annual programme takes years to 
deliver results, while a cabinet that lasts less than a year can only deal with short-term 
matters. Furthermore, such a government would not invest in monitoring or evaluation 
activities, since a one-year lifespan does not allow for any adequate review of 
implementation performance or any opportunity to learn about how to improve the 
programme for the future. 
Political accountability, in its simplest form, means 
"the requirement of a public organization (or perhaps an individual) 
to render an account to some other organization and to explain its 
actions. Further, the accounting may be financial or administrative, 
or about the policy decisions that were made. Accountability, 
therefore, depends upon some external organizations to assess what 
it has been done and to evaluate it" (Peters, 2001: 301). 
21It is measured in terms of number of different cabinets installed in each region during the period of 
legislature. 
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In politics, and particularly in representative democracies, accountability is an important 
factor in securing good governance. Accountability constrains the extent to which 
elected representatives and other office-holders can wilfully deviate from their 
theoretical responsibilities. The goal of accountability is at times at odds with the goal of 
leadership. A constituency may have short-term desires that are at odds with long-term 
interests, in such context policy makers are likely to pursue their own political agenda 
and be interested in enriching themselves. This is particularly true in relation to 
Structural Funds implementation, which not only is based on a long term planning but 
also can be used by the political class to finance projects, which do not always represent 
a priority for regional development but are useful in building consensus for other goals. 
Therefore, a political class that is not accountable will try to manipulate every form of 
information and publicity seen by the public about the use of the funds. The purpose of 
monitoring and evaluation systems is to feed this information to the MA, the national 
government, the EU and ultimately the public. The presence of efficient monitoring and 
evaluation procedures over policies adopted and implemented leaves policy makers less 
able to divert resources to other goals and to or use them for self-interested purposes. 
I believe that political accountability influences monitoring and evaluation practices - 
i. e. the less accountable a political class is, the more it will be trying to obstruct forms of 
monitoring or evaluation activities, despite the fact that the less information there is 
available on the policy implemented, the lower the flow of resources will be. 
2.3.2 The role of political factors in administrative capacity variation: model of 
analysis 
My model of analysis suggests that each of the three political aspects influences each of 
the key components of administrative activity. Through the analysis of the case study, I 
will test the following corollary relationships (Figure 2.3): 
1. Strong political interference increases deficiency in management on the part of 
the MA; 
2. High governmental instability might accounts for poor programming and follow- 
through on implementation; 
3. Political accountability affects monitoring and evaluation practices. 
67 
Furthermore, as anticipated, I believe that the three political factors are strongly 
interconnected. Indeed, I expect to find that in ä region where the government is 
unstable, the political class will act in an interfering manner in order to pursue its own 
short-term interests during its tenure, and will be not be accountable for its action. Vice 
versa, I presume that where the government is stable, the political class will be less 
inclined to interfere and will act to pursue the long-term interest of the region and its 
own political status. 
Figure 23 Model of analysis: Interaction between political factors and key administrative 
components. 
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One might argue that other factors could be responsible for the different degrees of 
administrative capacity. Indeed, in scrutinizing the literature, I find that three main 
explanations exist: (1) education; (2) centralization of policy by the government, which 
has impeded a development of capacity at the regional level; and (3) corruption. In the 
next paragraph, I will review each of the cited explanations, and will test them in my 
selected case studies. The test is performed in order to verify whether those explanations 
provide an exhaustive clarification. If they do not, then I will continue to investigate my 
hypothesis. 
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2.3.3 Alternative explanations: education, centralization, corruption 
Education level 
In the literature considering the factors that could determine different degrees of 
capacity within institutions, some authors (North, 1992; Berg, 1993) advocate the 
relevance of the educational and training system. Indeed, as discussed in Section 2.1, 
North argues that: 
"Administrative capacity has to do with personal capacity, thus any 
administration is staffed with civil servants, therefore it is their capacity 
which ultimately determines service delivery and the general performance of 
a civil service in executing its primary functions" (North, 1992: 6). 
Similarly, Berg (1993: 62) regards capacity building as characterized by three main 
activities: 
"skill upgrading - both general and job-specific; procedural improvements; 
and organizational strengthening". 22 
Here Berg refers to the gradual increase in the inherent capacity of civil servants as they 
apply themselves to the execution of the daily duties to which they are assigned. This 
follows the comparatively recent emphasis on capacity building as an integral part of 
civil service reform -a "discovery" which highlights the fact that, in the process of 
establishing the administrative machinery of government, the important issue of human 
resource development has often been overlooked. 
The definition discussed so far seems to point to the educational and training system as 
the variable that determines capacity. Although this seems a plausible explanation, I will 
argue that it is far from exhaustive. The reason why I consider that education is not in 
itself a fully satisfactory explanation lies in the analysis of the educational characteristics 
of the personnel in the two selected case studies. Table 2.2 presents the educational level 
of each region. 
22 Under "skill upgrading" he includes general education, on-the job-training, and professional training in 
crossover skills such as accounting, policy analysis and information technology; "organisation 
strengthening" covers the process of institutional development; "procedural improvements" refers to 
general functional changes or system reforms. 
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Table 2.2 Indicators of educational levels of regional personnel in different years 
Indicators Sicily Basilicata 
Personnel who hold a degree (1991) 90% 87% 
Peronnel who hold a high school degree (1996) 87% 90% 
Personnel who holds a university Degree (2003) 70% 68% 
Regional expenditure in personnel training (1995- 
2002) as % of GDP 
0.20 0.24 
Source: ISTAT 
Sicily and Basilicata have similar scores on most of the indicators considered. This 
should indicate that administrative capacity is similar in both regions, but the assessment 
I perform in Chapter 5 confirms that this is not the case. Furthermore, a close study of 
the education of the administrative class reveals that in both Sicily and Basilicata the 
civil servants have been trained to develop an understanding of the Structural Funds 
rules and regulations. 23 
Indeed, the authors who consider education to be the determinant variable for capacity 
level are misled by the important distinction between personal and non-personal 
capacity, which is identified by Mentz (1997). In his work, Mentz argues that the 
educational system plays a crucial role in capacity building because it fosters personal 
capacities. But he adds the following: 
"This capacity will also be influenced by the normal interaction of all 
individuals working in a specific section, division, department or ministry". 
While personal capacity has to do with people, "non-personal capacity is that 
of the organization as a whole, which provides the context in which personal 
capacity is developed and used. " (Mentz, 1997: 10-11) 
It is in this sense therefore that administrative capacity should not be studied in isolation 
but should be regarded as an integral part of the political process. This assumption 
corroborates my hypothesis that the features acquired by the political and administrative 
spheres can determine variation in capacity. 
23 This fact was confirmed during the fieldwork carried out in both regions. It is not based on secondary 
source evidence but on the self-declaration of each civil servant interviewed. 
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National government influence 
A second competing explanation which is supported by many authors (Gualini, 2004; 
Marks, 1996) suggests that the reason for poor regional administrative performance can 
be explained in many cases by investigating the role played by the EU and the national 
government. Indeed, a centralized approach to regional policy, where the national 
government acts as a gatekeeper strongly constrained the potential of the regional level 
to develop its own capacity. Although this might be true to some extent, I will 
demonstrate that it cannot be used as an explanation in the case of southern Italian 
regions because all of the regions have been subject to the same centralized approach 
which ended at the same time (cf. Chapter 3 and 4). Conversely, it reinforces my 
hypothesis that the intervening variable, which accounts for the variation in 
administrative capacity must be found within the region. This affirmation will bring 
back the issue of social capital, but I will not need to explore that further because, as I 
have mentioned already in Chapter 1, Putnam (1993) has already established the 
similarity between the two selected case studies, Sicily and Basilicata. 
Corruption 
There has been a growing interest in the subject of corruption, as policymakers and 
academics have traced its impact on economic growth and quality of governance 
(Thomas and Meagher, 2004). In a world in which governments do not always act in 
their citizens' best interest, corrupt politicians may be expected to spend more public 
resources on those items on which it is easier to levy large bribes and keep secret. As 
Mauro (1995; 1996; 1998) shows, corruption does indeed affect the composition of 
government expenditure. In particular, education spending is found to be adversely 
affected by corruption. Both economic theory and common sense suggest the types of 
government expenditure that provide opportunities that are more lucrative. 
However, measuring any corrupt practice is difficult because corrupt behaviours are 
usually criminal and take place in private. Because of the variety of types of corrupt 
practices, and the impossibility of directly measuring any of them, all measures of 
corruption are partial measures. Efforts to assess corruption have focused primarily on 
survey data of perceptions or experiences. Perception questions ask interviewees to rate 
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the levels of corruption in particular government agencies, or to report whether they 
think levels of corruption have gone up or down. However, public perceptions may not 
be well informed. Experience questions in surveys ask interviewees how frequently and 
to what government agencies they have paid bribes. While surveys targeting personal 
experience may produce more reliable data, people may hesitate to report their own 
involvement in corrupt activities (Thomas and Meagher, 2004). 
This uncertainty about the corruption index and its impact is the main reason for not 
considering this factor a valid explanation. Indeed, the vast literature on southern Italy, 
and on Sicily in particular, looks at corruption as the prime reason for institutional 
output, but again this affirmation is close to being speculative, rather than giving us a 
generalizable explanation. Furthermore, Pantaleone's (2003) analysis of the presence of 
the mafia in Basilicata seems to corroborate the practice of corruption 24 there too (cf. 
paragraph 3.4.2). Therefore I exclude this variable from my analysis and I will be 
looking for more empirically measurable variables. 
Along with corruption, one could look at the criminality index. Sicily has a much higher 
index than Basilicata. 25 Criminality is considered to be among the main factors that have 
impeded economic development (Centorrino e Ofria, 2001; Censis, 2002). It might 
therefore account for the economic backwardness of Sicily. However, in this thesis I am 
not interested in finding the factors which account for different economic developments 
(outcomes), I am interested in those factors, which account for different institutional 
24 Some recent headlines report: "A round-up of leading politicians, lawyers and mafiosi accused of 
collaborating to cheat the State has shaken Italy's southern backwater of Basilicata. They are the result of 
an investigation lasting three years, documented in an 800-page report. The report chronicles how 
politicians across the political spectrum, including both Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia and the former 
communist Left Democrats, colluded with confirmed gangsters to ensure that public works contracts were 
awarded only to firms linked to the Mob. The politicians were rewarded with bribes and guaranteed 
election votes. Those fingered constitute a roll-call of the region's top dogs. They include Filippo Bubbico, 
the president of the region, a member of Left Democrats and the most powerful man in Basilicata; 
Gianfranco Blasi, a MP with Forza Italia and the party's organiser for the south of Italy; the heads of two 
top lawyers' organisations in the region, and a mayor and former mayor of Potenza, the regional capital. 
The president of Basilicata's penal chamber, Piervito Bardi, was arrested and accused of feeding gangsters 
with information about investigations against them" (BBC News, Monday, 22 November, 2004,18: 14), 
25 According to the ISTAT data, the index of criminal activity carried out by organized crime in the period 
1995-2001 varies in Sicily from 14.2 to 13.1% and in Basilicata from 6.4 to 7.8% 
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outputs (resource expenditure). The object of my investigation is the regional 
government and the dynamics within it. 
2.4 Method of analysis 
2.4.1 Measurable indicators of administrative capacity 
My analysis will follow two main steps. First of all I will assess the degree of 
administrative capacity in the selected regions in order to test the first part of my central 
hypothesis that there is a positive correlation between capacity and Structural Funds 
expenditure rates. Secondly, I will explain why capacity varies across regions - i. e. the 
second part of the central hypothesis. 
In order to perform the first part of the analysis, I need to have adequate indicators to 
assess the degree of capacity within a region with regard to Structural Funds 
implementation. Table 2.3 shows the indicators for the administrative arena, which have 
been deduced according to the definition of the objective that each key determinant aims 
to reach. The indicators have been selected in order to guarantee comparability across 
organizations and over time. The method chosen to measure the performance of each 
key component, following progressive stages, is an adaptation of the Institutional 
Development Framework Method26 (IDFM) used by the Centre for Development and 
Evaluation of USAID (2000). There are four identified stages of administrative capacity 
along a capacity development continuum: Absent, Starting, Developing, and 
Consolidated. The criteria for each progressive stage have been adjusted to the 
expectation for each phase. 
26 I have made some changes to the original IDFM in order to adapt the methodology to my study. Indeed, 
the four stages of the IDFM are: Start up, Development. Consolidation, and Sustainability. In my analysis 
the four stages start from a lower level - i. e. Absent - because after performing the fieldwork it was clear 
that many capacities were not present in the regional administration when the cohesion policy was 
introduced. 
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Table 2.3 Indicators and progressive stages in benchmarking administrative capacity 
Key components Indicators Absent Starting Developing Consolidated 
1. Management a) Clarity in the Staff roles and Staff roles and Staff roles and Roles of personnel 
definition of role responsibilities responsibilities responsibilities well defined; Staff 
unclear and vaguely defined defined increasingly able to 
changeable shape the way in 
which they 
participate in 
management 
b) Coordination and Poor inter-staff Modest amount Communications Organization 
cooperation and inter- of inter-staff and are open and inter- periodically reviews 
between department inter-department hierarchical; communication flow 
departments communications; communication; Formal and to ensure free flow of 
Lack of formal Emergence of informal channels information through 
and informal formal channels established and both formal and 
channels. for dialogue and utilized informal channels 
decision-making 
2. Programming a) Program design: Absence of a Introduction of a SWOT analysis is SWOT analysis is 
SWOT Analysis SWOT analysis SWOT analysis; supportive of the thorough. It allows 
important programme, full correspondence 
territorial although between the budget 
problems still interventions and targeted 
overlooked, selected still not territorial needs 
fully targeted. 
b) Programme Approval of the Approval of the Delay in the ROP ROP starts within six 
approval: time lapse ROP ROP delayed by approval contained months 
between the significantly up to two years. to 1 year 
beginning of the delayed (by over 
CSF and approval two years) 
of the ROP 
3. Monitoring a) Introduction of a No monitoring System has been Indicators and Indicators and 
system of indicators system introduced but procedure are procedure are 
and monitoring indicators and coherent with coherent with the 
procedures procedure are national/European national/European 
responding to not functioning guidelines but still guidelines and fully 
national/European properly not fully operational 
agreed standards operational 
b) Guaranteeing the No data Only partial data Data available Data available and 
availability of available available without much used in support of the 
financial, physical delay policy process 
and procedural data 
. Evaluation a) Production of No reports x-ante report One report still not All three reports 
evaluation reports produced produced, but no produced produced 
initinere or ex- 
post report 
b) Integration of he evaluation Although Evaluation Evaluation 
evaluation method method considered performed as considered a 
and culture into the considered time important, it is thoroughly as fundamental tool to 
system consuming and too difficult to possible improve policy 
not useful perform implementation 
Each indicator will be rated on a scale from 0 to 3, as follows: 0= Absent; 1= Starting; 
2= Developing; 3= Consolidated. Consequently, all components will be averaged 
together to provide a summary score for the administrative area (Table 2.4). 
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Table 2.4 Range of scores for each area 
Score 0-0.5 0.6-1.5 1.6-2.5 2.6-3.0 
Stage Absent Starting Developing Consolidated 
The rating scale will be calculated for each key component and then for the overall 
activity. 27 This will provide a comprehensive indication of where the institution is in its 
stage of development for that particular key determinant and for its overall approach to 
administration. The four final stages are defined below (Table 2.5). 
Table 2.5 Progressive stages of administrative capacity 
Absent Starting Developing Consolidated 
Administrative Most of the Administrative Administrative capacity Administrative 
capacity components capacity is in the is developing. Structures capacity is 
measured are early stages of for management, fully 
non-existent. development. All programming, functioning 
The output of the components monitoring and and 
produced is measured are in evaluation practices are sustainable. 
very low. rudimentary form. in place and functioning. The output 
The output The output produced is produced is 
produced is low. medium/high. high. 
2.4.2 Case study 
The core of the methodology presented here is an in-depth case study. The purpose of 
the case study is to provide a thorough insight into the specific administrative features 
that prevail in the selected regions and to provide a basis for comparative analysis based 
27 Two issues will be taken into account, accordingly with the rules of measurement of institutional 
capacity suggested by USAID 2000: "1. Quantification. Using numbers to represent capacity can be 
helpful when they are recognized as relative and not absolute measures. Many tools for measuring 
institutional capacity rely on ordinal scales. Ordinal scales are scales in which values can be ranked from 
high to low or more to less in relation to each other. They are useful in ordering by rank along a 
continuum, but they can also be misleading. Qualitative descriptions of an organization's capacity level 
are a good complement to ordinal scales; 2. Internal versus external assessments. Some tools require the 
use of external facilitators or assessors; others offer a process that the organization itself can follow. Both 
methods can produce useful data, and neither is automatically better than the other. Internal assessments 
can facilitate increased management use and better understanding of an assessment's findings, since the 
members of the organization themselves are carrying out the assessment. By contrast, the risk of bias and 
subjectivity is higher in internal assessments. External assessments may be more objective. They are less 
likely to introduce internal bias and can make use of external expertise. The downside is that external 
assessors may be less likely to uncover what is really going on inside an organization". Having 
participated in a number of external assessments of regional administrative activity, I do not fully agree 
with the later observation. 
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on empirical facts in order to generate evidence to validate my hypothesis for the 
conclusions to be reached. One of the major benefits of the case study approach is that it 
facilitates the presentation of processes and complexities that are impossible to see in 
any other way. This is most useful in testing a theoretical hypothesis against a detailed 
insight into the reality of daily actions in the field (OIR, 2003: 33; ISFOL, 2002). An in- 
depth case study provides a clear view of the way in which the administrative machinery 
operates and how it affects institutional performance. 
Case study research excels at bringing us to an understanding of a complex issue or 
object and can extend understanding or add strength to what is already known through 
previous research. For the purpose of the hypothesis I aim to test, which has not been 
previously investigated, the case study and associated fieldwork are essential in 
providing original information that may validate my hypotheses. 
Critics of the case study method believe that the study of a small number of cases cannot 
establish reliable findings that can be applied generally. Others feel that the intense 
exposure to study of the case biases the findings. Some dismiss case study research and 
say it is useful only as an exploratory tool. 
In order to use the case study method optimally and successfully, I will follow four 
fundamental steps in organizing and conducting the research: 
1) Defining the research questions and the hypothesis; selecting the case study that 
is of most use to us in answering the questions; 
2) Determining data gathering and analysis techniques; 
3) Collecting data in the field; 
4) Evaluating and analysing the data. 
The first step has already been completed. The two case studies were chosen to ensure 
the representation of two contrasting performances: Sicily is an example of low 
implementation of the funds; Basilicata has the highest implementation rate. 
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2.4.3 Data collection 
The data collection is based on three methods to ensure reliability of findings: (1) 
document analysis; (2) interview data - questionnaires, focus groups, semi-structured 
interviews; and (3) direct observation (Johnson, 2005: 185-304). 
The originality of the data collection is based on a questionnaire designed in order (i) to 
assess regional administrative capacity in terms of the selected indicators; and (ii) to 
investigate the eventual relationship between the administrative key actions and the 
correlated political factors. The questionnaire was divided into three sections, one for 
management, the second for programming and the third for monitoring and evaluation. 
Each section was divided into two parts: the first assessed the administrative 
components; the second asked relevant questions about the political factors (Annex II). 
The respondents to the questionnaire were the politicians and civil servants involved in 
the implementation of Structural Funds. Based on the questionnaire, I also designed an 
interview guide to support semi-structured interviews with key actors within the regional 
government, including both administrative staff and political leaders (cf. Section 2.3.4). 
Like other analytical approaches (OIR, 2003) the case studies were conducted over three 
stages as follows. 
Stage 1: Deskwork involving a detailed review of all primary source documentation 
associated with the region concerned - i. e. the CSF 1989-1993; CSF 1994-1999; CSF 
2000-2006; CSF ex-post evaluation 1994-1999; CSF Intermediate Evaluation 2000- 
2006; Plurifond Operational Programme (POP) 1989-1993; POP 1994-1999; Regional 
Operative Programme (ROP) 2000-2006; each POP and POR ex-ante, ex-post and 
intermediate evaluations for each period; 28 the annual reports on Structural Funds 
implementation produced each year by each regional administration; and all of the 
available documentation produced by each regional and national Monitoring Committee 
on the status of Structural Funds implementation. 
2&The same external evaluator, namely, Ernst &Young, carried out the intermediate evaluations for Sicily 
and Basilicata. 
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Stage 2: Fieldwork in the selected region involving consultation with members of the 
MA, general managers, civil servants, and relevant political assessors (assessori) 
involved in Structural Funds implementation. In detail, in Sicily, I interviewed three 
assessors and seven general managers, who also completed the questionnaire. In 
addition, the questionnaire was completed by one assessor, eight general mangers and 10 
civil servants, reaching a total of 29 opinions (Annex I, Part I). In Basilicata, I 
interviewed two assessors, 17 general managers and managers, and seven civil servants. 
The- written part of the questionnaires was returned by 10 managers and five civil 
servants, making a total of 41 completed questionnaires (Annex I, Part II). In both Sicily 
and in Basilicata the consultation covered all of the assessors involved with Structural 
Funds, all of the general managers, 75% of the managers, and 75% of the civil servants 
concerned with the policy. 
The principal purpose of the fieldwork was to conduct interviews, to ensure the 
correctness and completeness of the desk-based research on the basis of the 
documentation available, to collect supplementary or additional documentation, and to 
determine the management, programming, monitoring and evaluation structure in place. 
The fieldwork represents the core of the research. Indeed, a preliminary analysis of the 
documentation revealed the lack of adequate information on the variable I aim 
investigating and so the main source of information became the interaction and 
interviews with the key actors involved in Structural Funds implementation. 
Stage 3: Consultations with relevant players in the regions via email, telephone and fax 
with a view to completing the analysis of the region and verifying the correctness of the 
analysis. 
Further information, data and primary source evidence was also gathered from two main 
projects in which I have been involved. The first project, `The ex-post evaluation of the 
Plurifound Operative Programme (POP) in Sicily 1994/99", lasted one year and focused 
on analysing nine projects financed by the Structural Funds in Sicily between 1994 and 
1999. The aim of the research was to single out administrative and political bottlenecks 
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in the implementation of those projects. The findings of the research are integrated into 
the ex post evaluation report finalized by CENSIS (Center for Social Studies and 
Policies) in 2001. 
The second main project, coordinated by the Economic Social Cohesion Laboratory, 
namely "rhe intermediate evaluation of the Community Support Framework Objective 
1, Italy 2000/2006", lasted 3 years. The fieldwork and research carried out over the 
period 2002-2005 aimed to scrutinize the performance of the seven southern Italian 
regions in implementing Structural Funds, by focusing on specific sectors of 
intervention - transport, rural development, research, tourism, professional training and 
territorial integrated projects. The results of the study were published in the final report, 
which was presented to the European Commission in December 2005. 
Both these projects, particularly the latter, have been an essential support in enabling 
constant contact with both the central and the regional governments in southern Italy, 
providing original data and information. Indeed, through the projects I had the 
opportunity to conduct some interviews with the personnel of the Italian Ministry of the 
Economy and Finance (MEF), who are directly involved in overseeing the 
implementation of the Structural Funds (Annex I, Part III). 
Table 2.6 shows the main correspondent source of information for each indicator. Other 
sources have also been scrutinized. 
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Table 2.6 List of main sources for assessing administrative capacity's key component 
Key Indicators Source 
components 
1. Management a) Clarity in the definition o Essential documents: POP 1989-1993; POP 1994- 
role 1999; ROP 2000-2006; Intermediate, ex-ante and ex- 
post Evaluation Reports for each period; Annual 
eports on Structural Funds from 1989 until 2004; 
nterviews with key actors; All the relevant European, 
national and regional legislation (cf. References first 
source) 
b) Coordination and cooperation List of essential documents; Interviews with key 
between departments. actors. 
2. Programming a) Programme design: SWOT List of essential documents; Interviews with key 
Analysis actors. 
b) Programme approval: time List of essential documents; Cabinet documents on 
lapse between the beginning o decisions of approval; Interviews with key actors. 
the CSF and approval of the 
ROP. 
3. Monitoring a) Introduction of a system of List of essential documents; National Monitoring 
indicators and of monitoring reports-, Interviews with key actors. 
procedures responding to 
national/European agreed 
standards. 
b) Guaranteeing the availability List of essential documents; National Monitoring 
of financial, physical and report; Interviews with key actors. 
procedural data. 
T Evaluation a) Production of the evaluation List of essential documents; National Evaluation 
reports. report, Interviews with key actors. 
b) Integration of the evaluation List of essential documents; National Evaluation 
method and culture in the report; Interviews with key actors. 
system. 
2.4.4 Field research and questionnaire 
Once in the field the data collected has be systematically stored in a format that can be 
referenced and sorted so that converging lines of inquiry and patterns can be uncovered. 
I have carefully studied the implementation of Structural Funds and identified causal 
factors associated with its variation. Therefore, renegotiation of arrangements with the 
subjects of the study or addition of questions to interviews was necessary as the study 
progressed. Case study research is flexible, but changes made have been documented 
systematically. The personal interviews have also been recorded. 
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The main analytical dimensions included in both the questionnaire and interview guide 
are the following: 
1) Basic information on the organization and the interviewee: name, position held. 
2) Description of the management activities: this is aimed at assessing management 
with a focus on the coordination activities and the clarity of roles among 
personnel; the questions are also retrospective, in order to capture any 
improvement or variation over the three different periods of analysis - i. e. 1989- 
1993; 1994-1999; 2000-2006. Some of the questions require self-evaluation of 
past administrative behaviour. 
3) Investigation of the relationship between the political and administrative class: 
this is aimed at understanding whether there is a separation of power in the region 
and how the relationship between these two spheres influences Structural Funds 
management. 
4) Analysis of the programming activities in terms of programme design and 
programme approval: this is aimed at investigating how the regional government 
has reacted to the novelty of the multi-annual planning approach introduced by the 
Structural Funds. Particular attention is given to: (i) the use of a SWOT analysis to 
link the interventions planned with the real needs of the territory; (ii) the time 
taken to approve the designed programme, in order to ascertain the reasons for 
eventual delays. 
5) Description of regional government stability and of the eventual repercussions for 
the continuity of the Structural Funds programme. 
6) Scrutiny of the monitoring and evaluation system: this is aimed at assessing how 
the monitoring system works and whether it is positively correlated with 
improvements in the implementation of Structural Funds. The two dimensions 
investigated are the setting up of a monitoring system and the availability of data. 
Similarly, the questions regarding evaluation activities aim to capture the 
perception of evaluation in the region and assess the spread of an evaluation 
culture. 
7) Self-evaluation of the accountability of the political class: these questions ask the 
personal opinion of the interviewees on political accountability and eventually on 
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the influence that the political class might exercise in impeding or propelling the 
diffusion of monitoring and evaluation systems. 
Table 2.7 presents a synoptic structure of both the questionnaire and the interview guide 
with selected key actors. It provides for each analytical dimension covered by the main 
questions, which were translated into Italian. The full text of the questionnaire and 
interview guide is presented in Annexes 11 and III respectively. 
Table 2.7 Synoptic structure of questionnaire and interview guide 
Analytical Main questions 
dimensions 
Basic Name of the interviewee; Position in the organization; Date of interview; Duration of interview 
information 
Assessment of Which have been the major changes in the Managing Authority (MA) over the three planning 
the management periods? 
activities Which have been the major difficulties faced by the MA and how have they been solved? 
Describe the coordination activity carried out by the MA. Is there clarity of role between the 
different departments and within the departments as far as Structural Funds are concerned? Is 
there clarity of role among personnel? 
Investigation of Define the interaction/relation between the MA and the political class. 
the relationship Has the separation of powers between the political and the administrative sphere had any impact 
between the on the Structural Funds management? 
political and Define the influence of political power on Structural Funds management before the Regional 
administrative Law that formally separated it (12/1996 in Basilicata and 10/2000 in Sicily). 
classes Which level is more suited to managing the Structural Funds? 
Despite the formalized separation of powers, is there still political interference in the 
management of Structural Funds? 
Analysis of the Was the programme supported by a SWOT analysis? Were there previous experiences that 
programming guided the regional administration in adapting to the multi-annual planning approach introduced 
activities by Structural Funds? 
How has the programming capacity evolved over the three different periods 1989-1993,1994- 
1999, and 2000-2006? 
What is the main cause of the delay in the approval of the Regional rative Programme (ROP) 
Description of Does government stability affect Structural Funds programming? What kind of effect does it 
the regional have? 
government Which are the major problems in terms of Structural Funds programming related to eventual 
stability changes of government? Is the programme implementation strictly related to the government 
stability and continuity? 
Scrutiny of the Which were the major difficulties encountered in the establishment of a monitoring system? How 
monitoring and has the monitoring system evolved during the three planning periods? 
evaluation Has an adequate system of monitoring indicators and procedures been introduced? If yes, which 
system one? 
Does the monitoring system guarantee availability of up-to-date financial, physical and 
procedural data? 
Each planning period should be supported by an ex-ante, intermediate and ex-post evaluation. 
Have these reports been produced accordingly? 
Is the culture of evaluation spreading within the regional government? Self-evaluation Is the improvement of monitoring and evaluation activities supported by political leaders? 
of the Does the political class openly support the practice of monitoring and evaluation? 
accountability Has the political class propelled or impeded the diffusion of an evaluation culture? 
of the political How would you define the perception by the political class of the practice of monitoring and 
class evaluation? 
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2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed the first part of my central hypothesis - i. e. that 
differences in implementation are strongly connected to the degree of administrative 
capacity existing in a regional government. I have reviewed the existing literature on 
administrative capacity and seen that in the EU, emphasis on administrative capacity 
emerged as a result of the most recent accession process, where a large number of states 
with different administrative traditions were preparing for entry into the EU and targeted 
programmes were created to address the issue explicitly. Therefore, the issue of 
administrative capacity has become an important consideration during the recent years 
because it has become clear that not all regions or Member States have all of the 
necessary administrative capacity to effectively and efficiently implement Structural 
Fund programmes according to the rules and regulations established by the EU. Though 
the rules are uniform, the results have varied across Member States and regions. 
However, neither a clear definition of administrative capacity nor a strong and coherent 
assessment model can be found in the existing literature. Therefore, by using the 
literature on institutional capacity, together with a thorough scrutiny of Structural Funds 
principles and policies, as well as the framework of multilevel governance, I have 
suggested a novel definition of administrative capacity. The latter is defined by four key 
actions: (1) Management; (2) Programming; (3) Monitoring; and (4) Evaluation. 
I have also introduced the second part of the central hypothesis regarding the second 
interlocked question of this thesis, which asks why administrative capacity varies across 
regions. I suggest the relevance of political factors - political interference, government 
stability, and political accountability - in influencing the features aquired by the four 
key components of administrative activities. More precisely, I hypothesise that each of 
the three political aspects strongly influences each of the key components of the 
administrative area as follows: 
(a) Strong political interference increases deficiency in management; 
(b) High government instability accounts for poor programming; 
(c) Political accountability affects monitoring and evaluation practices. 
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Furthermore, I believe that these three factors are interconnected, and create a recurrent 
and self-reinforcing model. So, I expect to find that where the political class is unstable 
and tends to interfere, it also lacks accountability. I reinforced my assumption of the 
relevance of political factors by testing competing explanations, such as education, 
national government role and corruption. These three explanations do not appear to be 
exhaustive. 
My plan is firstly to assess administrative capacity in the selected case studies on the 
basis of the proposed indicators (Chapter 5) in order to test the first part of the central 
hypothesis that there is a positive relation between the level of capacity and Structural 
Funds implementation. Secondly, I aim to explain why capacity varies across regions 
(Chapter 6). My chosen methodology is an in-depth case study supported by field 
research. The fieldwork is guided by a questionnaire designed to measure the selected 
indicators of administrative capacity and related political factors. 
Before moving onto the empirical sections, however, I will present in the following part 
of this thesis a retrospective analysis of the different phases of Italian regional policy 
and the political and administrative reforms that have taken place over time. This will be 
structured to provide an interpretative framework for the case studies. The next chapter 
investigates the first period of regional policy in Italy, which covers the years 1950- 
1992. It presents an historical analysis of the establishment of the regions as 
administrative and decision-making units. It characterizes the Italian approach to 
regionalisation as a strongly centralized one, which left little autonomy for the regions in 
the areas of regional development. Rather than being an explanatory variable, this factor 
provides the two case studies with a common background. 
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PART II 
BACKGROUND ANALYSIS 
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Chapter 3 
The creation and evolution of regional government and regional policy in Italy: 
first phase 1950.1992 
3.1 Introduction 
In the first part of the thesis, I have discussed the two parts of my central hypothesis, i. e. 
that (1) differences in implementation are connected with the degree of administrative 
capacity existing in a regional government; and (2) variation in administrative capacity 
across regions might be influenced by three political factors; namely political 
interference, government stability, and political accountability. I reinforced my 
hypothesis on the political factors by testing competing explanations such as education, 
corruption and the national government role. With regard to this latter factor, the vast 
majority of the literature on Italy suggests that the centralized approach to regional 
policy, adopted by the national government, acted as an external constraint on building 
regional capacity. I argue that this action has equally affected all the southern regions, 
and so it is far from being an explanatory variable. Instead, what is relevant to 
understand is why some regions have reacted differently than others to this top-down 
approach, and have been able to implement the novel instrument of cohesion policy 
while others have not. 
This chapter presents a retrospective look at the establishment of the regions as 
administrative units and of the different phases of Italian regional policy in light of 
European developments. This retrospective, while responding to a basic informative 
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need, is not intended simply as a chronological reconstruction. Rather, it is structured as 
an interpretative frame for two main purposes. The first is to understand the main 
features of the institutionalisation of Italian regions and their struggle to gain authority, 
in relation to regional policy and to the institutional crisis that took place at the 
beginning of the 1990s. The crisis was triggered by the challenges for institutional 
change emerging along with the progress of European integration. Secondly, it sets the 
administrative and political backdrop against which the region would later operate 
between 1989-2006 period in the management of the Structural Funds and interactions 
with the national and European level of government, in order to highlight that the two 
case studies presented in Chapters 5 and 6 are set into a common framework. 
The chapter comprises three main sections. Section 3.2 will highlight the centralized, 
top-down, approach that distinguished the first phase of regional policy in the 
Mezzogiorno from 1950 to 1992.29 It will reveal the constraints placed on the capacity of 
the regional level to engage in regional planning by the monopolization of decision- 
making and implementation exercised by the central level through the Cassa per il 
Mezzogiorno. In parallel, it will look at the process of the establishment and growth of 
regional governments, which occurred in two different stages. The first block of five 
special statute regions was created in between 1946 and 1964 (Sicily was the first in 
1946), and the second block of the remaining 15 regions was set up in 1970 (including 
Basilicata). These dates and events are important to keep in mind because they overlap 
with both the creation of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs) (1986-1992) 
and the first cycle of Structural Funds, 1989-1993 (Section 3.3). It is important to 
understand what was happening during these years in Italy with regard to the creation 
and consolidation of regional governments, in order to comprehend the reasons behind 
their poor performance over that period. 
Having established the national background in light of the European scenario in Section 
3.4,1 will analyse the cases of Sicily and Basilicata between 1946 and 1988. The chosen 
29 The second phase of the Italian regional policy covering from the 1990s to 2004 will be tackled in 
chapter 4. 
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period covers that of the top-down, centralized approach to regional policy. This section 
focuses on the creation and development of the regional institution in the two case 
studies. In Sicily this process took place in 1946, and occurred in Basilicata in 1970. I 
attempt to identify what the previous literature has said about the two regions from the 
point of view of administrative capacity and political stability. One would assume that 
the older Sicilian administrative machinery would have developed more advanced skills 
than the relatively new institutional structure created in Basilicata. But, the retrospective 
analysis will reveal that this was not the case. 
Before beginning the retrospective analysis it is important to distinguish between two 
aspects of the rise of the regions, namely decentralization and devolution. The former 
refers to 
"[t]he overall ideal or goal to be pursued in the restructuring of the state 
apparatus, which requires the fulfilment of numerous objectives of 
institutional change - among which are new political institutions, new 
relations among political forces, the integration of new economic and social 
actors" (Leonardi, 1993: 218). 
The latter refers to the 
"[t]ransfer of power to the regional level of government - i. e. to the change 
of political and administrative decision-making power in favour of the 
regions and, therefore, of the new regional political institutions" (ibid: 218). 
My analysis, once the events that characterized the process of decentralization, i. e., the 
creation of the regions, and devolution of power, which reached its peak with the reform 
in 2001 of the title V of the constitution, have been established aims to investigate the 
performance of the newly empowered units. It is important to clarify that devolution 
does not imply utilization. In other words, the fact that reforms took place and devolved 
the powers of programming and implementation of resources to the regional government 
does not imply that those governments were capable of fulfilling their new role. Indeed, 
I will argue that in order to act the regional governments needed to develop certain 
policy making and implementation capacities. 
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3.2 Italian regional policy 1950-1992: a top-down approach 
3.2.1 The regional struggle for authority 1950-1988 
The unification of the Italian State was proclaimed in 1861. This was seen as a starting 
point from which to integrate the strong regional and local identities that had always 
characterized the country. The method of unifying the regional differences, which posed 
an obstacle to a durable form of integration, was found in the creation of a powerful 
central authority. 3° It took more than one hundred years to induce the central 
government to create and assign power and resources to the regional government level 
(Leonardi, 1993: 217-245). 
Today's quality of regional government - e. g. its capacity to deal with new reforms and 
resources and therefore produce a high level of institutional performance - is the result 
of the process of devolution and decentralization that took place during the 1970s. To 
fully understand the characteristics of the regional dimension I need briefly to 
reconstruct the pattern that led to the empowerment of the regions, i. e. how the regional 
institutions were created and how they evolved. 
It was in 1948, with the new Constitution, that the establishment of regional 
governments became possible (Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana, 1947: Titolo V, 
Art.! ). This mandate was carried out in just four "special" regions - Sicily, 
31 Sardinia, 
Valle d'Aosta, and Trentino Alto Adige - where regional governments were established 
by 1949. Creation of the fifth special region, Friuli Venezia Giulia, was postponed until 
1964, due to the dispute between Trieste and Yugoslavia. The special regions were given 
more autonomy due to their particular problems related to borders, language or 
ethnicity. 32 
30 In 1861, the Italian Kingdom was divided into 59 province (provinces), 193 circondari (districts) and 
1601 mandamenti (neighbourhoods). The head of each province was a prefetto appointed by the King. 
Each prefetto worked with the support of a consiglio di prefettura, and each circondario was headed by a 
vice prefetto. The State model was strongly centralized; indeed the last decision in any minimal local issue 
was up to the Minister of Internal Affair (Bonora, 1984). 
31 Sicily was established as a special statute region on 15 May 1946. 
32 Sardinia's creation as a Region was dictated by two main reasons: (i) its particular conditions of 
backwardness due to the morphologic situation and, above all, the socio-economic situation; (ii) the fact 
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The Leggi Costituzionali (L. cost. ) (Constitutional enabling laws) n. 2,3,4,5 of 1948 
were passed to accept the special statutes of the four regions as the basis for their 
creation. Article 117 of the 1948 Constitution clearly specified that the regions were to 
be responsible for a series of socio-economic policies in the areas of professional 
education, agriculture, tourism, regional economic and territorial planning, artisan 
trades, and transportation. Industry was instead left to the national government, as was 
credit and monetary policy. The subsequent articles (118-133) set out the institutional 
structure of the regions, their financial basis and their relationships with local and central 
government. 
It was twenty years before the other fifteen regions were created. Although, like that of 
the five special statute regions, the legal base of the fifteen ordinary regions was founded 
on regional statutes, these were adopted through a general framework legislation passed 
in 1966 by the Italian parliament. Ultimately, in 1975, the Parliament passed Law n. 382, 
which assigned greater powers to the regions and the provisions of the Law were 
operationalized through the 616 and 617 "implementation decrees" of 1977. It was with 
this second set of decrees that the provisions of the Constitution were respected, and the 
regions could begin to operate fully as policy-making bodies in their designated areas of 
responsibility. 
Even if the regions began to legislate in the various policy areas set out by the 
Constitution, one field remained out of their grasp: regional economic planning for the 
less developed areas (Nanetti, 1988). In the south that function continued to be 
performed by the Casmez without any input from the regional governments (cf. Section 
3.2.2), and in the north it was relegated to a form of "indicative planning" where the 
regions prepared requests for funding from the national level, which were largely 
that a number of the leading advocates of regionalism were Sardinians, including Emilio Lussu (Sechi, 
1969). The special statue of Val D'Aosta was justified by the presence of large membership of French 
language speakers (Barbagallo, 1973). In Trentino Alto Adige there was a large German linguistic 
minority whose protection had been assured by the international treaty between Italy and Austria 
stipulated in 1946 (Toscano, 1967). In Sicily, whose experience is the most significant, the process of 
increasing its autonomy started straight after the Second World War, supported by significant separatist 
agitation (Finley, 1986). 
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ignored (Galasso, 2005). In the 1980s, the first signs of a regional reaction against the 
all-pervasive nature of state intervention began to appear, especially in two of the 
smaller regions, Abruzzo33 and Basilicata34, which had undergone significant shifts in 
their socio-economic bases. Thus, when the EC's cohesion policy was introduced in 
1989 it found fertile ground for a quick and enthusiastic adoption in both of these 
regions. The situation proved to be less welcoming in other southern regions. We will 
later discuss that this differentiation was caused by the fact that some regions, such as 
Basilicata and Abruzzo, had accepted the concept of integration and used it as an 
opportunity to modernize their administrations, whereas other regions, such as Sicily and 
Calabria, had continued with the previous approach of top-down planning initiated and 
controlled by the national centre. 
3.2.2 Regional planning policies from 1950 to 1984 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the eight southern Italian regions known as the Mezzogiorno 
have always been treated as a homogenous unit sharing the same socio-economic 
difficulties, the same cultural problems and the same political obstacles (Martellaro, 
1965; Carello, 1989). Indeed, in 1950 an ad hoc instrument and policy was created to 
tackle the backwardness of these regions (Law n. 646/1950). This instrument, known as 
Cassa per opere straordinarie di pubblico interesse nell'Italia meridionale (Casmez), 
acted as an autonomous entity and had complete independence in carrying out what was 
then defined as the Intervento Straordinario per il Mezzogiorno (Extraordinary 
Interventions for the Mezzogiorno). From 1950 to 1984, the Casinez was in charge of 
national regional policy implementation in favour of the south. The origins of the 
Intervento Straordinario are consistent with a policy tradition that, since the early stages 
of the Italian unitary state, has been characterized by a 
"[s]tate-centric, supply-oriented pattern of interventionism in economic 
development measures"(Gualini, 2004: 81). 
D In Abruzzo the completion of the Adriatic highway corridor (Milan-Taranto) and the east-west highway 
link between Rome-Aquila-Pescara facilitated the influx of significant private capital into the automobile, 
microchip, and space sectors (Felice, 2003). 
34 In Basilicata a more modem form of agriculture in the Metaponto and other plain areas helped to stem 
the tide of emigration and fuelled the rise of an endogenous political class anxious to increase its range of 
political action (Vellante, 2001). 
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Policies for deprived regions aimed to deal with backwardness by improving 
externalities through the modernization of infrastructure and of the agricultural sector, 
backed by the pursuit of a reform of land holding, by means of central state intervention 
through "extraordinary" public works programmes. No attention was paid to the 
modernization of the regional administration in terms of supporting the building of 
administrative and political capacities so that the regional government might carry out 
its own development policies. 
The vast majority of the literature on the Casmez35 (Annesi, 1989; D'Antone1996; 
Cafiero 2000) agrees on the division of its operation into four main time periods: 
36 
1) The starting period (1950-1957), which was characterized by a basic concentration 
on direct interventions in the improvement of externalities for the agricultural sector 
and infrastructures37 and by technocratic concentration of responsibilities and 
powers in the newly established special agency (Sarceno, 1957); 
2) The transition period, (1957-1965), which was characterized by a shift from a 
technocratic form of management towards a more politically-oriented style38 where 
the regional governments were excluded from both decision-making and 
implementation of national development projects (Viesti, 2000); 
3) The decentralization period, (1965-1970), which was marked by the progressive 
introduction of the decentralization of responsibilities to local authorities (La 
Palombara, 1966: 63-86), fostered in the 1970s by institutional reforms related to the 
establishment of regions with ordinary statutes and to the regions' access to 
development policy arenas. The most important step in this direction was the 
creation in each region of the Comitato Regionale per la Programniazione 
Economica (CRPE - Regional Committee for economic planning). The CRPE was 
allocated the following tasks: (1) to collect information on the socio-economic 
33 A comprehensive summary of these periods can be found in Gualini (2004: 82-93). 
36 For the legislation that applied to each period see: Law n. 949/1952; Law n. 634/1957; Law n. 717/1965; 
Law n. 853/1971; Law n. 183/1976. 
" Indeed, the investments were unevenly distributed between interventions for the reclamation and 
systemization of mountain areas, land reform, and land improvements, which constituted about 70% of the 
budget, and railroads, aqueducts and sewers, which absorbed another 20%. 
38 This has been labelled as synonymous with favouritism and clientelism, due to a strong political 
interference exercised by members of the national government and Parliament. 
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resources of each region by promoting studies and research in the field; (2) to 
identify the problems associated with regional economic development and suggest 
strategies to overcome these problems; (3) to arrange drafts of economic 
development plans according to the guidelines prepared by the Ministry of Planning 
and Budget; (4) to transfer data and information to the Ministry in support of the 
preparation of the national economic development plan by the Ministry (Bruzzo, 
1984). In other words, the regional economic plans were to be derived from the 
overall context provided by the national economic plan, thereby making regional 
economic development plans subordinate to national economic planning. The 
quality of the work carried out by the CRPE varied greatly across the regions: 
"... in some regions it was a mere report that was outsourced to 
external experts, while in other regions it became part of the 
activities undertaken by the regional government. In this context, 
the most important legacy left by the CRPE was related to the 
introduction of the concept of planning at a regional level" 
(Leonardi et al., 1985: 50). 
4) The final phase, from 1970 to the termination of the Casmez in 1984, was 
characterized by the progressive demise of central governmental intervention; a 
shift-back of responsibility to ordinary procedures and to the regional governments; 
and an alignment to Community regional policy rationale (Gualini, 2004: 84). In this 
period, a further step towards the ending of the top-down approach and an increase 
in the power of the regions was sanctioned in 1980 by the creation of the Conferenza 
Stato-Regioni (State-Regions Conference). The members of the Conference were the 
presidents of the Regions, the Prime Minister, and the Ministers of the Treasury. 
The intention behind the creation of a joint Conference was to overcome the conflict 
between the regions and the national government, to create a forum for the exchange 
of information and to prepare common positions of the Italian Regions on national 
issues (Sandulli, 1995). The legislative basis for the creation of the state-regional 
Conference represents the first time that the national government acknowledged the 
existence of two other actors, namely the regions and the European Commission, in 
development planning and in a broad range of public policies. 
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3.2.3 Reorganization of regional policy management (1984-1992) 
Finally, in 1984, the Parliament rejected the further refinancing of the Casmez, and it 
came to an end. Two years after the abolition of the Casmez, Law n. 64/1986 
reintroduced a system of central, national coordination: the Casmez was in fact replaced 
with two new agencies: the Department for the Mezzogiorno, which was entrusted with 
the financial evaluation of projects, and the Agenzia per lo Sviluppo del Mezzogiorno 
(Agency for the Promotion of Development in the Mezzogiorno, popularly known as 
Agensud), which took over the structure of the Casmez but with its responsibilities 
restricted to the financial management of projects (Lorenzoni and Zappella, 1988). 
Meanwhile, from a constitutional perspective, the power of the regions increased. 
Indeed, all regions were authorized to obtain funding to finance interventions and 
activities within their area of policy responsibilities and to provide for programme 
implementation according to the procedure put in place by their respective statutes. The 
regional proposals were to be framed within three triennial plans provided by the 
Department and broken down into annual implementation plans. Thus, decision making 
on regional development schemes remained centralised. 
During this period (1986-1992), Agensud played a different role to the centralized one 
carried out by the Casmez. Indeed, 
"it offered the regional governments different forms of assistance regarding 
the management, planning and assessment of public investment, the 
monitoring of the expenditure, the evaluation of projects, and the 
undertaking of cost-benefit analyses" (Camera dei deputati, 1993: 238). 
In 1987, the Department for European Community Policies was created to manage 
interaction between the national government and the European level, in terms of 
changing national legislation to comply with EC regulations and directives. When the 
cohesion policy was introduced in 1989 the Ministry for EC Affairs was given the 
responsibility of overseeing Structural Funds. Therefore, from 1989 onwards there was a 
significant overlap between the traditional approach to regional policy managed by the 
Agensud and the novel approach introduced by the EC during the first cycle of the 
cohesion policy. In the former the regions remained the objects of the policy while in the 
latter they became active participants in the policy. 
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These transitional years introduced a phase of reorganization for the central management 
of development policies and structural actions. Institutional, administrative and 
organizational adjustments were made in order to manage the conversion from a 
centralized management approach to a multi-level, decentralized one. The regional 
governments were formally recognized as equal actors in this new system and were 
called upon to contribute to the planning and eventual management of the EC resources 
while the national level continued to be oblivious of the regional role in regional policy. 
The operationalization of these changes proved to be far more difficult than expected, 
confirming that the Casmez had acted as a substitute for the lack of territorial 
institutional capacities, ultimately leading to the consolidation of a policy environment 
that could be defined: 
"as if the whole of the activities related to local development could be 
conceived and realised outside of the regional administrative structure" 
(Barca 1998, as cited in Gualini 2004). 
3.3 European Union regional policy 
3.3.1 The Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (1986-1992) 
The increased power of the regions was also attributable to the Integrated Mediterranean 
Programmes (IMPs) launched in 1985, which was a prelude to the eventual form of 
multilevel governance of cohesion policy. In fact, the IMPs represented the most 
advanced model of a multi-annual programme during the 1986-1989 period because of 
its adoption of an integrated and territorialized approach, which suggested a real change 
in the role attributed by the policy-makers to the regions. 
The IMPs were created in response to the fear of France, Italy, and Greece that the entry 
of Spain and Portugal into the European Community would undermine their ability to 
compete on an equal basis in the field of Mediterranean agricultural projects (Leonardi, 
2005), even though once the programmes were finalized the projects to be financed were 
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not limited to the agricultural sector (Art. 2, Reg, 2088/85). 39 The IMPs were 
operationalized in the form of 29 programmes operating in the three Mediterranean 
countries 40 The approval of the IMPs Regulation n. 2088 on 23 July 1985 introduced 
three major innovations, which sowed the seeds for the principles incarnated in 1988 by 
the Structural Funds. 
Firstly, they created a collection of comprehensive, integrated and multi-annual 
development programmes as the basis for the allocation of funds. 1 Secondly, they 
introduced a new legal framework for the operationalization of the programmes, which 
represented the formalization of the concept of institutional partnership. Article 10 of 
Regulation 2088/85 established that: 
"Given that the EC participation rate could not exceed 70% of the total cost 
of any planned investment, member states, regional authorities and other 
public and private bodies needed to cover the remaining 30%. The rights and 
duties of the parties in the IMPs were defined in a programme contract that 
made the IMPs provisions compulsory and legally binding"(Bianchi, 1993: 
68). 42 
As we have seen, up until this point in time the bargaining, decision-making, and 
implementation processes had been dominated by the national governments. 
"The IMPs, instead, introduced a novel institutional principle of partnership 
in making decision and implementing the programmes that placed emphasis 
on the actions by sub-national levels of government and administrative 
39 Art 2: `The operations shall concern the various spheres of economic activity: agriculture, fisheries and 
related activities, including the agri-food industries; energy; crafts and industry, including building and 
public works; services, including tourism". 
40 The 29 programmes were divided as follows: seven in Greece; seven in France and 14 in Italy. Also, a 
sectorial programme aimed to address the agricultural problems in the lagoon areas of the northern 
Adriatic. 
41 "The creation of the IMPs for the first time broke the predominance of the sectorial approach to policy' 
making which had characterized in the past the use of the three Structural Funds. With the IMPs the 
Community for the first time adopted an explicit 'integrated' strategy designed to coordinate investments 
in industry, agriculture, and services with infrastructure development and vocational training, so that 
Community investment programmes could become cumulative in impact and leverage adequate additional 
resources to trigger a process of endogenous and sustainable local development. " (Leonardi, 2005: 47). 
42 The legally binding contract between the Commission and member states/regions committed both sides 
to the provisions contained in the overall programme. No one party to the agreement had the ability to act 
unilaterally to change the nature, conditions, or contents of the programme. In this manner, changes to the 
programme were kept to a minimum, and where changes were made they had to be agreed by all members 
of the Monitoring Committee. Otherwise, the Community had the right to withdraw the money allocated. 
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structures. With the IMPs the regional governments became central to the 
process and, through them, private interest groups. " (Leonardi, 2005: 47) 
In this new institutional framework the role of the regions was increasingly relevant. 
They were required to perform novel tasks such as developing the programmes to be 
financed, implementing the individual "measures" and "actions"43 contained in the 
programmes, and monitoring the progress of the actions taken. 
Thirdly, the IMPs dictated for the first time a provision for monitoring 44 and assessing45 
the Programme (Council Regulation, 2088/85: Art 6). 
The IMPs experience proved to be immensely valuable, providing not only new 
concepts such as multi-annual programme design, integration of interventions, relevance 
of monitoring and assessment, but also creating space for the role of the regional level 
(CEC, 1989). Thus, by the mid-1980s national governments were no longer the 
exclusive arbiters of regional development policies within their borders. A new period 
was about to begin, with a new actor in a position to dominate the scene: the regional 
government. Would it be able to play this role? 
The Italian experience 
The 14 Italian regions that received additional support from the IMPs included eight 
southern regions - Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Calabria, Puglia, Sicily, Sardinia and 
Basilicata - and six from the central north - Lazio, Umbria, Marche, Emilia Romagna, 
Toscana, and Liguria. As we have seen, this is the first time that the regions were asked 
43 Measures represent groups of similar projects while actions constitute the individual project. 
44 The implementation of the IMPs was managed by a Monitoring Committee whose members were 
representative of the three contracting parties - European Commission, national governments, regions - 
and of socio-economic groups. Responsibility for monitoring the administration and impact of the IMPs 
was allocated to an independent technical unit provided by the regions. aS The IMPs regulation inserted the requirement for ex ante and ex post assessments of the Programme. 
Prior to its implementation, the authorities responsible for implementing the IMP were called upon to 
undertake an ex-ante evaluation which would render explicit the expected outputs (quantification of 
results) and outcomes (quantification of the multiplier effect in terms of GDP, jobs and private 
investments) of the programme. Once the programme was completed an ex post evaluation was to be 
carried out in order to measure whether the expected outputs and outcomes had been realized. In most 
cases it was never carried out. The IMPs provided a small budget for technical assistance so that the 
Monitoring Committees could tender to external firms the tasks of evaluating how the programmes had 
been carried out and of measuring their socio-economic impact (Council Regulation, 2052/88). 
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to participate in the formulation of a programme, not only in Italy but also in the other 
two Member States. 
The EC approved the programmes presented by Greece and France in 1987, whereas 
authorization of the Italian programmes was delayed until the end of 1988. The delay in 
Italy was due to the difficulties encountered by the Italian regions in selecting the 
projects to include in the programmes. This lack of project selection capacity was 
evident from the dramatic reduction in the initial financial allocation required by the 
regions. The regional proposal of 10.5 billion of ECU was halved by the national 
government - i. e. it was reduced to 5 billion ECU. The programme eventually approved 
by the Commission was for a total amount of 2.5 billion ECU, half of which was EU 
funded. The difficulty encountered in selecting the projects was indicative of the 
regions' lack of experience in planning the use of resources according to an integrated, 
multi-annual approach. 
Along with the programming difficulties, problems also arose in the implementation 
phase. The delays in the implementation of the IMPs in Italy resulted in a low level of 
expenditure. Indeed, by 1991 Italy had spent only 17% of its allocation whereas France 
and Greece respectively had spent 58% and 68% of their allocation (Fanfani, 2001) 
(Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 IMPS allocations 1986-1992 (Mecu) and % of expenditure at the end of 1991 
MEMBER 
STATES 
Total 
Allocation 
Payments % of expenditure 
France 843,52 487,88 58% 
Greece 2.000,00 1.361,62 68% 
Italy 1.256,48 219,31 17% 
OTAL 4.100,00 2.068,81 50% 
Source: Corte dei conti, 1991. 
Not all regions experienced the same difficulty in managing the programme. Indeed, a 
strong variation in performance was already evident across the regions (Table 3.2). 
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Table 3.2 Regional !P IPs allocations 1986-1992 and % of expenditure at the end of 1991 
Region Total Allocation 
(Mecu) 
Payments 
(Mecu) 
% of 
expenditures 
Marche 88,97 17,17 19.2 
Umbria 83,98 18,75 22.3 
Lazio 58,15 14,55 25.1 
Emilia Roma a 80,27 24.12 30.2 
Liguria 52,12 11,59 22.3 
Toscana 114,22 38,66 33.6 
Laguna Adriatica 42,98 2,97 7.2 
Total Northern Italy 520,69 117,81 22,6 
Molise 58,57 15,43 26.3 
Abruzzo 79,4 18,22 23.2 
Puglia 99,97 20,82 20.8 
Basilicata 93,49 16.78 17.9 
Calabria 119,96 13,52 11.3 
Sardinia 96,32 10,13 10.5 
Campania 75,75 3,9 5.2 
Sicily 112,33 3,7 3.3 
Total Southern Italy 735,79 101,50 13.2 
[TOTAL Italy 1.256,48 219,31 16.7 
Source: Corte dei Conti, 1991 
A good level of performance was achieved by all of the northern regions, except the 
multi-regional Lacuna Adriatica IMP. In the south the average level of implementation 
was much lower, and the situation presented was very heterogeneous. A relatively good 
performance was registered by some southern regions (Abruzzo, Molise and Puglia), an 
intermediate level by others (Basilicata, Calabria and Sardinia), whereas an almost 
complete implementation deadlock was evident in Campania and Sicily. 
Fanfani (2001) has argued that the low level of expenditure was due, on one hand, to the 
lack of technical expertise and administrative capacity of the regional governments when 
it came to designing and implementing integrated development programmes, and, on the 
other, to the new approach introduced by the Community, i. e. the need to coordinate a 
multi-level system of governance in relation to the policy. In a similar fashion, Sapienza 
(1993) suggests that difficulties in implementing the IMPs were related to 
inconsistencies and duplication in the central and administrative apparatus, as well as to 
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the difficulties regions encountered in gaining full acknowledgment of their role from 
the central government. This was considered "normal", if we remember that when the 
IMPs were introduced in 1986, the regions were still under the centralized control of the 
national government when it came to regional development policies. Gualini (2004) 
adds that factors related to a differentiated administrative capacity between the regions 
and the central government and within the regions played a major role. 
However, neither Gualini nor Fanfani specifies which administrative capacity was 
missing, whereas Buti (1995: 228) identifies some specific political and administrative 
factors that impeded the success of the IMPs, namely: extreme instability of the 
government; short-term strategies of regional development; fragmentation of 
responsibilities; and the absence of a culture of monitoring. The limitation of Buti's 
suggestion is that these factors were not in any way tested in the various regions. 
Bianchi (1993), who has examined the IMPs experience in four regional cases, 
concluded that 
"the determinants for success or failure of the IMPs were more likely to be 
found in the institutional performance of the government rather than in the 
economic structure of the local area" (Bianchi, 1993: 65). 
These findings corroborate further my suggestion of looking at administrative capacity 
as a determinant factor for the implementation of the resources. 
The data shown above suggests that the centralized approach used in the south but not in 
the north may have influenced the lack of administrative capacity, in terms of the ability 
to manage, programme and implement the policy. Furthermore, the data corroborate the 
hypothesis that, in the south, irrespectively of the overall centralized approach, some 
regions were developing differentiated capacities to deal with issues related to economic 
development. Looking at my selected case studies, there is already a clear gap between 
Sicily 46 and Basilicata. Therefore, the overall centralization of the policy cannot be 
46 Unfortunately, there is very little documentation available on the IMPs implementation and on the first 
cycle of Structural Funds. The most reliable information is that found in the evaluation report carried out 
by external evaluators appointed by the region and the information acquired through my own interviews 
(cf. Chapter 5). What clearly emerges is that the regional government in Sicily did not have the means to 
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considered an explanatory variable to account for differences among the regions, as is 
suggested by some authors (cf. Section 2.3.3). 
3.3.2 The beginning of Structural Funds programming (1989-1993) 
In 1989, three years after the introduction of the IMPs, the first Structural Funds 
programming period began. Its framework clearly followed from the experience gained 
from the IMPs. As discussed in Chapter 1, the reform of 1988 launched an innovative 
approach to regional policy, based on multilevel governance with regional governments 
taking part in the different stages of the policy cycle - i. e. decision-making, 
programming, implementing, monitoring and evaluation. Since then, we have seen 
some dramatic changes in the internal structure of nation states. Where regions did not 
exist, they were created as a tier of governance to activate the partnership triangle of the 
European Commission, national government and regional government. Where they 
already existed, regions moulded their institutional setting to fit the European 
regulations. In both cases a process of institutional adjustment was set in motion, with 
institutional frameworks converging toward a two- or multi-tier system of governance 
according to the willingness of national governments to involve just regional 
governments or also to include local private, public and social partners in policy- 
making. 
These institutional changes represented an important step forward in policy-making. 
Nevertheless, some authors (Bailey and De Propris 2002; Hooghe 1998) identify only an 
entitlement of the regions to European funding in the above process. Such studies claim 
that the 1988 reform overestimated the capacity of the regions to activate such 
entitlement through effective participation. 
manage the newly introduced programme in contrast to the situation in Basilicata. In Sicily there was a 
blurring of responsibilities among the administrative staff and the different assessorates, and the region 
was not familiar with any long term planning or monitoring and evaluation processes (Arthur Andersen, 
1995; 1997). Furthermore, the administrative bottlenecks were exacerbated by the constant interference of 
the political class and the continuous change of government and political leaders (Interview with Giuseppe 
Morale, member of the Regional European Community Group in charge of managing the IMP and 
Structural Funds in Sicily, Palermo, 4/07/2005). 
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On a more positive note, Nanetti (1996) looked at the participation of national, 
supranational and subnational actors in the implementation of the CSF after the 1988 
reform in five of the seven Member States with Objective 1 regions: Italy and Spain, 
which had regional systems; Greece and Portugal, which had recently created regional 
administrative planning systems; and Ireland, where the whole territory was the basis for 
a regional plan. Nanetti (1996: 86-87) concluded that 
"[d]espite national governments retaining almost exclusive powers of 
negotiation with the Commission over policy formation, the early years of 
implementation of the first CSFs proved the slow47 but steady emergence of 
the regional level as the new institutional partner of the Commission in the 
operationalization and monitoring of broad-based development policies". 
In such a framework, major problems arose at all stages. Again, the Italian 
implementation rate was very poor compared to that of the other EU Member States 
(Table 3.3), and the variation between the southern Italian regions was accentuated 
(Table 3.4). 
Table 3.3 EU Objective 1 Structural Funds allocations 1989-1993 (NIecu) and % of expenditure 
MEMBER TOTAL 
STATES Structural Funds 
Ob. 1 
Structural Funds 
% of expenditure 
of Ob. 1 funds 
Ireland 4.901 4.460 95% 
Portugal 9.461 8.451 91% 
Spain 15.086 10.171 87% 
Greece 9.161 7.528 84% 
France 6.942 957 84% 
United Kingdom 5.329 793 83% 
Germany 6.431 2.955 79% 
Italy 11.872 8.504 73% 
OTAL 71.368 43.819 
Source: Author's elaboration on EC Seventh Annual Report on Structural Funds, 1995 
4' The author made a clear distinction between decentralized and centralized countries. In the latter the 
national authorities had much more power and dominated most of the process. 
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Table 3.4 Italian Structural Funds allocations 1989-1993 (1 Iecu) and % of expenditure 
REGION FUNDS 
AVAILABLE in 
Meuro 
(%)FUNDS SPENT 
(by 31/12/1993) 
(%)FUNDS SPENT 
(by 31/12/1996) 
Basilicata 768 56% 92% 
Abruzzo 593 34% 79.80% 
Calabria 1.156 44% 79.50% 
Sardinia 1.087 51% 77.40% 
Molise 344 54% 77% 
Sicily 1.687 39% 64% 
Campania 1.617 31% 61.80% 
Puglia 1.027 45% 57.30% 
Source: Author's elaboration on EC Ninth Annual Report on Structural Funds, 1997 
Although the literature on Structural Funds implementation in Italy over the period 
1989-1993 is very limited, the failure to spend the funds allocation fully during the first 
planning cycle can be attributed to two main factors, which are consistent with my 
hypothesis: (1) blurring of responsibilities, both between national and regional 
government, and within the regional government; and (2) the lack of alignment between 
Italian regional policy and the EU approach. 
First of all, 
"the lack of clarity of responsibility between the regional and the national 
level which gave rise to significant inter-institutional conflicts led to 
inefficient policy-making and high coordination cost" (Grote, 1996: 260). 
However, most regional governments seemed to have accepted this unequal and unclear 
situation because the expected payoff seemed to be quite high (Hine, 1993). Therefore, 
in this confused and centralized situation, responsibilities for failure or for inefficient use 
of resources could always be shifted to the centre. Ultimately, the lack of accountability 
of the regional political class left room for discretion in the expenditure of resources, not 
necessarily according to economic criteria, but most of the time according to personal 
agendas. Indeed, Bianchi (1993) hints that poor administrative capacity at the regional 
level was attributable to the constant interference of regional politicians. This practice 
deprived the regional civil servants of discretionary powers, and forced them to become 
mere executors of administrative acts. Regional programming, in circumstances such as 
these, is destined to fail because planning becomes almost impossible. In Italy during 
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this period there was no provision for the separation of powers and responsibilities 
between the political and administrative spheres, and so the political class acted in an 
intrusive fashion according to its personal interests, and was far from following a 
technocratic approach. 
Secondly, as Trigilia (1992) has pointed out, the Italian approach to regional policy did 
not contain many of the features that had been built into the EU's cohesion policy 
approach. This is the classical "lack of fit" argument, which is used in other contexts to 
explain the difficulties countries have encountered in incorporating European level 
legislation into their individual policy structures (Cowels et al., 2001). Indeed, at the 
national level and consequently at the regional level there was no management structure 
in charge of coordinating a long-term development plan; programming was based on 
short-term goals and most of the time these goals were not tied to real territorial needs; 
and monitoring or evaluation procedures were deficient. Therefore, the capacity to 
manage the new cohesion policy adequately was missing at both the national and 
regional level because of the policy's innovative structure and direction. 
Additionally, I suggest two further elements that might have impeded successful policy 
implementation. The first is the high level of government instability in Italy, which had 
48 different governments over the period (1950-1992), an average of 0.9 governments 
per year (cf. Annex VI). In this national scenario, it is predictable that the regions, which 
are all subject to national intervention, would have felt the impact of government 
instability in undermining the predictability of government programmes. Therefore, the 
fact that some regions, such as Basilicata, managed to perform well, is worthy of 
attention. 
A second reason for the poor performance both during the IMPs and the first Structural 
Funds planning period could be attributed to the confusion and overlapping 
responsibilities created by the still existing Intervento straordinario. The centralized 
approach ended with Law n. 488/1992, which closed the Agensud. Then, in 1993, in 
Decreto Legislativo (Digs. ) (Legislative Decree) n. 96, the term "Mezzogiorno", used to 
refer to southern Italy, was replaced with the European Commission's phrase "depressed 
104 
areas or Objective 1 areas", and the content and principles of the interventions became 
those of the EU regional policy. 
This D. lgs. marked the beginning of the second phase of regional policy in Italy, which 
was characterized by a bottom-up approach capable of considering the regional 
governments and supporting administrative capacity development. This will be 
extensively investigated in Chapter 4, but before concluding this chapter I want to trace 
the overall features of the two case studies - Sicily and Basilicata - over the first phase 
of regional policy. 
3.4 The background of the two case studies: administrative and political aspects 
The above retrospective, which looked at the features and results of the first period of 
regional policy, has highlighted two main issues. Firstly, the previous literature has 
attributed the poor performance of some regional administrations to weak administrative 
capacity, but it has not clarified the exact nature of the "capacity" under scrutiny and 
how this has affected the policy outcomes. Secondly, it appears clear that the centralized 
method of management has equally affected all of the southern regions, and so it is far 
from an adequate explanatory variable. Although it can account for the overall lag of the 
southern regions, it does not explain why some regions in the south were able to perform 
better than others. The reason behind this variation does not appear to lie in different 
levels of social capital or in economic factors (cf. Section 1.6). 
In order to investigate other reasons for this variation, in 'this section we will examine 
the experience of two regional governments during the first phase of the Italian regional 
policy, 1950-1992, briefly recalling their historic backgrounds and their political and 
administrative features. Although this period is not the concern of my study, it is 
essential in comparing the two case studies and excluding other possible explanations of 
their different regional performances. 
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In 1985, Robert Putnam, Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Nanetti published the most 
extensive study made about the establishment and growth of the ordinary regions in Italy 
between 1970 and 1982. Summarizing their findings, it appears that during that period 
the level of regional performance was very limited, "a lot of time was wasted and many 
opportunities were missed" (Putnam et al., 1985: 107). 
Most of the regions' initial administrative difficulties were due to the recruitment and 
training of personnel that was transferred to them from other public administrations. 
Indeed, the legislation that established the regions had stipulated that the regional 
government could not recruit new personnel but had to staff the regional administration 
with workers transferred from the national ministries or semi-public agencies, or from 
local government (Law n. 6211953 for special statute regions, Art. 65-70 and subsequent 
Law n. 281/1970, Art. 17 for ordinary statute regions). This provision effectively 
excluded the possibility of a regional government selecting its own employees. It is 
arguable whether the regions would have recruited employees based on merit, had they 
the opportunity to select their own personnel. The study noted that in many cases when 
the regions did have the power to recruit new staff their selection criteria used was based 
more on clientelism48 and party affiliation than on technical capacity and expertise. 
"Too much money has been spent on doorkeepers, chauffeurs, and phantom 
jobs of various sorts. Neither the National transfer system nor the regional 
recruitment system has produced a class of officials eager and able to 
implement innovative regional policy" (Putnam et al., 1993: 50). 
From the same study, a negative picture of the regional administrator emerged: 
"Regional administrators were often unmotivated, unprofessional, inefficient 
and unqualified. Regional officials were eager to get their input and the basic 
policy directions are often admirable. But implementing those policies has 
been proven beyond the capacity of many regional agencies. Bureaucratic 
procedures (patterned too often on the practices of the central 
administration) were maddeningly slow and inefficient, cramped by controls 
designed to assure procedural regularity, not real effectiveness. " (Putnam et 
al., 1993: 49) 
48 Clientelism is defined in the literature as a "pattern of political integration that is linked directly to the 
inflexibility, disjunctiveness and fragmentation of the stratification system of Mezzogiorno. Hence politics 
is non ideological, broad functional interests cannot be expressed and access to authority can expand only 
through the further vertical extension of the clientele link. One reaches the structure of authority, not by 
merging one's demand with parallel demands of others, but by linking oneself to a hierarchical chain of 
personal acquaintance that reaches power holders at the higher level. " (Tarnow, 1967: 74). 
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Agencies of the regional government acted in mutual ignorance, without coordination 
with one another or other levels of government. 
As we saw in Section 3.2.1, it was with the D. lgs. n. 616/1977 that the regions were 
given substantial autonomy in the legislation area. Indeed, if up until then their 
autonomy had been strongly constrained, from 1978 onwards the process of devolution 
of power from the centre to the periphery increased. Greater autonomy called for greater 
responsibilities and capacity in properly implementing the newly acquired power. 
Indeed, Putnam et al. (1985) conclude that over 15 years (1970-1985) the ordinary 
regions had been more capable of producing legislation than the special statute regions 
created 20 years before. Although we have to remember that the regional planning area 
was still in the hands of the state, the established regional units gained no real 
experience in this area. We have to wait until 1988, the year of the Structural Funds 
reform, to witness a switch in the responsibility for planning and implementation from 
the national to the regional level. 
Within this overall situation, what we are interested in is to focus on the more specific 
characteristics of Sicily and Basilicata, in order to understand how two regions located 
in the same national context could have produced such different sets of implementation 
performance. The next two sections will highlight some features of both regions in order 
to provide an understanding of their respective backgrounds. 
3.4.1 The first of five special regions: Sicily 
The historic background (1860-1946) 
Sicily was the first of the four special statute regions established in Italy in 1946. The 
Sicilian eagerness to become an independent region from the rest of Italy is rooted in the 
historical process of state making and in the propensity of the various governments that 
have dominated Sicily over the years - whether Bourbon, Savoyard, Fascist or 
Republican - to impose central programmes of development on the island. The year 
1812 marked a milestone in Sicily's ambitions to be an independent region, when a 
constitution for the island was secretly written by the aristocracy of the time. The 
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subsequent events, marked by the fall of Napoleon and the inclusion of Sicily under the 
Piedmont regime postponed the Sicilian dream for more than a hundred years 49 
The exploitation of Sicily by each different government created discontent among the 
townspeople, who witnessed a decline in the social and economic conditions of the 
island. Many popular movements (movimenti popolari) were established during those 
years but none succeeded in obtaining the freedom from the external dominator 
(Spataro, 2001). 
It was during the Second World War, precisely in 1942, that the Comitato per 
l'Indipendenza della Sicilia (CIS) (Committee for the Independence of Sicily) was 
created (Marino, 1979). The first President and leader was Andrea Finocchiaro Aprile, 
while the members and significant contributors to the activities of the committee came 
from the mafia organization (Paternö Castello, Duca Di Carcaci, 1977). Sicily was, at 
this moment in time, "nelle mani di nessuno" (under nobody's domain) and so 
Finocchairo asked for the abdication of Vittorio Emanuele III. The CIS was soon 
transformed into a real political movement, the Movimento per l'Indipendenza della 
Sicilia (MIS) (Movement for the Independence of Sicily). This political movement was 
based on a strong relationship between the political class and mafia representatives. 
In 1944, the MIS began military action to obtain independence from the Italian state. 
This action was supported by the Esercito Volontario per l'Indipendenza della Sicilia 
(EVIS) (Voluntary Army for the Independency of Sicily), whose guerrilla warfare 
continued until the 15 May 1946, when King Umberto II proclaimed a D. lgs., which 
attributed to the Island of Sicily a Special Statute of Autonomy. The Italian Constituent 
49'Fhe day after the unification of Italy, Conte Camillo Benso di Cavour imposed Piedmontese law on 
Sicily, ignoring that Sicily had its own laws and had a certain autonomy, which was developed during the 
Bourbon monarchy. This imposition provoked a hostile reaction from the Sicilians towards the piemontese 
regime. An exacerbating factor was the fact that Cavour sent civil servants and administrators from the 
northern region to rule Sicily. He justified this action by suggesting that Sicily was too corrupt and that 
clientelismo was the political fashion of the island. The northern administrators were too different in their 
way of thinking and the Sicilians again perceived themselves as being exploited by external authorities. 
All these events built up an even stronger feeling for the independence of the region from the rest of Italy 
(Huri, 2005). 
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Assembly turned the statute into law on 26 February 1948 (Musumeci, 2005). The MIS 
disappeared from the political scenario after the first regional elections were held on 20 
April 1947 when it polled a disappointing 8.8% of the votes (Gaja, 1990). 
The history of Sicily, characterized by backwardness and underdevelopment, has 
attracted the attention of sociologists (Sabetti, 2002; Blok, 1974), economists 
(Centorrino and Signorino, 1990; Centorrino, 1986) and historians (Finley, 1986; 
Colajanni, 1894). Most of these authors point at the strong presence of the mafia in the 
region as a reason for the lack of development, along with the inefficiency of the 
institutions (Chubb, 1982; Gambetta, 1993). These authors attribute to the mafia a 
determining role in both the economic and the political life of the region. Block (1974) 
gives a clear excursus of the genesis of the mafia in Sicily. His analysis reveals that: 
"The element of Mafia became tangible in the early 19th century when a 
formative apparatus of a modem central government was superimposed upon 
a society still largely feudal in its main features. The predominance of large 
landed states, together with the considerable amount of autonomy enjoyed 
by local power-holders in both rural and urban areas, expressed the extent of 
Sicilian feudalisation During the long centuries of foreign rule, no 
government ever effectively penetrated this hinterland. Spanish objectives in 
Sicily were minimal: the production of modest revenues and the 
maintenance of order. For both, the outside authorities relied on the 
landowning barons who dominated local government" (Block, 1974: 89). 
FeudalismSO was abolished in 1816, but the situation was so rooted in the Sicilian culture 
that it pervaded the land reform that was thereafter implemented by the Bourbons. In 
1860 the centralization of power that was imposed by the piemontese met strong 
resistance from the privileged class that had always dominated Sicilian society. 
"At the end the central ruler had to come to terms with local vested interests. 
Mafia was born in a context of tensions between the central government and 
the local landowners on the one hand, and between the latter and peasants on 
the other. "(Block, 1974: 92) 
50 Feudalism indicates a political and economic system that operated in Europe from the 9th to around the 
15th century, based on the holding of all land in fief, or fee, and the resulting relationship between lord 
and vassal, which was characterized by homage, legal and military service of tenants, and forfeiture 
(Gaudioso, 1969). 
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The mafia gained significant power by managing these tensions and acting as a link 
between the three counterparts. The mafia strengthened links with the government and in 
some cases became part of it (Block, 1974: 94) 
Without discrediting the validity of the sociological or historical approach, or the mafia 
explanation, I aim to investigate the role of another variable, administrative capacity, in 
determining the low performance of Sicily with regard to the object of my analysis - i. e. 
Structural Funds implementation. Operationalising a more concrete and measurable 
variable, such as administrative capacity, allows us to single out factors that can 
eventually be modified in order to improve the level of performance. 
Political and administrative features (1946-1990) 
After the election of 1947, the Sicilian region was conceived as an intermediate level of 
government endowed with its own powers guaranteed within its own Statute. The 
creation of the region was meant to bring more homogeneity to a land that since 1860 
had been administratively subdivided into a large number of small provinces (De 
Stefano, F. and Oddo, F. L., 1963: 65-94). 
The region was invested with legislative power, i. e. the power to issue normative actions 
not inferior to the laws of the State, but of equal force and value, even though within 
enumerated competences. Three main bodies constituted the special region of Sicily, 
namely the Assembly" (Assemblea), the Cabinet (Giunta) and the President of the 
region. The last two represented the executive body of the region, while the Assembly 
held legislative power. 
The Cabinet is composed by the Presidents and the Assessori (Assessors). At the 
beginning, the Assembly elected the President, but in 2001 L. cost. n. 2 changed the 
procedure. Now the President is elected by direct universal suffrage along with the 
members of the Assembly. The President appoints the Assessori, who are in charge of 
31 Ninety deputies elected by universal suffrage constitute the Assembly, which lasts 5 years. The Sicilian 
Assembly recalls the body of a similar name that was constituted in 1130 by Ruggero II di Siclia of the 
Altavilla Dynasty. It became the first Parliament in Europe. 
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the various branches of the regional administration, namely the assessorato 
(assessorate)52. In each assessorato, along with the political head or assessore figure, 
there is an administrative head, namely a general manager (dirigente generale). The 
general manager is the highest administrative position and he is in charge of the entire 
department. Under this position are the division managers, who are in charge of the 
specific areas into which the department is divided. 
Although there was not a formalized separation of responsibilities between the 
administrative and political powers during the first fifty-four years of the regional 
government in Sicily, the division was formalized by Regional Law (L.. R. ) n. 10 in 
2000.53 
After the first regional elections on 20 April 1947, the first President of the Sicilian 
Region was Giusppe Alessi. Alessi belonged to the Democrazia CristianaS4 (DC) party 
and was a member of the CIS. He was President over the period 1947-1949 until Franco 
Restivo, who belonged to the same party, replaced him. He returned to the Sicilian 
presidency in 1955 just for one year. 
A shake-up in the DC presidency came when Silvio Milazzo" was elected in 1958. He 
was a former DC member who had gone on to set up his own party, Unione Siciliana 
52 There are twelve assessorates: presidency; agriculture and forestry; cultural assets and public education; 
budget and finance; cooperation, commerce, handicraft and fishery; social family, political and local 
autonomies; industry; public works; social security, professional training, emigration and immigration; 
health; environment; tourism, communications and transport. 
53 Even though a first attempt can be seen during the implementation of the second cycle of Structural 
Funds 1994-1999. 
sa La Democrazia Cristiana (DC - Christian Democratic Party) was an Italian party of Christian- 
democratic inspiration, which was moderate and represented the centre. It was founded in October 1942 
by Alcide De Gasperi together with representatives of the disbanded Italian People's Party (PPI) of Don 
Luigi Sturzo and of the "Movimento Guelfo d'Azione" (Guelph Movement of Action) of Piero Malvestiti 
and other intellectuals originally from Catholic organizations. In the political elections of 1992, DC 
obtained 29.6% of the total vote (its historical minimum). In the same year the scandal of "Tangentopoli" 
broke out and, after over fifty years of activity, the crisis over the inquisition of "Mani Pulite" caused the 
party (led by Mino Martinazzoli) to announce a change in its name on 18 January 1994 to that of the party 
founded by Sturzo in 1919: the Italian People's Party (PPI). For a discussion of the collapse of the DC and 
what substituted it, see Leonardi and Alberti (2004) and Nanetti (2006). 
ss The importance of his political activity is as such that it is known as "milazzismo". The term refers to 
the aim of setting up political coalitions between right and left in order to exclude the centre government. 
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Cristiano Sociale (USCS), in order to unseat the DC. His success lasted until 1961 when 
the DC returned to power. The DC's reign then lasted until 1991 (Table 3.5). 
The data shown in Table 3.5 reveals that the Sicilian Region has experienced significant 
political instability since its establishment. 
Table 3.5 Regional governments in Sicily (1947-1989) 
I Legislature (25-05-1947 to 12-04.1951) I Legislature (11-06-1967 to 03-04-1971) 
Gover 
nment 
Period President 22° 11-8-1967 to 30-9-1967 V. Giummarra 
(DC) 
1° 30-5-1947 to 9-3-1948 G. Alessi (DC) 3° 30-9-1967 to 24-4-1968 V. Carollo (DC) 
° 9-3-1948 to 12-1-1949 . Alessi (DC) 24° 24-4-1968 to 
27-2-1969 V. Carollo (DC) 
° 12-1-1949 to 12-4-1951 F. Restivo (DC) 5° 27-2-1969 to 29-4-1970 M. Fasino (DC) 
II Legislature (02-07-1951 to 05-04-1955) 26° 29-4-1970 to 19-2-1971 M. Fasino (DC) 
° 20-7-1951 to 05-04-1955 F. Restivo (DC) 7° 19-2-1971 to 3-4-1971 M. Fasino (DC) 
II Legislature (04-07-1955 to 05-04-1959) II Legislature (13-06-1971 to 29-04-1976) 
° 27-7-1955 to 27-9-1956 G. Alessi (DC) 28° 10-8-1971 to 11-10-1971 M. Fasino (DC) 
° 11-9-1956 to 26-11-1957 G. La Loggia (DC) 9° 11-10-1971 to 23-12-1972 M. Fasino (DC) 
° 26-11-1957 to 31-10-1958 G. La Loggia (DC) 0° 3-12-1972 to 27-3-1974 V. Giumm4rra 
(DC) 
° 31-10-1958 to 5-4-1959 S. Milazzo (USCS) 1° 27-3-1974 to 29-4-1976 A. Bonfiglio(DC) 
IV Legislature (07-07-1959 to 22-03.1963) III Legislature (20-06-1976 to 22-04-1981) 
° 12-8-1959 to 18-12-1959 S. Milazzo (USCS) 2° 13-8-1976 to 20-3-1978 A. Bonfiglio (DC) 
10° 18-12-1959 to 23-2-1960 S. Milazzo (USCS) 3° 21-3-1978 to 15-3-1979 S. Mattarella (DC) 
11° 23-2-1960 to 30-6-1961 
( 
B. Majorana 
USCS) 4° 
15-3-1979 to 2-5-198 
S. Mattarella (DC) 
12° 30-6-1961 to 9-9-1961 S. Corallo (PCI) 15° 2-5-1980 to22-4-1981 M. D'Ac uisto (DC) 
13° 9-9-1961 to 11-8-1962 G. D'Angelo (DC) IX Legislature (21-06-1981 to 01-05-1986) 
14° 11-8-1962 to 19-10-1962 G. D'Angelo (DC) 16° 7-8-1981 to 23-12-1982 M. D'Ac uisto (DC) 
I5° 19-10-1962 to 22-3-1963 . D'Angelo (DC) 7° 23-12-82 to 20-10-1983 C. LoGiudice (DC) 
V Le gislature (09-006-1963 to 03-04-1967) 18° 20-10-1983 to 22-3-1984 S. Nicita 
16° 25-7-1963 to 20-8-1963 G. D'Angelo (DC) 9° 22-3-1984 to 1-2-1985 M. Sardo (DC) 
17° 20-8-1963 to 29-1-1964 G. D'Angelo (DC) 0° 11- 2-1985 to 1-5-1986 R. Nicolosi (DC) 
18° 29-1-1964 to 5-8-1964 G. D'Angelo (DC) Le gislature (22.06.1986 to 01-05-1991) 
19° 5-8-1964 to 9-1-1967 F. Coniglio (DC) 1° 31-7-1986 to 6-8-1987 R. Nicolosi (DC) 
20° 9-3-1966 to 20-1-1967 F. Coniglio (DC) 2° 6-8-1987 to 12-1-1988 R. Nicolosi (DC) 
21° 20-1-1967 to 03-04-1967 F. Coniglio (DC) 3° 12.1-1988 to 14-12-1989 R. Nicolosi (DC) 
4° 14-12-1989 to 1-5-1991 R. Nicolosi (DC) 
Source: Author's elaboration of data from the Sicilian Regional Assembly database. 
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The database of the Regional Assembly recording the first ten legislatures (1947-1991) 
shows that there have been 44 governments over 44 years. The instability is such that the 
region has had on average one government per year. This instability was not caused by 
a change in coalition, but by frequent changes of presidents and reshuffles of assessori 
during the legislatures. Indeed, it was impossible to reach agreement within the coalition 
on keeping a leader for a significant length of time, because of the fear that he would 
become too powerful (Semaforo, 1962). 
I believe that this government instability created a political class that was not in a 
position to address the long-term planning of resources; that was not accountable for its 
actions, and whose subjugation to short-term mandates fostered an attitude of 
intervention aimed at gaining as much as possible in terms of personal reward over a 
short period of time. 
Some other authors who have highlighted the reason behind the malfunctioning of the 
regional body and the disappointing output of the development programmes, which has 
ultimately been very small, confirm my assumption. In Palmeri's words, 
"[t]he short time that each president was governing the regional government 
was not enough to implement any consistent development plan, but allowed 
each president to pursue its own interests" (Palmeri, 2002: 4). 
The list of authors who have critically analysed the political and administrative situation 
in Sicily runs into the hundreds. Here I mention only some of them. Antinori (1877), 
Chiaramonte (1901), and Greco (1970) all point out the inefficiency of both the 
bureaucracy and the political class in producing any results which could benefit the 
region. Twenty and forty years respectively after the creation of the Sicilian Region, 
Moncada (1970) and Epstein (1992) denounced the "lack" of a development programme 
and held the regional administration, including both the bureaucrats and the politicians, 
responsible. 
Precisely, in Moncada's words: 
"The Sicilian government does not have a development programme tailored 
to the needs of the region. What we have is a programme, which is based on 
investing in industrialization. Just because this process has been successful 
in other regions it does not mean it will be successful here. 'Besides, no 
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matter how perfect a plan is, what makes it successful is the competence of 
the political and the bureaucratic class"(1970: 79-83). 
This affirmation highlights the lack of programming ability, which the Sicilian Region 
seems to have been unable to overcome. In his study, Moncada underlines that the 
failure to produce an adequate development programme was caused by a political class 
that was more concerned with fulfilling its own personal interests than those of the 
overall regions, and that uses resources to buy consensus instead of investing in the 
economic potential of the region. Furthermore, Moncada criticizes: 
"[t]he dozens of employees within the regional administration who do 
nothing or do not even go to work, who are more in number than is needed 
and who are clearly hired just for political reasons ruled by favouritism and 
patronage" (Moncada, 1970: 113). 
Along the same lines as Moncada, Giuseppe Palmeri and Alessandro Garilli (1981) 
described a political class that recruited personnel on the basis of party affiliation, 
without any meritocratic system. Indeed, Palmeri and Garilli noted that 70% of the civil 
servants recruited in Sicily during the period 1960-1980 were enrolled in the ruling 
political party. A similar consideration is highlighted by Stefano and Oddo (1963: 81): 
"It became common opinion that to become a civil servant, one did not need 
to be clever, or competent, or educated, or devoted to its job. What was 
needed was the "right" membership card of the ruling political party. " 
The political class tended to keep Sicily isolated from external interference. This attitude 
had repercussions for the approach to development policy as well as to the overall 
management of the region. Indeed, when Structural Funds were created and, previously, 
the IMPs, little attention was paid to them because they required opening the region to 
transparent regulation and procedures (cf. Chapter 5). 56 
56 Interview with Giuseppe Morale (Palermo: 4 July 2005) 
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3.4.2 The ordinary statue region: Basilicata 
The historic background 1860-1970 
Basilicata, on the instep of the Italian boot, has none of the organised crime history of 
Sicily or neighbouring Calabria 57 and Puglia. 58 Nowadays, it is best known for the 
vehemence with which the regional population united to rebuild the region after the 
earthquake of 1980, and with which the same population forced the central government 
to drop its plan to store radioactive waste by the sea in 2004. But its history is not as 
smooth as it seems. Indeed, since 1860 Basilicata has been subject to a widespread 
phenomenon called brigantaggio (banditry) . 
59 The civil war, which began with the aim 
of the peasant to win the lands, lasted over five years. Two thousands peasants led by 
Carmine Donatelli (best known as Crocco di Lagopesole) fought furiously so that in 
1862 the government declared the region to be under siege. In order to stop the civil war 
in Basilicata, the government had to send in 120,000 soldiers led by General Pallavicini. 
Finally, in 1865, after a very expensive war both economically and morally, the 
government succeeded in quelling the uprising (De Jaco, 1969). Looking back on these 
events, Sergi Pantaleone described them as pre-mafia (Pantaleone, 2003). Indeed, his 
original analysis of the mafia in Basilicata highlighted the existence of the phenomenon 
there. The difference between Basilicata and Sicily, Calabria or Puglia on this is that it is 
a very recent fact, and therefore less known, but still very significant and with highly 
damaging characteristics. Other authors (Vigna, Masciandaro, Roberti 1999; Sciarrone, 
1998; Bubbico, 1993) strongly support Panataleone's claims about the existence of a 
strong mafia component in the region of Basilicata. 
However, as I have maintained since the beginning of my analysis, I am not interested in 
investigating or using the mafia as a variable to account for the difference in regional 
57 The mafia association of Calabria is known as Ndrangheta 
58 The mafia association in Puglia is known as Sacra Corona Unita 
59 Since the Middle Ages, Basilicata has witnessed the struggle for control between Byzantines, Goths, 
Lombards, and Normans. In 1300 the region mobilized a strong opposition to the Svevis and afterwards 
against the Spanish domain. As in Sicily, many regimes have passed through Basilciata, and all of them 
have left the region poorer and more resentful than before. In Basilicata as in Sicily the most penalized 
class was the peasant class, which could not benefit from the ownership of the land. The Unification of 
Italy was seen as an opportunity to solve the land distribution problem. When this did not happen, the 
rural class rose up against the State, fuelling guerilla warfare and mainly banditism (Fuccella, 2002). 
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performances. The purpose of this historical background is just to prove that both 
regions were and are subject to the presence of forms of mafa. 
Over the years that followed the land occupation movement of the 1940s and the land 
reform policies of the central government in the 1950s, Basilicata witnessed a massive 
emigration that left most of the rural areas unpopulated, and consequently the agriculture 
sector faced a major crisis. Up until 1970, Basilicata had the poorest socio-economic 
conditions, so that it was generally described as a "subsidized region" and the "tail light 
of the Italian South" or "the South of the South" (Levi, 1945). Basilicata was divided 
into two provinces (i. e., Matera and Potenza) in a similar way to the other Italian 
regions, and the regional delineation functioned simply as a delimination of statistical 
boundaries. The situation changed when the regional government was established in 
1970 along with the other 14 ordinary regions in continental Italy. 
In 1982, twelve years later, Basilicata had an improved industrial and service sector, an 
increased employment level, and an improved infrastructure setting. `"This progress was 
due to the changing in the political and administrative reality" (Putnam et al., 1985: 50). 
Basilicata, similarly to the other southern Italian regions, was under the remit of the 
centralized Intervento Straordinario; nevertheless, unlike other regions, stach as Sicily, it 
was able to develop its own capacity in the area of regional policy even before the 
official institutions of the region were created. 
Leonardi et al. (1987: 40) identified the turning point as the experience of the CRPE. As 
mentioned in Section 3.2.2, this committee was present in each region and was in charge 
of planning interventions in the region. The experience of the CRPE varied across the 20 
regions and it was particularly good in Basilicata. Indeed, the experience was defined as 
"innovative in the way that for the first time the region identified its own 
path for future development, which was strongly related to the mobilization 
of internal political and social factors as well as external resources" 
(Leonardi et al., 1987: 40). 
If the CRPE represented the turning point, the IMPs symbolized the beginning of the 
introduction of an integrated method for the preparation and management of cohesion 
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policy (Regione Basilicata, 1996c: 5-6). Indeed, the IMPs regulation had a remarkable 
impact on the organizational and operational levels of the regional administration, in 
both the political and administrative spheres. Thus, the necessary implementation of an 
inter-sectorial programme financed by different funds served to open a dialogue and 
cooperation between different assessorati and departments. In the words of the 
assessore interviewed: 60 
"The IMPs have brought to light the awareness of. (i) the importance of 
having a central body for the coordination of actions; and (ii) the 
fundamental necessity for a constructive dialogue at three different levels - 
i. e. between the political parties; between the different administrative units 
(departments and assessorati); and between the political and administrative 
sphere". 
Conversely to the Sicilian experience, the Basilicata region "used" the IMPs as a 
laboratory for developing new administrative and planning capacities and organizational 
features, which proved to have a determining effect on the subsequent first cycle of the 
Structural Funds 1989-1993 61 
Political and administrative features (1970-1990) 
As in Sicily, three bodies constitute the regional government in Basilicata, namely the 
Council, the Cabinet and the President. In contrast to the Sicilian case, Basilicata is an 
example of high stability and coherence; indeed over its first four legislatures (from 
1970 until 1990) there were only five governments (Table 3.6) and only one reshuffle of 
the cabinet in 1982 (which was caused by the ill health of the regional president). 2 
60 Interview with Rocco Colangelo, Regione Basilicata (Potenza: 14 June 2006) 
61 Among other factors, which I will discuss in detail in chapter 5, which favored the spread of the IMP 
method within the region at both the administrative and political levels was strong government stability. 
62 The person who replaced Verrastro as president of the region, Carmelo Azzara', was the person 
responsible for regional planning during the previous giunta, thereby providing a continuity in the 
planning approach championed by the region in subsequent years. 
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Table 3.6 Regional governments in Basilicata (1970-1985) 
I Legislature (13-10-1970 to 06-09.1975) 
Government Period President 
10 from 13-10-1970 to 6-9-1975 V. Verrastro (DC) 
II Legislature (06-09-1975 to 08-09-1980) 
2° from 7-9-1975 to 8-9-1980 V. Verrastro (DC) 
III Legislature (09-09.1980 to 19-06-1985) 
3° from 9-9-1980 to 23-3-1982 V. Verrastro (DC) 
4° from 24-3-1982 to 19-6-1985 C. Azzarra'(DC) 
IV Legislature (20-06-1985 to 10-07.1990) 
5° from 20-06-1985 to 10-07-1990 M. Gaetano (DC) 
Source: Author's elaboration of data from Regional Assembly database 
Looking at the data on the first four Basilicata legislatures, a striking trend emerges. The 
governing coalition was centre-left, Democrazia Cristiana (DC), as was the case during 
the same period in Sicily and in Italy in general (for Italy see Annex IV). Nevertheless, 
in Basilicata the situation appears to have been the opposite to the scenario of political 
instability that was dominant in Sicily. The analysis of Leonardi et al. (1987: 69-116) 
reveals that the political government was very stable in Basilicata due to a series of 
mediated steps in moving from one phase of development to another - i. e. the first 
generation of political individuals involved in the regional government represented a 
mix of national and local administrators and new entrants. This mix of different people 
was coordinated by a political leadership, which succeeded in distributing responsibility 
among the various components and avoiding any form of inter-governmental or inter- 
coalition conflicts, thereby guaranteeing a rolling consensus on the most important 
decisions taken by the Cabinet and the Council. A process of depolarisation contributed 
to the low level of internal conflict, 63 which was also attributed to the personal qualities 
of the political leaders and to the succession of people, selected on the basis of their 
professional expertise, who were keen to find solutions based on open discussions to 
solve specific problems. 
63 Leonardi et al. (1987) conducted three rounds of interviews, in 1970,1976, and 1981, with components 
of opposite political parties: from this it emerged not only that the ideological differences among parties 
had diminished, but also that the degree of tolerance among political leaders of different parties had 
increased. 
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Governmental stability in Basilicata was key in creating a political class that was more 
concerned with long-term planning and more accountable for its own actions, in light of 
the fact that it could expect to lead the region for a considerable length of time (i. e., the 
time horizon for political leaders was the entire five year length of the legislature). 
Furthermore, in this political scenario, the administrative class was not subject to 
manipulations and interventions aimed at the gain of personal rewards (Leonardi et al., 
1985). 
If we look at the output of the four legislatures, 64we can reconstruct a smooth and 
coherent path of actions. During the first legislature, 1970-1975, the region elaborated its 
own model of planning, which was defined as "project planning", and was different 
from the more general "global planning" implemented in other Italian regions. The 
project planning approach was meant to find specific solutions for sectorial problems in 
order to intervene in a specific area or territory, rather than trying to find a global 
solution in the form of prescriptive planning that could be applied to any sector in any 
region (Regione Basilicata, 2001: 1-44). 
The beginning of the second legislature, which covered the period 1975-1980, was 
characterized by Law 183/1976, which formally recognised the role of the region in the 
decision-making process related to "extraordinary interventions". In this climate, 
Basilicata started to stake its position on economically related issues. Indeed, in 1978 the 
President of the region stated: 
"After 27 years, the extraordinary intervention in the south, which focused 
on infrastructure and the provision of subsidies for enterprises, has not 
delivered any possibility for the region to develop a self sustaining form of 
economic growth. The Basilicata region has various resources, which if 
adequately used, can guarantee a prosperous future. "(Basilicata Regione, 
2001: 60) 
60 For further information on the three legislatures, see also Leonardi et al., 1985 and Regione Basilicata 
2001. 
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This statement contained the seeds of what became in 1988 the new approach to regional 
policy - i. e. programming in order to develop local resources, rather than investing in an 
indiscriminate fashion. 
The third legislature, between 1980 and 1985, was marked by a natural disaster, an 
earthquake, which seriously damaged 55 municipalities, covering 45% of the whole 
territory and affecting 53% of the population. Besides the economic and human loss, the 
earthquake had two additional effects: on the one hand, it reinforced the political class of 
the region, which mounted an effort to thwart a centralized intervention in the 
reconstruction process on the part of the state, and on the other, it encouraged the 
allocation to the region of the responsibility to continue to promote its own 
reconstruction and development, which ultimately led to an improvement of the region's 
overall administrative capacity. In order to deliver efficient results, the region adopted a 
full development approach to regional policy, realizing that the subsidy development 
model could not guarantee the necessary results (Regione Basilicata, 2001: 87-132). 
The new regional development plan of 1983-1987 marked the beginning of the new 
approach to planning, based on a more endogenous approach that rejected the old, more 
exogenous approach formulated by the central government. The logic behind the 
endogenous approach adopted by the Basilicata region was as follows: (1) it was 
independent from the central control of the State; (2) it was based on territorial resources 
and needs; (3) it was necessary for the region to have planning and implementation 
capacity "in house" (in contrast, the "old" model was based on one easy concept, that 
decisions were made by the central authority irrespective of what the region wanted); 
and (4) the political leadership had the task of guaranteeing the overall interests of the 
region rather than the personal interests of a few or of a small group of governing 
parties. 
The third legislature ended in 1985 with the definition of the general basis for the new 
development model, but a lot of work was still necessary during the subsequent years to 
improve the methods and implementation principles in relation to the new European 
approach introduced by the IMPs and cohesion policy. In these sixteen years, the 
existence- of the regional institution contributed to the creation of a regional political 
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class independent of the influence of the central government, and willing to pursue the 
overall interest of the region (Leonardi et al., 1987: 71). The region's approach to 
regional planning proved to be pragmatic in nature in making sure that the region 
remained the centre of power and decision making and that the administrative apparatus 
became gradually accustomed to experimentation and adopting the best solutions 
available. 
The 1985-1990 legislature began with a clear declaration of what direction to follow. 
The political programme presented by the President was based on the need to renew the 
region's important economic sectors-i. e., agriculture, industry, tourism- in order to 
reach a stage of economic development based on balanced regional growth65. It was 
during this legislature, in 1986, that the IMPs were introduced and Basilicata was able 
to register a level of performance in terms of implementation (16%), which was above 
the average of the southern Italian regions (12,1%). A retrospective analysis of the 
documents (Regione Basilicata, 1986) highlight three main reasons for the good 
performance of the IMPs in Basilicata were tied to the activities and decisions taken by 
the political class: 1) the openness towards the involvement of the private sector and of 
the local communities; 2) the decision to create a working group which would act as a 
coordinator of the intervention in order to guarantee that the programmes were 
implemented correctly and not arbitrarily; 3) the exclusion for the first time of 
investments in traditional infrastructures in favour of more territorial related economic 
activities. Over the five years of the legislature, the political class was able to act as a 
link between the objective of the programme and its concrete implementation due to 
strong political stability (Rosa, 2000: 166). 
The coherence between the development plan, the territorial needs and the concrete 
implementation of the strategy has been the element that has characterized the 
governance of Structural Funds over the following legislatures. The assurance of each 
political leader to keep the government stable has been not only a "sentence" in his 
inaugural speech but, as the past events show, a real commitment. Based on the 
government stability, the political class has developed a system to govern Structural 
65 See speech of Gaetano Michetti during the inauguration of the Cabinet on the 19'h of June 1985 
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Funds. This system relies on correlated institutional relations and it has as a centre point 
the CICO, which is in charge of coordinating the various departments, and keep a clear 
vision of the long term run. 
Over these four legislatures, the administrative class, mobilized by the proactive political 
plan, implemented the political directions in an efficient manner. The administrative 
class showed an impressive learning capacity, which ultimately enabled it to carry out its 
duties and optimize time and resources (Leonardi et al., 1987). In the next chapter we 
will analyse the other legislatures with respect to Structural Funds. 
3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has analysed the establishment of the regions as administrative units, and 
the first phase of the Italian regional policy in light of the European scenario. The 
purpose of the chapter has been to offer an interpretative framework for the subsequent 
chapters in that it provides an understanding of. (i) the main features of the 
institutionalization of Italian regions and their struggle to gain decision-making and 
implementation powers in relation to regional policy; (ii) the characteristics of regional 
policy in Italy during the first period, 1950-1992, which was marked by the collapse of 
the CasmezlAgensud. 
The analysis of the establishment of regional policy in Italy shows that from 1950 until 
1992, the Italian approach to regional policy was not accustomed to the European 
scenario. This was shaken up by the 1988 reform of Structural Funds, which 
demonstrated to Italy that the malfunctioning of its centralized approach would make 
success in the EU impossible. 
We have seen that, during those years, Italy had its "own" regional policy under a 
"special" organization, the Casmez, and that the actions implemented by this 
organization were defined as Intervento Starordinario. The top-down, centralized 
approach that led Italian regional policy until 1992 had left the southern regions with a 
burdensome legacy. This chapter has demonstrated that the centralized approach is far 
from an explanation of the differences in implementation among southern regions. 
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Instead, it acted as an external constraint that affected all of the regions equally. 
Furthermore, it emerged that the national government did not possess the administrative 
capacity to manage, programme, monitor and evaluate the implementation of resources. 
Neither was the political class acting in favour of improving the level of administrative 
performance. Indeed, the ruling class at the time constantly intervened with an eye on 
personal agendas rather than economic development; severe governmental instability 
created a volatile climate in which the political class was oriented towards short-term 
rewards rather than long-term planning, and accountability for actions was non-existent. 
Within this national scenario, regions inherited the same administrative and political 
characteristics. 
Despite the fact that two of the five special regions were created during the second half 
of the 1940s (Sicily and Sardinia), southern regions were never prominent in the 
formulation and implementation of regional policy before the reform of 1988. Indeed, in 
those years the southern regional governments (of both the "special" and the "ordinary" 
variety) developed a strong dependence on the centre from an economic, as well as an 
administrative perspective, which compromised their ability to build their own capacity 
to design and implement adequate development programmes. 
This weakness first came to light during the management of the IMPs. Indeed, the 
regions' poor administrative performance undermined the successful implementation of 
the IMPs, whose results were very poor compared to the performance of the northern 
Italian regions or that of France and Greece. Similar problems were encountered during 
the implementation of the first planning period of the Structural Funds (1989-1993). The 
failure of both implementation efforts corroborate the thesis that the Intervento 
Straordinario did not have the effect of building at the regional level an autonomous 
capacity to participate actively in regional policy. Instead, the national regional policy 
had a perverse effect of delegitimizing and transforming the regions into mere observers 
of a policy process that remained the responsibility of the centre (Gualini, 2004). 
In reality, the actual needs of the regional institutions were not taken into consideration 
at any stage during the period between 1950 and 1990. The changes made to the 
definition of regional powers in 1976 and 1977 were represented as mere transfers of 
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administrative responsibilities from the centre to the periphery, but they were not 
perceived in the area of national regional policy as a challenge to the primacy of the 
State in planning, or as opening up a significant role for ' the regions. Reinforcing 
regional administration through an authentic decentralization would have been been 
detrimental to the retention of power at the central level. The sharing of power in the 
form of multi-level governance with regard to regional policy was not an option that had 
ever been considered by the national government (Trigilia, 1992). That innovation had 
to come from the European level. 
Along with the regional policy evolution I have analysed the creation and growth of the 
regional dimension, in order to understand why, in this similar scenario, some regions 
have been able to develop their own administrative capacity and outperform other 
regions. In the last section I focused on my two case studies, Sicily and Basilicata, and 
on the features that characterized their development up until 1988. These two regions, 
although they share a common background of centralized intervention, foreign control-, 
and mafia existence, have revealed contrasting features in both the administrative and 
political dimension. Indeed, from a political point of view the element that differentiated 
Basilicata from the other southern regions was the minimal conflict between parties, 
which favoured the stability of its leadership and the continuity of the planned 
interventions. Sicily, on the other hand, experienced a high degree of government 
instability, which as we will see has probably helped to influence its low level of 
administrative performance. We have seen that the region of Basilicata has always been 
oriented towards gaining more institutional and economic independence and towards 
developing its potential, in contrast with the development model that was at that time 
applied indiscriminately to any region by the central state intervention. Sicily also has a 
history of asserting its political independence, but for totally different reasons. Indeed, 
the Sicilian politicians aimed to wield sole power in the region in order to fulfil their 
personal interests. This led to the creation of a political culture that constantly intervened 
in the administrative sphere and manipulated its activities in order to set its own agenda. 
In this context, the political class showed no interest in EU funding before the end of 
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centralised economic planning because this would have meant adapting to new rules and 
regulations, which might have undermined its political control. 
This chapter has clearly shown that, on one hand the poor results of a region are due to 
its poor administrative capacity, but, on the other, what ultimately determines the 
functioning of that capacity are the choices made by the political class. 
Before moving on to the empirical testing of my hypothesis, it is necessary to look at the 
second part of the evolution of regional policy to understand how the change in 
approach to regional policy that took place in Italy in the 1990s had an effect on regional 
administrative capacities in the areas of policy-making and implementation. 
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Chapter 4 
The awareness of the administrative capacity deadlock: 
policy shift in the second phase of Italian regional policy 1992.2004 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter investigated, in light of the European scenario, the first period of 
regional policy in Italy, which took place between 1950 and 1992. It presented an 
historical analysis of the establishment of the regions as administrative and decision- 
making units. This retrospective, while respondeding to a basic need for information, 
was structured as a means of reading past events from the perspective of the two parts of 
my central hypothesis and its correlated variables - i. e. the relevance of administrative 
capacity for the implementation of policies, and on political factors that intervene to 
determine the degree of administrative capacity. 
We have seen that the introduction of regional policy in Italy under a special agency, the 
Casmez, and its evolution over the period 1950-1992 was based on a top-down, 
centralized approach. The Italian experience with top-down regional policy approaches 
was not much different from what took place in other countries that experimented with 
regional policy, such as France, Great Britain, Spain and Greece. I have argued that it is 
not only the nature of this top-down approach but also, more specifically, the Italian 
variety of that approach that undermined any possibility of sub-national institutions 
developing planning and implementation capacities with regard to regional 
development. The policy's endogenous approach and lack of a specific territorial 
component doomed the policy to failure. The choices made by the political class and 
the use of regional policy for the purpose of building political patronage also did not 
help the overall success of the policy. Indeed, the ruling class at the time constantly 
intervened in the administrative activities according to personal agendas rather than 
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economic means; the extreme instability of the government created a political class more 
focused on short-term rewards than long-term planning; moreover, accountability of 
actions was non-existent. Within this national context, the regions took on the same 
administrative and political characteristics. The adoption of a centralized approach to 
regional planning cannot therefore explain in any way the differences in the 
implementation performance of individual southern regions observed after the abolition 
of top-down policies. Indeed, the national regional policy was an external constraint that 
applied equally to all regions. 
In light of these initial findings, this chapter aims to continue to analyse the evolution of 
regional policy by scrutinizing the characteristics of its second phase, 1992-2004, when 
profound changes to the planning of policies for the development of the Mezzogiorno 
took place. These changes followed three concurrent events: the end of a forty-year top- 
down economic policy; the beginning of the radical reform of the Public Administration 
(PA); and the sudden drop in public expenditure which directed attention towards the 
Structural Funds as the only available funding for development purposes. All these 
events took place between 1992 and 93. This is why many authors labelled the year 
1992 the "turning point" in Italian regional policy (Bodo and Viesti, 1997; Barca, 
2001b). 
In order to analyse the impact of these changes in relation to my case studies and 
Structural Funds implementation, this chapter is divided into three sections. Section 4.2 
looks at the massive and revolutionary regulatory reforms implemented from 1992 
onwards with the aim of modernizing the PA and improving the devolution of powers 
and the separation of responsibilities between the political and administrative classes. I 
will disentangle and study the reform under two headings; administrative changes and 
political changes. 
66 The failure of both European programmes corroborates the thesis that the intention behind the 
Intervento Straordinario was not to build any autonomous capacity into the regional government, but that 
it was instead aimed at gaining support from the local political class and keeping the regions strongly 
dependent upon the centre (Gualini, 2004). 
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Section 4.3 focuses on the impact of the reforms on regional policy. It considers the end 
of the Intervento Straordinario and its consequences for the national and regional 
governments, focusing particularly on the sudden relevance given to the Structural 
Funds and the EU cohesion policy, and the consequent adoption of the multilevel 
governance model. It recalls the main features and results of the second Structural Funds 
planning period (1994-1999). 
Section 4.4 scrutinizes the third period of Structural Funds 2000-2006 and the events 
that stimulated public awareness about the necessity of promoting administrative 
capacity at the regional level. 
4.2 The reform of the 1990s: a revolutionary shift in the Italian tradition 
At the beginning of the 1990s67, when the entire Italian political system was going 
through a period of severe crisis, the most important reform of the Italian State since 
1860 began, including a major review of the constitutional framework. Not one central, 
peripheral or local organizational structure and decision-making process or procedure 
managed to escape this wave of change, which swept over the formal rules and the 
procedures of public sector management (Rebora, 1999; Capano, 2000). 
The poor results of the centralized intervention along with the fiscal and economic 
problems of the early 1990s associated with the huge public debt and the move during 
the beginning of the 1990s to eradicate government corruption established the seeds for 
change (Ceccanti and Vassallo, 2004). 
European policies - the single market programme, competition law and policy, the use 
of EU funds, and monetary and fiscal rectitude that was the price of entering the euro 
area - greatly influenced the Italian regulatory and administrative environment. At the 
67 The long cycle of reform was introduced mainly by the governments led by Amato and Ciampi (1992- 
1994) and by the centre-left coalitions (1996-2001). 
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beginning, the main goal was to reduce the public debt and balance the state budget, in 
order to meet the Maastricht criteria. " 
The Italian reforms introduced during the 1990s were also part of an international trend 
characterized by a new approach to administrative problems. This solution has been 
labelled the New Public Management (NPM), a definition that combines a variety of 
different, often contradictory, public management techniques, based on two previously- 
existing general principles: the managerial approach of the American school and 
classical organizational theory (Gow and Dufour, 2000). This is a solution that, at least 
at the international level, seems to have been acknowledged and proposed as a 
programmatic move by all countries (OECD, 1995). At the same time, the last 20 years 
have seen all Western countries introduce important reforms of their PAs, using 
strategies and content that from the "programmatic" point of view seem to have been 
inspired by the adoption of organizational and institutional solutions contained in the 
NPM. The NPM suggests the use of the following instruments: privatization; a growing 
emphasis on the idea of the citizen as client; de-centralization towards the regional level 
in order to emphasise territorial development needs; strategic planning and management; 
the creation of a competitive environment; the measurement of results; public service 
management flexibility; the use of innovative accounting methods; personnel 
management based on wage incentives; the use of tariffs; the separation of politics from 
administration; financial efficiency; and the considerable use of computer technologies 
(Hood, 1991; OECD, 1995; Peters, 1997; Lane, 2000; Barzelay, 2001). This constitutes 
a wide range of different instruments, and so it is no surprise that each individual 
country has chosen to combine these instruments in a different way (Olsen and Peters, 
1994; Hood, 1996; Cheung, 1997; Kickert, 1997). It is only to be expected that each 
country has established its managerial paradigm according to its own specific structural 
and cultural characteristics. 
68 The criteria were: (1) Inflation - no higher than 1.5% above the average inflation rate of the lowest 3 
inflation countries in the EU; (2) Interest rates - the long-term rate no higher than 2% above the average 
of interest rates in the three countries with the lowest inflation rates; (3) Budget deficit -no more than 3% 
of GDP; (4) National debt - no more than 60% of GDP; (5) Exchange rates - currency within the normal 
bands of the ERM with no re-alignments for at least 2 years (Talani, 2004). 
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In the Italian case and in relation to the general use of Structural Funds we also have to 
attribute the change in management approach to the impact of Europeanization - that 
is, the need to align the national and regional approach to cohesion policy according to 
the regulations and principles enunciated in the 1988 and subsequent reforms of the 
ERDF, ESF, and EAGGF (Leonardi, 2(x)5, pp. 48-56). 
In the following sections, 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, we will he looking at the main changes that 
Italy experienced as a result of the need to adapt to the European standard, including 
implementing cohesion policy and Structural Funds, in the administrative and political 
arenas respectively. Indeed, Structural Funds were the only ones available, now that the 
Casme was closed and public spending dramatically reduced. 
4.2.1 The administrative reorganization 
Six successive Italian governments launched and supported numerous initiatives, 
policies, and programmes. Two areas were subject to drastic changes: the market70 and 
the PA. The PA reforms covered four important issues: (I) the balance between the 
centre and sub-national governments, i. e. the devolution of power; (2) the reform of the 
central administration; (3) the civil service reform and separation of responsibilities of 
the political and administrative class; and (4) the simplification of the PA, procedures 
and controls (Table 4.1 and Table 4.2). 
Table 4.1 Structural reforms in the Italian Public Administration 1961-2005. 
Public Budget 
Civil service and administrativ 
responsibilities 
Political and administrative 
devolution r. r *******w ** 
1901-70 197 I -80 1981-90 1991-95 1996 ? (X10 2001-2(X)5 
. 
Source: ! arca, 200) 
Note: euch * re/ers to it rcform introduced in that period 
On Europeanization see also: Borzel and Risse, 2(X)0; Fahhrini and Della Sala, 2(X)3; Page, 2003. 
70 The market reforms covered the capital markets, the labour market and the production market. They 
aimed. on one hand, to minimize the state's intervention in the economy, including privatization, 
establishing new regulatory regimes and institutions, and simplifying laws on a broad scale, and on the 
other hand, towards the -reorganization" and the management of the legal and regulatory system. 
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Table 4.2 Administrative reforms in Italy 1990-2005 
Year Regulation Content 
Civil Service and Admin istrative responsibilities 
1990 Law n. 241 Legge sul procedimento 
1992 Law n. 421 The delegation to the government of the power to reform the juridical status 
of public employment, and to introduce innovations in the financial control 
of local government. 
1993 D. lgs. n. 29 The "privatization" of public employment. The setting up of the National 
Agency for the Collective Bargaining of Public Employment. New rules 
regarding labour representation. 
1995 Law n. 273 The enforcing of efficiency of public administration. D. lgs. n. 77 The 
introduction of managerial accounting in local governments. 
1997 Law n. 94 Reform of budgetary procedures by government (enforced by means of 3 
legislative decrees issued during 1997). 
1997 Law n. 59 The re-designation by government of the duties and powers of regional and 
(Bassanini local governments; the reform of the public sector bargaining system; the 
Reform) reform of the macrostructure of government; the introduction of the annual 
law on de-legislation and simplification. (To enforce this delegating law 
more than sixty legislative decrees were needed. ) 
1997 Law n. 127 The so-called "simplification law". Hundreds of regulations changing rules 
regarding the personnel system, bargaining system, and control and 
evaluation systems in administrative procedures. 
1998 D. Igs. n. 80. Changes to legislative decree no. 29/93, reinforcing the "privatization" of 
public employment. 
1998 Law n. 191 Changes to certain provisions of law 59/97 and of legislative decree 80/98. 
1999 Law n. 50 The first annual law on de-legislation and simplification. 
1999 D. lgs. n. 286 The introduction of a new control and evaluation system (to be implemented 
independently by all public administrations and organizations). 
2000 Presidential A change in the mechanism used to recruit executive management. 
decree no. 
324 
2000 Law n. 205 The reform of the duties of the Administrative Courts. 
2000 Law n. 340 The second annual law on de-legislation and simplification. 
2000 Presidential The unification of all rules governing the administrative process 
decree n. 445 
2001 D. 1 s. n. 165 The unification of all rules governing public employment 
2002 Law n. 145 Dispositions for the re-organization of the PA managerial class 
2005 Law n. 15 Modification of Law 241/90 
Firstly, the process of political-administrative devolution was guided by two main 
innovations. On the one hand, a process whereby power was delegated to the regions 
and to local authorities began (Law n. 421/1992; Law n. 59/1997). In the eyes of the 
reformers, 
"[t]his process did not constitute the third transfer of administrative 
functions to regional government and local authorities, but a much more 
ambitious, radical operation, a new stage, as it has been called, in the 
institutional history of Italy" (Dipartimento dells Funzione Pubblica, 
2001 b: 19). 
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On the other hand, the organizational and managerial capacities of local governments 
were strengthened through a reform of the system of checks and controls (Law 
n. 127/1997; D. lgs. n. 286/1999), the introduction of city managers (Presidential Decree 
n. 324/2000), of managerial accounting (Law, n. 273/1995) and the chance to link 
managers' salaries to their performance (Bassanini, 2000b). 
Secondly, the reform of central administration, the first of its kind since Cavour's days 
in the nineteenth century (when the Kingdom of Italy was founded), involved 
"[m]erging bodies with similar missions; eliminating duplication and 
segmentation"; a `more flexible internal organization', with 'freedom to 
choose between organizational models'; the presence `of just one ministry 
for each mission: 22 ministries in 1990,12 in the year 2001'; the creation of 
numerous agencies, that is, of `company-like technical-operative structures' 
(Bassanini, 2000b: 11). 
Thirdly, the literature on Italian PA describes the civil service at the time as concerned 
only with job and salary security, rather than with other values such as performance, 
effectiveness, personal success, professional capabilities, interpersonal and inter- 
organizational competition. In the word of D'Auria (1990: 125), 
"[t]he hierarchical and cooptation practices that govern access to higher 
levels of the career, coupled with the advanced age of executives on average, 
favour conformism rather than innovation". 
On the same note, 
"... career typically takes place within only one administration that produces 
a "parochial" vision that excludes consideration of issues from the point of 
view of other administrations, discourages innovation and the circulation of 
new approaches, and encourages personnel to develop a "patrimonial" 
conception of its post" (Minelli, 1990: 189). 
This "passive" role of the administrative class, characterized by high levels of 
frustration, detachment from and indifference towards its tasks, was mainly caused by 
the constant interference of the political class, which reduced civil servants' activities to 
mere mechanical actions. Such a situation proved to be inadequate for the complex 
tasks that contemporary societies pose to the PA, and mostly inadequate for the 
implementation of European standards. 
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Therefore, in order to overcome the inefficiencies and bottlenecks created by such a civil 
service, the reform of the 1990s introduced a reorganization of public sector 
employment, focusing on the privatization of the working relationship and further 
emphasizing the separation of politics from administration (D. lgs. n. 29/93; Law n. 59/97; 
Law n. 191/98; Law n. 145/2002). With regard to the first of these two changes, collective 
bargaining was extended to virtually all public sector employees (except for small 
groups of individuals such as university lecturers and professors, prefects and members 
of the armed forces), with even the rules regarding the careers of public employees 
defined by employment contracts. This process led to the introduction of the "spoil 
system" (Law n. 145/2002). Political leaders could choose the general manager to 
allocate to a particular administrative area. The general manager contract was therefore 
linked to the political life span - i. e. the manager was dismissed in the moment the 
politician finished his mandate. I will further discuss this aspect in the next paragraph 
(cf. Section. 4.1.2). 
As far as the second of the two features characterizing public sector reform is concerned, 
the legal foundations of the separation of powers were further re-enforced: 
"it is now the duty of politicians to define policies and strategies, assess 
results, appoint general directors but to have no further direct involvement in 
administration, whereas administrative directors and managers are given 
broader powers but also greater responsibility, and higher salaries linked to 
results and performance" (Bassanini, 2000a: 16). 
Fourthly, the simplification process was based on the principles of reasonableness (the 
enforcement of self-certification, the increased interpretation of silence as assent, the 
formulation of consolidation acts that incorporated and co-ordinated all existing laws 
within a given public policy sector), and the planned introduction of an annual 
simplification law (Law n. 127/1997). At the same time, experiments were conducted to 
ascertain the impact of this regulation process, involving the setting up of a "task-force 
of experts whose job it is to safeguard the quality of regulation" (Bassanini, 2000b: 30). 
The introduction of these four sets of reforms was designed to transform the Italian PA 
from a form of administration in which only rules and procedures mattered to a 
performance-oriented administration, The reformers seemed to be strongly convinced 
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that they had effected a break with the past, starting with the replacement of the "old" 
legal paradigm with a "new" managerial model (Bassanini, 2000c). 
As a result, in less than a decade, Italy took important steps from being a highly 
interventionist state in which law was devalued and the regional dimension was 
underestimated and disregarded, towards becoming a modem regulatory state based on 
transparent rules and multilevel governance. In the meantime, regional policy was also 
subject to major reforms, due to the abolishment of the centralized approach. Indeed, a 
new-bottom-up method, based on the central role of the region, emerged. In sum, Italy 
tried to get into line with EU dictates in order to be able to gain credibility and play a 
more active role in EU regional policy as well as in other areas of interventions. 
4.2.2 The political implications 
As mentioned in the above paragraph, running parallel to the changes in the 
administrative arena were similar relevant reforms in the political sphere (Table 4.3). 
These can be summarised under three headings: (1) Increased devolution and 
decentralization; (2) Changes in party system; and (3) Introduction of the spoils system. 
Table 4.3 Main political changes in Italy 1990-2003 
Devolution, decentralization and electoral reform 
1990 Law n. 142 Local Autonomy Organization 
1993 Law n. 81 Reform of the Electoral System: direct election of the Major, the President of 
the Province, the County Council and the Province Council 
1998 D. lgs. n. 112 The conferral of new powers and competencies on regional and local 
government (this will need at least 100 secondary regulations to be enforced). 
1999 L. cost. n. 1 Second Reform of the Electoral System: direct election of the President of the 
Region I Council 
1999 D. lgs. n. 300 A change in the macrostructure of government (requiring at least 25 secondary 
regulations for its implementation). 
1999 Law no. 265 A change in the institutional organization of local government. 
2000 D. 1 s no. 287 The unification of all rules concerning local government. 
2000 D. 1 s. n. 267 Testo Unico Enti Locali 
2001 L. cost. n. 3 Major Review to the second part of Title V of the Constitution 
2003 Law n. 131 ("Legge La Lo is") - Implementation of L. cost. n. 3/2001 
Firstly, the process of decentralization and devolution initiated in the 1990s was 
formalized by Law n. 59/1997 and dramatically reinforced over the last years. 
Decentralization was marked by the restructuring of the state apparatus (D. tgs. 
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n. 300/1999), the establishment of new relations between political forces, and the 
integration of new economic and social actors. Devolution - i. e. the transfer of powers to 
the regional level of government - was finalized with D. lgs. n. 12/1998, which recorded 
the shift of political and administrative decision-making power in favour of the regions. 
This process reaches its peak in 2001 with the reform of title V of the Constitution 71 (Cf. 
Section 4.3.2). 
Secondly, the changes that took place in the Italian party system from 1990 onwards 
were not mirrored in the post-war history of any other western democracy. In the space 
of a few years, the parties that had dominated the parliament since 1945 either dissolved 
or re-branded themselves and transformed profoundly. New elites entered the political 
arena, causing serious consequences for politics and institutions (Newell, 2000). This 
process was triggered by, among other factors, 72 the Referendum movement, which 
believed that the Italian system of proportional representation favoured clientelistic 
practices and party fragmentation, prevented the formation of long-lasting majorities and 
therefore limited the duration and the stability of governments. A system of plurality 
would have instead reinforced accountability and trust, and delivered stronger and more 
stable governments. Between 1994 and 1996 the new rules determined the polarization 
of Italian party system, which has actually delivered a more stable government, although 
there is still a lot to do with regard to building trust and accountability (Diamanti, 2001). 
Same stability, as well as increased responsibility and accountability, was reached at 
regional level after L. cost. n. 1/1999 and L. cost. n. 212001 introduced the direct election 
71 What these reforms accomplished was to formally put the national and regional levels on a more equal 
footing vis-ä-vis the Constitutional Court and in the allocation of primary powers in a variety of policy 
making sectors, including regional policy, to the regions. 
72 Newell (2000) identifies two other factors as accountable for the transformation of the party system: (i) 
the sudden occurrence of judicial investigations unveiling and prosecuting the structure of political 
corruption; and (ii) the change in electoral behaviors, and the rise of the Northern League, a regionalist 
party that built its fortunes on a populist critique of the traditional political class. This Populist Party 
proved able to capitalize on the discontent of the richest and most developed part of the country. The 
southern part of the country was accused of inefficiently consuming resources produced in the north, and 
the traditional parties were held responsible for the consequent spread of corruption. The diffusion of 
corruption in Italy was fuelled by two concurring factors. First, in the southern regions the State was 
historically weak, and resources were mainly allocated through personal links. Second, the political 
system never underwent an alternation in power. In 1992, a number of major investigations hit all of the 
major governmental parties, including their top leaders and officials. 
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of the President , respectively, in the ordinary regions and 
in the special status regions 
(the same electoral system based on direct elections had already been introduced in 1993 
for the majority of municipalities). 
Finally, the third change in the political scene was strictly linked to the administrative 
area, and in particular to the privatization of the public employment. Indeed, as 
previously discussed, this introduced the spoils system in Italy. 73 This practice, which 
reached its peak with Law n. 145/200274, has been the subject of opposing debates. The 
greater concern was related to the choice of the highest bureaucrats by the politicians: 
the risk is that the administration becomes a mere executive instrument of politics 
(Cerbo, 2002). 
This examination of both administrative and political reforms, although brief and mainly 
descriptive, is relevant in putting into context the second part of my central hypothesis 
on the relevance of the political factors - i. e. political interference, government stability, 
and political accountability - in influencing administrative capacity. As we have seen, 
these factors were seen as fundamental to improving national performance, so that a 
process of radical systemic reform has taken place over the last 15 years. Have these 
changes also been implemented at the regional level? What has been the impact of the 
reforms on my policy of interest -regional policy? 
73 The term "spoils system" originated in Anglo-Saxon systems and indicates the right given to the 
winning political party in elections to make key appointments in the bureaucratic system. Many consider 
this practice to be justified when capable persons are appointed to senior policy-making positions. They 
hold that the party in power must craft policy to meet its constituents' needs (Peters, 1997). On the other 
hand, it is unwarranted when political leaders dismiss able persons from non-policy-making positions. 
They do this to bring on board others who are qualified only by loyalty to the party, thus compromising 
Governmental effectiveness. 
Law n. 59/1997 originally previewed the spoils system for the communal and provincial level. Law n. 
145/2002 significantly upgraded the previous law by extending the system to all the administrative leaders 
of the public administrations - i. e. regional and ministerial general managers. Furthermore, it has 
established: (1) that all the managing assignments are temporary, lasting for a maximum duration of three 
years for the general manager and five for the others; (2) 10% of the positions of general manager and 8% 
of the places for division manager can be appointed from outside the administration. (Cassese, 2002) 
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4.3 The impact of the reform on regional policy: a bottom-up approach 
4.3.1 From the Intervento Straordinario to multilevel governance 
The" revolutionary administrative and political changes that took place in the 1990s 
marked the end of the Intervento Straordinario. Indeed, the logic behind the Intervento - 
i. e. centralized intervention, little autonomy for the regions, strong political interference, 
and poor attention to administrative performance - was incompatible with the needs of 
the Maastricht criteria for reducing government spending and with the EU regulation for 
Structural Funds allocation. 
The consequences of this event were two-fold. First, there was a return to ordinary 
administrative procedures, that is, responsibilities were redistributed amongst the central 
administration bodies of the State according to their statutory competencies. Second, 
regional governments were formally recognized as key actors in this pluralist and 
decentralized system of responsibilities. This underlined the importance of their strategic 
as well as operational programming abilities, in terms of mobilization, distribution and 
timing of resources. 
The end of the centralized approach meant first of all a drop in public investments in the 
Mezzogiorno, from a peak level of 21 billion Euro in 1992 to a lower level of 15 billion 
Euros in 1996. Therefore, European funding became the most important enabler of 
public investment for the southern regions. To implement Structural Funds successfully, 
the country needed a radical change in its approach to regional policy. This meant an 
abandonment of the top-down centralized approach in favour of the bottom-up, 
multilevel approach; a focus on investments in an integrated, territorialized 
programmatic fashion rather than sectorial interventions; multi-annual rather than short- 
term plans as the basis for the investments; the adoption of an expenditure monitoring 
system; and the incorporation of an evaluation culture that had so far been missing. 
These requirements proved to be very difficult to be implemented both at the national 
and regional level due to their absolute novelty. An awareness of their essentiality, 
however, brought forward the need to foster administrative and political innovation a the 
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regional level. The first step in this direction was the strengthening of the "concertation 
model" of programming. This model was labeled programmazione negoziata 
(negotiated programming) (Gualini, 2004: 195). The legislation on programmazione 
negoziata was based on the merging of previous local practices featuring experimental, 
bottom-up initiatives that had been adopted in the regions with the more advanced forms 
of regional economic planning, e. g. in Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany (Leonardi and 
Nanetti, 1998; Leonardi and Nanetti, 1991). Many initiatives developed, on the one hand 
as a result of the Structural Funds logic and on the other in order to put the Structural 
Funds into operation. 5 
The main change arrived with the Bassanini reform, i. e. Law n. 59/1997, which 
introduced a general reframing of the competencies of regional and local governments in 
key areas of public action and regulation, moving towards a subsidiary pattern of inter- 
governmental relationships, which constituted a crucial premise for a "territorialization" 
of development policies outside of what was already possible through the regional 
operational programmes. Law n. 59/1997, along with the reforms in the electoral (direct 
election of majors since 1993, of regional presidents since 2000, and new executive 
powers) and fiscal (regionalization of fiscal revenues and budgeting since 2000) 
systems, constitutes a major factor of change in State-local relationships towards a 
model of "administrative federalism". 
Among the most important policy areas in which regulatory and/or managing 
responsibilities were devolved to the regions as of 1999 (D. lgs. 143/1997, D. lgs. 
469/1997, and- D. lgs. 112/1998) were active labour policies, local development 
 In 1996, the Financial Act (Law n. 662/1996) realized a further step in the institutionalization 
of this policy approach, extending the rationale of negotiated area-based agreements to a 
comprehensive set of development tools. In particular, the Act introduced two new forms of 
institutional agreement: (1) intesa istituzionale di programma (institutional protocol of 
understanding), aimed at realizing inter-governmental coordination between State, regional and 
provincial governments. Intese istituzionali di programma are called in particular to outline 
programmes and related objectives and joint actions, to define the listing and scheduling of 
operational agreements (accordi di programma quadro), and to set criteria for monitoring and 
evaluation and periodic revisions of objectives; (2) contratto d'area (area-based contract), a 
peculiar collective agreement put together by the 1996 national central accord to foster 
employment within Objective 1 areas. 
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promotion and incentives to SMEs, social services, tourism, waste management, 
transportation, environmental protection, and city and regional planning. 76 In all matters 
pertaining to territorial development, the central administration retained only those 
responsibilities in the definition of the national preferences and managing special 
legislation (e. g. regional State aids) that required a national programming and 
coordination framework. 
The reform assumed a particular importance in redefining the institutional context of 
local development policies. What made programmazione negoziata a crucial step in the 
renewal of the Italian states' approach to regional policies was that it embedded local 
development in a multilevel framework of horizontal, i. e. public-private and inter- 
organizational, as well as vertical, i. e. intergovernmental, forms of collaboration. 
Regions and local governments were identified as the primary actors in a much broader 
array of policies related to the promotion of territorial development relying on 
coordination among a plurality of actors rather than on direct public intervention. 
4.3.2. The growing role of the regions in the Italian institutional setting 
As explained in Chapter 1, Structural Funds explicitly promote a multi-tiered, compound 
system where national, sub-national and European institutions co-operate with each 
other to produce public decisions. In the Italian case this multi-level governance 
approach clashed with the pre-existing diplomatic and centralist orientation towards 
European affairs, according to which only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had the 
competence to represent the national interest at European level, and sub-national 
authorities were prevented from establishing direct links with European institutions. 
Structural Funds, thanks to the partnership principle and to the important role assigned 
to regional administrations in programming and managing European resources, clearly 
highlighted the inconsistency of such a framework and contributed to the modification 
of national legislation. 
76 Given that in the past these policies were already under the responsibility of the regions, what the new 
law did was to clarify the state's lack of concurrent powers - i. e., the ability to legislate without first 
consulting with the regions. 
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Moving to Brussels 
Law n. 52/199677 finally allowed the Italian regions to establish offices in Brussels and to 
participate (with four representatives) in the national delegation within the European 
Council. This provision proved to be a crucial turning point in the management of 
Structural Funds. Indeed, it allowed the regions to bypass the national state and to 
establish a direct link with the European Commission. 
Thanks to this law, the Italian regions became increasingly legitimate "actors" in 
European decision-making, with a new role that was also acknowledged by the later 
Constitutional reform of 2001. Despite this opportunity, not all regional governments 
fully exploited the chance to promote themselves as interlocutors at the European level; 
rather, their "activation" in Brussels appears to have been strongly differentiated in 
terms of timing, number of channels, type of participation and strategy of representation 
as demonstrated in a study carried out by Fargion et al. (2005). From the study it 
emerged that Italian regions can be divided into three groups: a leading group of 
"proactive" regions, that became active before the removal of the national legislative 
constraint (that is, before Law n. 52/1996); an intermediate group of "reactive" regions, 
that became active once the national law allowed them a presence in Brussels and 
elsewhere in Europe (that is, between 1996 and 1999); and a last group of "inactive" 
regions, that became active only recently (between 2000 and 2002). The leading, 
proactive group is composed of some Central and Northern regions with the sole 
exception of one southern region: Basilicata. On the contrary, the inert regions are led by 
a group of southern regions, including Sicily. These findings suggest that while 
Basilicata was developing an active role in the EU scenario Sicily was still in the 
shadows. 
77 The 1996 law was officially motivated by the fact that the Single Market programme, guaranteeing the 
free circulation of people, goods and capital across national borders within the EU, came into effect on 1 
January 1993, and so the national governments could not prevent regional presidents or other officials 
from travelling to Brussels to contact Commission officials. Another important motivating factor was the 
creation of the Committee of Regions in December 1993 that formalized the regional role in the EU 
process of decision-making and consultation. 
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A change in the Constitution 
The success of the regional governments in emerging and acting according to the new 
form of multilevel governance that had entered Europe was marked by the changes in 
title V of the Italian Constitution, made in 2001 (L. cost. 3/2001) by the Amato 
government. Indeed, under L. cost. n. 3/2001, the republic was defined as a unit 
composed of municipalities, provinces, regions and the state. The legislative powers of 
the regions were considerably extended, 78 while government restrictions on regional 
legislation were curtailed. A new legal framework for governance was thereby created, 
and new criteria for the distribution of administrative duties amongst the state, regions, 
municipalities, provinces and metropolitan cities were established, whilst external 
controls were lifted. New provisions governing the financial autonomy of regional and 
local authorities were laid down. Finally, regional powers with regard to relations within 
the EU and at international level were redefined, and gave more space for regional 
participation. 
This reform irrevocably established a strong and autonomous role for the regional 
dimension within the national boundaries. Once the reforms were put in place, it was 
necessary to strengthen the capacity of the regions to exert these powers. 
78 Under art. 117 of the new title V of the Constitution: the Regions were given (exclusive) legislative 
power with respect to any matters not expressly under the preserve of State law (comma 4) and not 
included in concurrent legislation. The article listed a series of matters of concurrent legislation where the 
State would be allowed only to set the fundamental principles (comma 3) with regard to: regional 
international relations and relations with the European Union; foreign trade; job protection and industrial 
safety; education; scientific research; protection of health; food safety; sport; civil protection; town 
planning; civil ports and airports; development of cultural and environmental resources; large-scale 
transport and navigation networks; energy; complementary social security, etc. The region could 
participate in decisions to establish Community instruments, and implementation of international 
agreements and European Union instruments (comma 5). 
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4.4 The campaign to promote Italian regional administrative capacity (1999. 
2006) 
4.4.1 The creation of the Dipartimento per le Politiche di Coesione (1998) 
Once the institutional settings were in place, with the different tiers of governments 
empowered to take part in the multilevel form of governance, it was necessary to start to 
address the quality of each level's performance in programming and implementing 
development policies. This meant addressing the requirements of administrative 
efficiency on an unprecedented level in the Italian experience. 
Indeed, until 1998 the management of EU affairs concerning cohesion policy was 
characterized by a great "disorganization" and fragmentation. As previously discussed, 
this fragmentation arose from the logic behind the Italian regional policy, which was 
defined as centralized and sectorial - i. e. the funding was financing sectors of the 
economy such as agriculture, fishing, industry, and so on, rather than being "territorial", 
i. e. financing programmes to tackle the primary needs of the regions, as the principles of 
Structural Funds suggested. Therefore, the institutions dealing with regional policy were 
the various Ministries of the central government related to the relevant sector of 
intervention: Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Industry, etc. 
By the time the administrative and political reforms were in place and the top-down 
approach was eradicated (cf. Section 4.3.1), the second CSF 1994-1999 was coming to 
an end and the level of expenditure of EU funding was repeating the poor trend of the 
previous CSF 1989-1993 (cf. Table 1.1 and Table 1.2). This low level of performance, 
coupled with the drop in national funding available for the development of the 
Mezzogiorno, triggered a shift in the Italian approach to regional policy, so that 
Structural Funds and the implementation procedures required by EU regulations became 
the most important financial and organizational feature of cohesion policy in southern 
Italy. Indeed, EU funds were seen as the only available resources to support the 
underdeveloped regions. 
The first step in aligning the Italian regional policy with the EU procedures was the 
creation at the central level of a department responsible for the general coordination of 
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regional policy and, in particular, of cohesion policy. The new department, Dipartimento 
delle Politiche di Sviluppo e Coesione (DPS or Department for Development and 
Cohesion policies) was established in 1998 within the reformed Ministry of the 
Treasury. 79 The DPS was conceived as an administrative body strategically placed with 
regard to interests, procedures, and patterns of relations involved in implementing EU 
regional and cohesion policy. According to article 119, comma 5, of the Constitution, 
the main institutional objective of the DPS was 
"the realization of interventions for the economic and social re-equilibrium 
and the economic development of the underdeveloped areas of the country, 
mainly in Southern Italy". 
The process initiated by the DPS introduced several procedural novelties compared to 
the tradition of Italian development policies. Among its most relevant aspect was the 
importance attributed to the diffusion of a practical understanding of the embeddedness 
of Italian territorial policy-making in a European multi-level governance system, as well 
as to the building of administrative capacities within the regional government and the 
various National Ministries (Barca, 2001 a). The founding of the DPS contributed to the 
speeding up of the implementation of the CSF (1994-1999). Although, since the DPS 
intervened only in the latest stage of the period the results in terms of implementation of 
the resources remained rather weak compared to those of the other European Member 
States (cf. Chapter 1, Table 1.1). 
Over the course of the last eight years, the Ministry of the Treasury centralized all of the 
competencies for the "new programming" and also fulfilled an important co-ordination 
role with regard to social and regional institutional actors, in making sure that the 
management and programming activities would follow closely the EU principles and 
regulations. For the first time attention was paid to monitoring and evaluation 
procedures (Ismen Europa, 2002: 199-205). In retrospect and in the light of the key 
component of administrative capacity, Table 4.4 identifies some lessons learned from 
the period 1994-1999. 
79 Until 1997, there were two main economic ministries: the Ministry of Treasury and the Ministry of 
Budgeting. The Decreto Legislativo 430/1997 merged the two ministries in order to promote an 
organizational rationalization and a stronger economic ministry 
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Table 4.4 Lessons learned from the period 1994-1999 
Stt-engths Weaknesses 
Munuge, nent Improved ability in managing Vertical hierarchy and watertight separation 
structure structural funds, due to a more between different departments (particularly, in 
active role of coordination taken regions) still hampered transfer of know-how 
by the Ministry of the Treasury. and flexible adaptation to the needs of the 
programming cycle. 
Programming For the first time sector actions Absence of a integrated SWOT analysis and of 
reflected sector needs at local level a clear strategy for Objective I development. 
Monitoring/ Adequate efficiency of financial Very low efficiency, and often complete 
evaluation monitoring; absence, of physical monitoring; 
For the first time widespread use Evaluation did not support decision-making 
made of independent evaluation in mechanisms for many reasons: late start up 
the national OP: each OP had its (about 1999); low priority given by 
evaluator. administrative bodies. 
Pnrrnership Strong improvement of vertical Poor involvement of horizontal partnership in 
partnership; the decision-making mechanism; 
Reinforcement of co-ordination The participation of many local institutions in 
and direction by the Treasury. the OPs was not reflected in the decision- 
making mechanism. 
Source Ismeri Europa, 2002 
These adjustments at national level were also reflected at the regional level, although the 
modification of regional behaviour proved to be more challenging then expected. The 
continuing difficulties in regional interaction served to illustrate the fact that the national 
level had an incomplete understanding of what was going on at the lower levels of' 
planning and implementation, and that this gap had to he reduced very quickly. 
4.4 
.2 
Introducing mechanisms for the modernization cif Puhlic Administration 
At the end of the second planning period, 1994-1999, it was clear that administrative 
bottlenecks had to be addressed at both the national and regional level. Therefore. in 
1999, in preparation for the third CSF, the DPS invested a lot of its energy and resources 
into a campaign to promote the modernization of Italian public administrative structures 
and behaviour (Ministero del Tesoro, 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005). Appropriate incentive 
systems had to be created so as to persuade regions to implement administrative reforms 
and pursue high levels of outputs. The same approach was also applied to the central 
administration. 
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The first step in this direction was taken by the EU, with its initiative to increase the 
effective use of Structural Funds, Council Regulation n. 1260/1999, provided for the 
creation of a performance reserve (art. 44). The performance reserve foreseen by the 
regulation was considered an opportunity to hasten the upgrading of the MA and reach 
higher quality standards in the implementation of the programmes. The level of this 
reserve was set at 4% of the commitment appropriations. 
The Italian government considered the performance reserve a key incentive for 
improving the implementation of Structural Funds for the period 2000-2006 in Objective 
1 areas. On this basis, it has decided to strengthen the Commission's proposal8° by 
adding to the 4% reserve an extra 6% national performance reserve. The latter81 was 
conceived as a tool to incentivize regional government to implement some of the 
administrative and political reforms previously discussed - e. g. delegation of managerial 
responsibilities to officials (D. lgs. n. 29/1993); increasing the rate of expenditure and the 
quality of public spending; and developing the capacity of the public administration to 
interpret and study the socio-economic conditions of each regional territory where 
investments were to be directed. Overall the reserve mechanism aimed at the 
modernization of the public administrative structure, which was deemed essential to 
reaching the expected results. 
The design of the 6% reserve was divided into three blocks of indicators, namely; 
institutional enhancement; integration and concentration (Table 4.5). The first block 
included 10 indicators for regions. For institutional "enhancement", among the different 
features of the administrative reform, the performance reserve mechanism rewarded the 
transition from the former normative-hierarchical approach to administration towards a 
performance-oriented one where officials were delegated higher responsibilities and had 
80 The Commission proposal for the 4% reserve is contained in "Implementation of the performance 
reserve for objective 1,2 and 3", Working document 4, Directorate Genral, Programme Coordination and 
Evaluation of Operations 
s' A complete and detailed description of the Italian 6% reserve criteria and mechanism design is 
contained in the 2000-2006 Objective 1 CSF (§6.5 and annex D) and in the document "QCS Obiettivo 1- 
2000-2006; Criteri e meccanismi diassegnazione della riserva di premialitä del 6%" 
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defined targets, and where such elements are part of a contract that is monitored 
(indicator A. 1.1). The reward for implementing an internal management control system 
is formulated along the same lines (indicator A. 1.2). As previously highlighted, the 
success of the CSF depended mostly on the capacity of regional governments, to which 
the implementation of the majority of funds was delegated, to screen and select the 
interventions that were most relevant for their territory, and to monitor and evaluate their 
impact in terms of their contribution to improving supply externalities and intermediate 
objectives. A proxy for this is the indicator that measures if regional and central 
administrations have set up and implemented monitoring and evaluation mechanisms 
and equipped the responsible units with sufficiently qualified human resources to 
perform those functions (indicator A. 1.5). 
Table 4.5 Criteria and indicators for the allocation of the 6% reserve 
CRITERIA INDICATOR 
Al. INSTITUTIONAL ENHANCEMENT 
Implementation of the national A. 1.1 Delegation of managerial responsibilities to officials 
legislation fostering the process of (legislative decree n. 29/93) 
PA reform and procedural slimming A. 1.2 Set-up and implementation of an internal control 
management unit 
A. 1.3 Implementation of one back-stop shop 
A. 1.4 Implementation of employment services 
Design and implementation of A. 1.5. Set-up of regional and central administration evaluation 
organizational and administrative units 
innovation to accelerate and make A. 1.6 Development of the information society in the PA 
effective Structural Funds spending 
Implementation of measures aimed A. 1.7 Preparation and approval of territorial and 
at the implementation of sector landscape programming documents 
reforms A. 1.8 Concession or management by a private-public operator 
of integrated water services (L. 36194) 
A. 1.9 Choice of management mode and its implementation for 
urban solid waste within optimal service areas 
A. 1.10 Set-up and operational performance of regional 
environmental agencies 
A. 2 INTEGRATION 
Implementation of territorial A. 2.1 Incidence of commitments of integrated territorial 
integrated projects projects versus the total amount of resources budgeted for 
integrate d territorial projects in the operational programme 
A. 3 CONCENTRATION 
Concentration of financial resources A. 3.1 Concentration of financial resources within a limited 
number of measures 
vurce: nnscm: o e Aaimonao, zuuu. 
146 
As for integration and concentration, both criteria were based on the underlying 
assumption that when resources are limited, as they always are, only a restricted number 
of objectives can be achieved and that, for each objective to be reached, all pertinent 
interventions have to be implemented following both a logical and temporal integration 
path. 
Clearly the main purpose of the performance reserve and the correlated criteria was to 
reinforce at regional level the implementation of the administrative reform that was 
taking place at the national level. The indicators suggested by the DPS caught only 
partially the aspect of administrative capacity defined in this thesis. Indeed, my 
definition and correlated indicators for measuring administrative capacity are more 
focused on the actions of the regional administration relevant to improving public 
spending. The concept used by the DPS, however, was broader, and covered various 
aspect of the whole institution (that is why the DPS phrased its performance objectives 
in terms of "institutional enhancement" rather than administrative capacity building) 
(UVAL, 2002a). Although, some of the indicators used by the DPS were similar to the 
ones used in my fieldwork, namely: management (indicator A. 1. l and A. 1.2); 
programming (indicators A. 2.1 and A. 3.1); and monitoring and evaluation (indicator 
A. 1.5). 
Table 4.6 shows that by the end of 2002, after three full years of implementation, 
Basilicata was the region that fully satisfied the DPS institutional indicators and reached 
the highest level of performance in the three group of indicators. Sicily, although not 
among the lowest performers, was still far behind Basilicata, given its inability to satisfy 
the indicator on the programming of resources in an integrated manner. As far as the 
institutional indicators were concerned, Sicily managed to fulfil 80% of the required 
objectives. 
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Table 4.6 National Reserve. % of satisfaction for set of indicators (December 2002) 
Regions A.!. Institutional 
Enhancement 
A. 2. A. 3. 
Integration Concentration 
Total 
Basilicata 100% 53% 98% 88% 
Calabria 30% 0% 59% 27% 
Campania 60% 100% 58% 70% 
Puglia 80% 0% 98% 63% 
Sardinia 10% 53% 59% 29% 
Sicily 80% 0% 59% 57% 
Source: UVAL, 2002 
The Director of the DPS82 commented on these results as follows: 
'The incentive device has definitely had a positive impact in terms of 
pushing the regions to implement the appropriate reforms. This experiment 
has proven that the central government should have a role in overall 
guidance and should not be invasive as in the past. There is evidence to 
support the idea that the regions, if correctly supported, can increase their 
(institutional) capacity and performance"(Recorded Interview). 
4.4.3 The third CSF 2000/2006: the completion of the policy shift 
The 2000/2006 Objective 1 planning process gave the Italian government a chance to 
finalize the shift towards a more appropriate policy approach with the intention of 
increasing the capacity of the regional governments to manage, programme, monitor and 
evaluate the use of the available resources. This, as said, comes after a long period of 
time in which regional policies were designed to compensate for the competitive 
disadvantages suffered by lagging regions with a sectorial, top-down approach, based 
mainly on incentives for the private sector. 
The significant amount of resources (40 billion Euro of European and national public 
resources), the possibility of designing a new set of rules governing their use, and the 
constraints imposed by the European level in terms of accountability and credibility 
made it possible to put into practice some of the lessons learnt during the previous 
decade. 
82 Interview with Fabrizio Barca, DPS (Rome, 20 January 2006) 
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The new 2000-2006 CSF promoted three revolutionary features. First of all, Italy 
institutionally structured the interaction between different levels of government in the 
management of the Funds thorough monthly meetings of the regional presidents and a 
formalized consultation process between the regions and the national government and 
between the national government and local authorities. The Italian model is, for all 
practical purposes, an example of "cooperative federalism" where the component 
elements of the overall state apparatus (i. e., national, regional and local governments) 
cooperate in arriving at decisions on important issues dealing with the management of 
Structural Funds. 
Second, there has been a consistent move towards a "regionalisatidn" of the 
management of Structural Funds; that is, shifting down to the regions the bulk of both 
greater allocation and responsibilities of Structural Funds spending. Indeed, the CSF 
allocated 80%83 of the overall funds and the responsibility for selecting projects to the 
six Objective 1 regions (Campania, Basilicata, Calabria, Puglia, Sicilia and Sardinia) and 
to one phasing out region (Molise). The central government remains directly responsible 
for some Operational Programmes (e. g., transport, research, education, enhancing law 
enforcement, etc. ). The Ministry of the Treasury functioned as the overall Managing 
Authority for both the CSF and the Operational Programmes, financing ý central 
government technical assistance and innovative actions on behalf of the regions. Each 
region was in charge of its own ROP and provided the personnel for the Managing 
Authority. The increased responsibilities allocated to regional governments were fully 
justified by the fact that the regions were in the best position to set regional priorities, 
manage the regional programme, monitor the implementation of the programme, and 
maintain close contacts with social and economic partners, in addition to interacting with 
provincial and local governments in the implementation of specific sub-regional 
projects. 
83 Compared to less than 50% in the previous CSF (1994-1999). 
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Finally, for the first time attention was paid to supporting the regional institutions in 
developing and upgrading the capacity necessary to successfully implement the 
available resources. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have analysed the significant shift that took place in the Italian tradition 
in the 1990s. Indeed, after 40 years of centralized intervention characterized by 
convoluted administrative procedures, inefficient political actions and an overall poor 
performance, the Italian State underwent an unprecedented level of reform both in the 
political and administrative spheres that aimed to improve institutional capacity and 
accountability. 
On the same note, a campaign to promote the modernization of regional public 
administration, and particularly an increase in regional administrative capacity, started in 
coincidence with the beginning of the third Structural Funds planning period (2000- 
2006). This challenge was faced by the new department established in 1998 in the 
reformed Ministry of the Treasury, namely the Dipartinzento Politiche di Sviluppo e 
Coesione (DPS - Department for Development and Cohesion Policies). The DPS 
promoted the creation of a tool to strengthen specific administrative and institutional 
reforms at the regional level and to increase the effectiveness of public spending on local 
economic development. Finally, after years of ignoring the importance of the regional 
government in pursuing development policies, the Italian state began to face up to the 
problems associated with the performance of regional and national administrations in the 
management of cohesion policy. As already discussed, although there was no specific 
reference to administrative capacity, there was a growing interest on the part of the 
national government, in pushing the regional institutional enhancement. The word 
"enhancement" summarizes the logic behind the state approach to promoting 
administrative reforms - i. e. that it was assumed that the regions possessed the basic 
requirements but that there was the need to improve them. Conversely, I believe that 
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some regions did not possess what I have defined as administrative capacity key actions 
and needed to develop them from scratch. 
In light of this background, Chapter 5 will scrutinize in depth the first part of my central 
hypothesis, which is that regional administrative capacity is positively correlated to 
Structural Funds implementation. Therefore, I will first of all assess the degree of 
administrative capacity that existed in both Sicily and Basilicata by measuring it 
according to the indicators presented in Chapter 2. My analysis covers the first (1989- 
19993), second (1994-1999) and part of the third (2000-2006) planning period of 
Structural Funds - i. e. from 1988 until 2004. 
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PART III 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: 
PRESENTING AND DISCUSSING THE RESULTS 
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Chapter 5 
Assessment of administrative capacity in Sicily and Basilicata 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I established the overall common background shared by my two 
case studies. I highlighted the features of the Italian bureaucracy and focused on the 
process of regional policy implementation from the creation of the regions onwards. I 
have divided Italian regional policy into two main periods. The first, from 1950 until 
1992, was characterized by the centralized intervention of the Italian state in southern 
regions, which left those regions with no experience in the management of development 
plans. The second period began in 1992 when a radical reform took place in the political 
and administrative spheres of the Italian government. These reforms supported a 
remarkable policy shift at the central level, which was slowly incorporated at the 
regional level as well. It was only during the third CSF cycle of 2000-2006 that the issue 
of performance by regional administrative structures emerged as an important 
consideration in the implementation of cohesion policy in Italy and the EU at large. 
Furthermore, the background retrospective carried out in Chapters 3 and 4 was intended 
to eliminate some possible explanations for regional variation. Indeed, the analysis 
revealed that both Sicily and Basilicata were equally affected by centralized 
intervention; both were ruled by the same centre-left political coalition; they both had a 
history of foreign subjugation; the mafia was active in both of them; according to 
Putnam (1993) they had the same level of social capital; data on the education and 
training of the administrative class suggest that it was similar in both of them. What, 
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then, can account for the stark differences in their respective implementations of 
regional policy? 
Chapter 5 marks the beginning of the empirical analysis. The aim of the chapter is to 
explain the observed dependent variable - i. e. the different rates of expenditure of 
Structural Funds among Italian Objective 1 regions. Indeed as discussed in Chapter 1, 
out of all the Member States, Italy had the worst expenditure performance in the three 
planning periods of Structural Funds (cf. Table 1.1). However, in a national context 
featuring a lower than average ability to implement allocated funds, there was, in 
contrast, a higher than average ability on the part of some southern Italian regions to 
spend the resources. 
Indeed, if we take a detailed look at the regional rate of expenditure over the three 
periods, the situation appears to be as follows. On 31 December 1993, at the end of the 
first period, the rate of implementation in Sicily was among the lowest, being only 39% 
of the funds available, whereas Basilicata had. already spent an impressive 56% of its 
total allocation, the highest performance of all the regions (Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1 Structural Funds allocation 1989-1993 (Mecu) and % of expenditure 
Region Allocation % of expenditure 
by 31/12/1993 
% of expenditure 
by 31/12/1996 
Basilicata 768 56% 92% 
Abruzzo 593 34% 89% 
Calabria 1.156 44% 79% 
Molise 344 54% 77% 
Sardinia 1.087 51% 77% 
Campania 1.617 31% 62% 
Pu lia 1.027 45% 57% 
[Sicily 1.687 39% 64% 
aource: Aut for s elaboration on /CºKUI data 
Similarly, at the end of second planning period (1994-1999), Basilicata again recorded 
an excellent rate of expenditure while Sicily registered the lowest (Table 5.2). 
154 
Table 5.2 Structural Funds allocation 1994-1999 (NIecu) and % of expenditure 
Region Allocation* % of expenditure 
by 31/12/1999 
%of expenditure 
by 31/12/2001 
Abruzzo 361 60% 100% 
Basilicata 1.272 58% 100% 
Molise 616 53% 99% 
Sardinia 1.816 64% 92% 
Calabria 1.911 46% 84% 
Campania 3.091 55% 80% 
Pu lia 2.645 53% 77% 
Sicil 3.194 40% 75% 
Source: Author's elaboration on [(heut aata 
Finally, in the latest period studied (2000-2006; data available until end 2004), 
Basilicata remained the best in terms of expenditures whereas Sicily still registered 
delays in its ability to spend Structural Funds although the available quarterly data on 
Structural Funds expenditure for this period seems to show that the gap between the two 
regions decreased (Table 5.3). The difference dropped from a gap of 28% at the end of 
1996 to 25% at the end of 2001, while the latest available data shows a further decline to 
a gap of 15% at the end of 2004. 
Table 5.3 Quarterly Structural Funds expenditure 2000-2004 in percentage 
Year 2000 Year 2001 Year 2002 
31-Dec 30-Jun 30-Sep 31-Dec 31-Mar 30-Jun 30-Se 31-Dec 
Basilicata 1.05% 2.49% 2.18% 4.76% 5.82% 8.15% 16.90% 19.20% 
Sardinia 1.56% 2.66% 4.98% 7.82% 6.09% 7.78% 11.04% 13.90% 
Calabria 0.48% 0.48% 3.18% 3.82% 3.67% 8.46% 10.18% 10.70% 
Puglia 0.30% 0.30% 4.00% 4.15% 4.48% 3.26% 5.39% 7.50% 
Cam ania 0.00% 2.40% 3.37% 4.04% 4.34% 5.76% 6.27% 7.90% 
icil 0.00% 0.30% 0.44% 0.74% 0.80% 1.01% 3.71% . 00% 6 
Year 2003 Year 200 4 
31-Mar 30-Jun 30-Sep 31-Dec 31-Mar 30-Jun 30-Sep 31-Dec 
Basilicata 20.60% 23.10% 24.40% 28.30% 31.20% 31.00% 34.60% 38.50% 
Sardinia 16.20% 18.60% 21.90% 24.80% 27.10% 29.30% 30.40% 32.40% 
Calabria 11.20% 12.10% 19.50% 19.30% 20.30% 23.40% 26.80% 31.10% 
Pu lia 10.20% 11.60% 15.00% 18.50% 19.10% 20.10% 21.30% 26.10% 
Cam ania 
r 
8.40% 8.70% 14.20% 16.80% 17.70% 19.20% 26.10% 26.00% 
icil 6.50% 7.50% 9.60% 15.00% 16.60% 18.30% 21.80% 23.00% 
Source: Author's elaboration on IGKUtT data 
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Based on this empirical evidence, we seek to understand why this is the case and what 
happened in some Objective 1 regions vis-ä-vis others. How can we explain these 
differences in regional performance? 
The hypothesis tested in this chapter aims to investigate the role of administrative 
capacity in explaining the implementation rates in my two case studies of Basilicata and 
Sicily. I suggest that there is a positive correlation between administrative capacity and 
Structural Funds implementation - i. e. a low/high implementation of Structural Funds is 
determined by a low/high degree of administrative capacity. The testing of the 
hypothesis will be based on the four key components of the concept. 
The chapter is divided into four sections, each of which scrutinizes one of the key 
actions, in order to assess the degree of administrative capacity both in Sicily and in 
Basilicata according to the indicators established in Chapter 2. Section 5.2 analyses the 
management features present in Sicily and Basilicata in terms of the clarity of roles 
among personnel and coordination between the various departments involved in the 
implementation of the Structural Funds. Section 5.3 assesses the features of the 
programming approaches adopted in terms of strategy coherence and timing for 
approval. Finally, Sections 5.4 and 5.5 appraise the activities of each region's 
monitoring system and evaluation culture respectively. 
In order to assess the degree of administrative capacity, besides using for each period the 
available primary" and secondary sources, the analysis will draw on my own 
observations and interviews based on questionnaires completed by the four categories 
of relevant actors: (1) the Management Authority staff; (2) the general managers and 
managers of each department using Structural Funds; (3) the politicians - i. e. the 
assessore (assessor); and (4) the civil servants with key roles in Structural Funds 
implementation not included under points 1 and 2. 
84 The main documents consulted were: the national CSFs for 1989-1993,1994-1999 and 2000-2006; the 
Sicilian and Basilicata Regional Operational Programmes for the three periods; the respective Programme 
Complements; ex-ante, ex post and intermediate evaluations for each region for the three different periods; 
each annual report on Structural Funds implementation for each region; the corresponding European, 
national and regional legislation covering this policy area. 
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The first round of interviews was carried out in June and July 2005, and the second 
round in June and July the following year (Annex I). As explained in chapter 2,29 
actors were covered by the sample taken in Sicily - all 29 filled in the questionnaire, and 
10 also provided an oral interview. In Basilicata, however, it covers 41 people - again, 
all 41 actors filled in the questionnaire and 26 of them agreed to participate in an oral 
interview. The main difference is that in Sicily I was not able to interview as many 
people as in Basilicata (only those interviewed were able to provide complete 
information): others that were contacted - some division managers and related civil 
servants - answered that they were not in a position to answer my questions mainly 
because of limited knowledge. In Basilicata, however, all of the people I contacted were 
able to provide information and agreed to participate in the interviews. 
A limitation encountered during the filed research was the availability of documentation 
covering the period 1989-1993. Very little exists for both regions. I have tried to 
supplement the lack of primary and secondary sources with information gathered 
through the interviews. 85 Nonetheless, very few people were fully aware of the details of 
the first programming period. This was mainly because many of the people present in 
the regions at the time of the research were not employed during that first period. Where 
there was some knowledge, it was more detailed in Basilicata. Therefore, for the 1989- 
1993 period the collection of information was heavily dependent on regional 
government documents and personal interviews. All of the citations used in the text were 
gathered through personal interviews and have been translated into English by the 
author. 
85 As previously stated, for the purpose of testing my hypothesis - i. e. that variation in Structural Funds 
implementation can be explained by the degree of regional administrative capacity - which has not been 
previously investigated, the case study and the correlated fieldwork are essential as they provide unedited 
information that could validate my suggestions. 
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5.2 The degree of management 
Management of public policies has never been easy but it became even more difficult 
with the introduction of the Structural Funds. The introduction of the cohesion policy 
brought with it a new approach to the expenditure of resources. Many authors have 
argued that the logic behind the new system enabled the government not only to spend 
these additional resources, but also to improve public spending in general (Barca, 2001b; 
Leonardi, 2005). Indeed, the principles underpinning the expenditure of the Structural 
Funds introduced a method of managing, programming, monitoring and evaluating the 
resources that was previously unknown in Italy or in other Member States - e. g. Greece, 
Portugal, Spain and also Germany, the UK and France. Given that the Structural Funds 
were awarded to a country or region on the basis of a signed contract - i. e. the 
Community Support Framework86 (CSF) and the Operational Programmes (Ops) - the 
task of coordinating the implementation and accounting for expenditures became a vital 
necessity. Therefore, it was important to identify explicitly at both national and regional 
level the person responsible for the implementation of the programme and for reporting 
expenditures to the Commission. 
During the first CSF cycle, 1989-1993, this administrative exigency was not clearly 
spelled out and the administrative solutions varied from country to country. By the 
second CSF cycle, 1994-1999, the need for clarity and certainty in "identifying" the 
person and office responsible for implementation became a necessity that was in most 
cases fulfilled by the end of the programming cycle. With the Structural Funds cycle of 
2000-2006, the need to create an explicit Managing Authority (MA)87 became the basis 
for finalising negotiations regarding the OPs. Thus in 2000 it was necessary to set up a 
MA within each level of government responsible for the expenditure of Structural 
Funds. In the Italian case a national MA was created to oversee the entire CSF 
86 Art. 9 of Council Regulation 1260/99 defines the Community Support Framework as "the document 
approved by the Commission, in agreement with the member state concerned, following appraisal of the 
plan submitted by a Member State and containing the strategy and priorities for action of the funds, their 
specific objectives, the contribution of the funds and the other financial resources. This document shall be 
divided into priorities and implemented by means of one or more operational programmes". 87 The Management Authority tasks are defined by art. 34 Reg. 1260/99. 
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programme, while each national and regional OP had its own dedicated MA assigned the 
task of putting together the strategy, actions, priorities and funds allocated by the CSF. 
Indeed, the CSF, which was agreed by the Commission and Italy, was broken down into 
seven Regional Operational Programs (ROPs), which were managed individually by 
each of the seven Objective 1 regions88. 
The ROP is a document comprised of a consistent set of priorities divided into sub- 
programmes and measures, 89 which derive from the CSF but are more specific and tied 
to regional needs. The implementation of the assistance strategy and priorities is detailed 
in a technical document, namely the Programme Complement (PC), which contains 
detailed elements at the level of measures. Each regional MA had the responsibility of 
drawing up both the ROP and the PC. The regional MA was generally located within the 
Programming Department (Dipartimento della Programmazione) and a general manager 
was appointed to take responsibility for its activities. In recent years, with the reform of 
Public Administration, this role could be assigned to an individual from within the 
regional administration or even from outside, i. e., from the private sector or recruited 
from other regional institutions. In either case, the contract was temporary in nature and 
its continuation depended upon the results achieved. 
In sum, the underlying framework of the Structural Funds suggests that the regional 
authorities were ultimately responsible for the outputs of the programme and making 
sure that the Funds were spent on the objectives and projects outlined in the OP. 
as In the 2000-2006 cycle, as well as the ROP there were also the National Operative Programmes (NOP), 
managed by the central administrations: Scientific Research, Technological Development, Higher 
Education, the School for Development, Security for the Development of the South, Local Development, 
Transport, Fisheries and Technical Assistance. 89 According to art. 9 of Council Regulation 1260/99 a measure is "the means by which a priority is 
implemented over several years which enable operations to be financed". The same article defines 
operations as "any project or action carried out by the final beneficiaries of assistance". Within the 
framework of European economic and social cohesion policy, a measure is the basic unit of programme 
management, consisting of a set of similar projects and disposing of a precisely defined budget. Each 
measure has a particular management apparatus. Measures generally consist of projects. Many measures 
are implemented through a process of Calls for Proposals and subsequent appraisal (Tavistock Institute, 
2003: Glossary). 
159 
The key role of the MA is to be responsible for the efficiency and correctness of the 
overall programme in order to deliver the expected results. I suggest, therefore, that it 
performs two main activities: 
1) to clarify the role of personnel in the administrative structure of the MA (i. e. who 
does what, when and how); and 
2) to co-ordinate the activities of the assessorati involved in the implementation of 
sectorial sub-programmes and measures (i. e. horizontal coordination). 90 
Accordingly to the methodology I proposed in Chapter 2 (cf. Section 2.3.1), I will be 
using the MA's key activities as indicators of the degree of management in both of the 
two case studies between 1989 and 2004. I will present the results of the analysis of the 
component parts for each region in sequence. 
5.2.1 Clarity of roles among personnel 
Sicily 
The drafting and management of the Pluri-fund Operative Programme (POP) 1989- 
199391 was the responsibility of the regional government. Along with the 
implementation of the POP, the regional authority was in charge of the IMPs, which 
started in 1986. Both programmes were organised into sub-programmes and measures. 
The region, in order to respond to the new territorial integrated development planning 
approach, identified twelve thematic sub-programmes92 and assigned the responsibility 
90 As previously mentioned, investigations carried out in other countries have pointed to co-ordination as 
one of the main problems in the management of the programmes (OIR, 2003). Indeed, the Objective I 
Programme management structures in Burgenland (Austria) had a total of 17 departments from federal and 
land level involved in programme, implementation, a number which is large in comparison with the 
programme size. For the purpose of co-ordinating and guaranteeing integration of the measures 
undertaken by each department, fund-specific coordination meetings were instituted under the 
chairmanship of the MA. The coordinating meetings, which took place every six weeks, constituted the 
central decision-making body and played a major role in harmonising the varying interests of the federal 
level and the Länder. 
9' This is the name of the first and second programming documents. In the third planning period the same 
document was called ROP. 
92 Infrastructure and Network; Industry, Craft and Services; Tourism; Environmental Protection; Training; 
Research and Innovation; Technical Assistance, Information and Monitoring; Agricultural Infrastructure; 
enhancement of traditional cultivation and promotion of new one; Environment Protection; Support to the 
enterprise income; Human resources enhancement. 
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of implementation to the appropriate assessorato. 93 Following this criteria, the 
interventions financed by the ERDF came under the authority of the regional Presidency, 
Programming Department; the EAGGF interventions were assigned to the Assessorato 
of Agriculture; and the ESF sub-programme was the responsibility of the Assessorato 
for Labour. The other assessorati - Cultural Resources; Budget; Cooperation, Trade and 
Fisheries; Industry; Territory and Environment; Public Works; and Tourism, Sport and 
Entertainment - were involved according to their area of responsibility. 
From 1989 to 1993, a Joint Committee of the three different assessorati in charge of 
coordinating the activities of each Fund was created in order to guarantee coherence in 
Structural Funds intervention (Arthur Andersen, 1995). The Committee acted on the 
basis of regular meetings with the aim of coordinating the whole programme activities. 
However, these coordinating activities were only a formality. In reality, 
"the responsibility for the management of those funds remained entirely in 
the hands of the three different assessorates, and the Committee never really 
acted as a strong coordinating body"94. 
There is only one available report relevant to the activities associated with the 
management of the Structural Funds during the first period, 1989-1993, namely the 
Evaluation Report on the POP submitted by Arthur Andersen Consulting & Co. on 15 
November 1997 (four years after the end of the first planning period). An examination of 
this primary source reveals that the regional administration encountered great difficulties 
in managing the programmes. The two main indicators for benchmarking management - 
i. e. clarity of role among personnel, and horizontal coordination among assessorates - 
appeared to be lacking. Indeed, an accurate review of the evaluation report supported by 
my personal interviews leads to two main conclusions. 
First, there was a lack of clarity in the roles assigned to the administrative personnel 
within the planning assessorato as well as in the other assessorati involved in the 
implementation of the sub-progammes and measures. Indeed, the report states that 
93 As mentioned in chapter 3, in each of the 12 assessorates, as well as the political figure, i. e. the 
assessore, there is an administrative position, namely general manager (dirigente generate), which should 
be responsible for the management of the programme. It is only with Law n. 10/2000, however, that we 
witness a formal separation of powers between administrative and political responsibilities. 94 Interview with Giuseppe Morale, Region of Sicily. (Palermo: 4 July 2005) 
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"the staff was randomly doing everything. Along with its ordinary duties, the 
staff was dealing with the extra administration related to the implementation 
of the Structural Funds, which caused a significant increase in workloads" 
(Arthur Andersen, 1997: 90). 
Secondly, each assessorato acted on its own with no co-ordination within or between the 
departments comprising the regional administrative structure. This evaluation was 
corroborated by officials present during that period who declared that 
"the roles among the staff were not well defined and there was no 
coordination of activities among the different departments which led most of 
the time to a duplication of action. "95 
This state of affairs was mainly caused by the absence of a well-developed coordination 
framework and the lack of preparatory measures taken to facilitate the introduction of a 
new and more complex method of implementing regional programmes. 
Undoubtedly the Structural Funds, which have very specific requirements, posed 
additional challenges to the administrative system. No changes were made at the time to 
the administrative structure and personnel were randomly overloaded with extra work. 
This created a situation of overall confusion and duplication of efforts among the 
personnel, "[who] had no clear indication of what to do". 96 Ultimately this situation 
created friction and discontent among the personnel. In the absence of a co-ordination 
body to which to refer, everyone was left to act on their own. As revealed by the 
interviews, the main constraint on introducing an adequate framework within which to 
carry out the new tasks was the political class, 
"which was rather pleased with such a confused situation, that allowed them 
to interpret and manage the implementation of the funds according to their 
personal agendas and bypassing the administration". 97 
Similar problems characterised the period 1994-1999. It was only during the third 
planning period, 2000-2006, that the regional administration began a process of 
organisational restructuring on the heels of the explicit requirements introduced by the 
95 Interview with Emanuele Villa, Region of Sicily. (Palermo: 29 June 2005) 96 Intervie with Francesca Marino, Region of Sicily. (Palermo: 27 June 2005) 97 Interview with Giuseppe Morale, Region of Sicily. (Palermo: 4 July 2005) 
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1999 EU regulations. A new regional law (L. R. n. 10/2000)98 clearly distinguished the 
political function and responsibilities of the Regional President and Assessori from the 
administrative duties of the general managers, division manager and civil servants. The 
implementation of this law radically transformed the structure of the regional 
government with regard to the administrative responsibilities of the general managers. 
They were now granted full responsibility over carrying out each measure covered by 
their own department. 99 In order to improve the clarity in the definition of the role and 
the need for coordination and cooperation between different departments, the regional 
giunta approved the specification of the person responsible for the implementation of 
each intervention, with Decision n. 332 (18 September 2001). The same document 
established the conditions governing the coordination role of the MA. 
L. R. n. 10/2000 guaranteed that the administration was accountable for the management 
of the Operational Programme (OP), whereas the political class was responsible for 
providing the general strategic guidelines. 100 Setting these boundaries contributed 
significantly to clarifying the roles of specific individuals and reducing the blurring of 
responsibilities. 
Basilicata 
The regional government of Basilicata behaved similarly to that of Sicily in the way it 
assumed the responsibility of implementing the 1989-1993 OP. The interventions 
financed by the ERDF fell under the authority of the Presidency, Programming 
Department, and the EAGGF and ESF interventions were allocated to the Assessorato of 
Agriculture. The remaining four assessorati, namely Policies for Enterprise, 
Environmental Protection, Infrastructures, and Vocational Training, intervened in their 
areas of competence. 
98 L. R. n. 10/2000 takes in the national Law Decree n. 29/1993 on the privatisation of public employment. 99 The denomination "department" replaces the previous "direction". 10° In chapter 6 we will see that setting these boundaries limited political interference in the administration 
of the policy and was the major reason for the improved performance registered by Sicily during the latest 
period of implementation. 
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The main difference that I found between the OP management in Basilicata and that in 
Sicily was that the former created an ad hoc structure to undertake the technical and 
administrative coordination of the POP under the guidance of the Programming 
Department, namely the "Cabin of Direction" (Cabina di Regia) or headquarters to 
manage the policy. The Cabin of Direction was created by the region to cover the 
administrative necessity of coordinating the activities of various departments involved in 
the implementation of the operational programme. The other advantage of having a body 
in charge of coordination was that the roles of the various individuals involved in the 
administration were clearly defined. 
Some start-up problems were experienced at the beginning of the 1989-1993 programme 
because of the novelty of the Structural Funds mechanisms. Those initial difficulties 
were definitively overcome by the beginning of the second planning period, 1994-1999. 
This was possible thanks to the ongoing formal and informal meetings between the staff, 
which aimed to share information and experience (Ecosfera et al., 1999). This practice 
of sharing and solving problems together gave everyone involved in implementation an 
understanding of the mechanisms involved in the operationalization of the Structural 
Funds and an awareness of best practice. 
The experience accumulated during the previous two planning periods allowed the 
Basilicata region to set up its MA, for the purpose of managing programme 
implementation, without difficulty in 2000. At the time of establishing the MA it was 
possible to define the terms and conditions for programme implementation, in addition 
to specifying the deadlines by which measures had to be implemented and the 
obligations of each department in the sharing of information and good practice (Regione 
Basilicata, 2001). Each department was aware that if it ran into difficulties it was clear 
who was responsible for resolving problems and making the necessary adjustments. 
The establishment of such a clear working framework facilitated clarity of responsibility 
and the division of roles between personnel. Furthermore, the division of duties among 
personnel was coherent with each area of responsibility (Ecosfera, 2000: 29). 
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As one interviewee declared, 
"following this criteria of allocating responsibility according to staff 
background and as closely as possible to their ongoing activities within the 
regional administration has facilitated the process of taking on a greater 
workload, without creating a blurring of role or confusion of responsibilities 
over who does what". 1°' 
What emerged from the interviews was an overall tendency among the staff at every 
level to collaborate, in contrast to the picture that emerged in Sicily. This. attitude 
appears in both cases to have been stimulated by the political class. As I will discuss in 
more detail in Chapter 6, in Basilicata 
"a non-opportunistic, pro-active behaviour exemplified by the political class 
has favoured the spreading among the administrative class of a similar type 
of behaviour" (Mancinelli, 2001: 312). 
5.2.2 Coordination of activities among different assessorati 
Sicily 
In Sicily, there was another crucial factor accounting for the deficiency in management, 
along with the lack of clarity around the role of the personnel: poor coordination 
between the different assessorati. As we saw in the previous section, this was caused by 
the absence of a pro-active structure/body dedicated specifically to the implementation 
of Structural Funds intervention. Indeed, as both primary and secondary sources 
(documents and interviews) clearly reveal, the Joint Committee did not perform its role 
of coordination, and was a very weak body without full charge of the overall 
management of the programme. The weakness of the Committee can be traced back to 
the fact that 
"it was not supported by the political class, which was bypassing the 
Committee's authority and taking decisions autonomous] y. "lot 
101 Interview with Maria Teresa Lavieri, Region of Basilicata (Potenza: 7 June 2006) 102 Interview with Giuseppe Morale, Head of the Structural Funds Committee for 1989-1993 and 1994- 1999. Region of Sicily. (Palermo: 4July 2005) 
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The problem of coordination was increased not only by the absence of a politically 
recognized coordination structure, but also by a vertical and compartmentalized 
administrative hierarchy that did not favour exchanges between different assessorati and 
made management an individual concern. These circumstances led to a situation where 
the transfer of knowledge and information was very limited and hierarchical. Indeed, the 
organizational chart (Figure 5.1) of the regional government was based on a divisional 
structure, rooted in the principle that each assessore was responsible for its assessorate in 
front of the Cabinet. Consequently, each assessorato acted totally autonomously, and 
there was no communication between the different branches, 
Figure 5.1 Organizational chart of the regional government in Sicily 
Cabinet 
Assessorato AII Assessorato 
CODIPA 
created with 
R. L. 20/2001 
Al IDeaartment An I IDepartment Bi IDeaprtment Bn 
Area Al I Area (Area IArea Annl jArea B1 IArea Bn IArea Bn1 
Ani 
Source: Author's elaboration based on information given by the regional governments of Si 
Each assessorato was divided into two levels, departments (dipartimenti) and areas 
(aree), for a total of 12 assessorates and 22 departments. Each area was responsible for 
some activities, and again there was a lack of communication/coordination even within 
individual assessorati. Each member of staff was concerned only with the result 
achieved by his own department and not with the overall functionality of the 
administrative structure in guaranteeing particular results. This compartmentalized 
vision of the administration was an obstacle to the overall performance of the region as 
an implementer of policy. 
The main result of such uncoordinated administrative behaviour was the poor 
performance during the period 1989-1993, when Sicily spent only 39% of its total 
allocation, registering the lowest level of expenditure of all of the eight southern Italian 
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regions (cf. Section 5.1, Table 5.11). In the light of these results, the regional 
government established that the Programming Department, in addition to being 
responsible for the FESR, should coordinate all the different assessorati in activities 
related to the planning and implementation of the overall programme. 
The new POP of 1994-1999 clearly spelled out the role of each assessorato and the 
regional officer within it responsible for managing the single sub-programmes and 
measures. Specifically, it was established that the Director of each department was 
responsible for the sub-programmes, whereas the officer responsible for each measure 
was to be appointed by the assessore under the assessorato in which the measure would 
be implemented (Regione Sicilia, 1996: 6 Part V). 
Despite this innovation of having the whole Programming Department in charge of 
overall coordination, operational incompetence still affected the regional administration. 
Indeed, the necessary improvements to the organisation and management of the 
distribution of tasks and resources were still not clearly defined. As a whole, the 
management system was still deficient. It was not enough to create a new management 
structure; it was also necessary to allow the technical personnel in charge of 
management freedom to manoeuvre. This was not the case in Sicily, where, as Chapter 6 
will reveal, a constant level of political interference limited the decision-making powers 
of the administrative structure. 
Finally, at the beginning of the 2000-2006 period the regional administration set up a 
MA whose General Manger was hired from the national administration. ' 03 There was a 
general agreement, corroborated by primary, secondary and interview sources, that with 
the creation of a centralized administrative structure headed by an individual from 
outside of the regional administration, the situation in terms of clarity of role and 
responsibilities and coordination improved significantly (Ernst & Young, 2003a). 
Furthermore, in 2001, Law n. 20 created a Committee of Coordination of the 
Departments (CODIPA - Comitato di Coordinamento dei Dipartimenti) within the 
103 The actual general manager of the MA in Sicily, Gabriella Palocci, was the former Director of the 
Department of Development and cohesion policy at the Ministry of Treasury, the Budget Ministry and the 
Ministry of Economic Programming. 
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Presidency of the region. The tasks assigned to the Committee were: (i) to ensure a full 
correspondence between the managerial activity and the political directions; (ii) to 
increase integration and coordination between the operating structures of the 
administration; and to promote the simplification and effectiveness of administrative 
actions. All the general managers of the different departments were members of 
CODIPA: this represented an opportunity to share and discuss common administrative 
problems in the implementation of the operational programme. 
Basilcata 
Basilicata had a vertical structure similar to that of Sicily. The main difference, though, 
was the existence of coordination bodies at various levels (Figure 5.2). Indeed, I found 
that in Baisilicata coordination activities were considered essential to the functioning of 
the whole organization. Three bodies existed to cover this role: (1) the Interdepartmental 
Committee for Management Coordination (CICO - Comitato Interdipartimentale di 
Coordinamento Organizzativo), comprised of the general managers of each department 
and directed by the general manager of the Dipartimento Presidenza della Giunta; (2) the 
Comitato di Direzione, created within each department, comprising all of the lower 
division managers and directed by the general manger of the department; (3) the 
Conferenza di Organizzazione, in which all members of the staff of each department 
participate along with other third parties, such as the trade unions (Figure 5.2). 
Figure 5.2 Organizational chart of the regional government In Basilicata 
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Clearly, in Basilicata coordination of activities was ensured at each level. This was the 
key element that enabled Basilicata to manage the use of EU funds well. Furthermore, 
each of the six assessorati corresponded to one of the six departments. 
Indeed, based on this logic, what made the difference for the management of Structural 
Funds in Basilicata was the creation of the Cabin of Direction, 1°4 which was in charge of 
the coordination of the activities related to the POP of 1989-1993 and of 1994-1999, in 
order to overcome the shortages caused by sectorial and departmental division in the 
regional administration. The Cabin of Direction was organized on two main levels: a 
political level where the decisions were taken by the regional Cabinet and the Mixed 
Committee (Comitato Misto); and a technical level where the decisions were taken by 
the Interdepartmental Technical Commission (CTI - Commissione Tecnica 
Interdipartimentale)1°5 and by the Staff Office for Community Policy and Programme 
(Struttura di Staff Politiche e Programmi Comunitari). 
The members of the Mixed Committee were the President of the Cabinet, three 
representatives of the local authorities' association, three representatives of the trade 
unions, three representatives of the entrepreneurial associations, four representatives of 
the labour organizations, and a representative of the environment association. The Mixed 
Committee had three main roles: (I) to propose criteria for the formulation of the 
programs; (2) to advise the Regional Cabinet and the Interdepartmental Technical 
Commission on the implementation, evaluation and the re-planning of the programmes; 
(3) to enable the diffusion of information on programme implementation. 
Clearly, the Mixed Committee acted under political direction, but the Interdepartmental 
Technical Commission constantly monitored its actions. The members of the latter were 
the managers responsible for each Structural Fund and the managers responsible for the 
sub-programmes and/or measures. The coordination was left to the general manager of 
the Programming Department. The CTI was in charge of coordinating the 
administrative, technical and managerial issues related to the implementation of 
104 Cabinet resolution n. 502,19 February 1996 105 Created with D. G. R. 7523 dated 10 November 1997 
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Structural Funds. In carrying out these responsibilities the CTI was supported by the 
Staff Office for Community Policy and Programme, composed of experts and technical 
staff competent in the specific fields of Structural Funds intervention (Regione 
Basilicata, 1996b: 37-42). 
The management structure set up for the Structural Funds with the above terms was 
capable of guaranteeing an optimal implementation performance between 1994 and 
1999, enabled, among other factors, by constant mediation between the political and 
technical needs. Indeed, the degree of expenditure reached 58% in 1999 and after the 
two years' extension, it rose to 100% implementation (cf. Section 5.1, Table 5.2). This 
achievement speaks for itself. 
From the analysis of the overall performance of the 1994-1999 POP, and of its sub- 
programmes, it emerged that the successful outcomes are in great part tied to the 
learning and the sharing of objectives, rules, and procedures among the political and 
administrative classes. 
The evaluation report completed by the independent evaluator, documents that the 
establishment of organizational instruments and procedures produced an ability to 
coordinate activities effectively between the different departments and the clarification 
of each one's role with respect to political and administrative duties and responsibilities 
(Ecosfera et al., 1999: 79). All 26 of the people interviewed in Basilicata agreed on the 
vital role played by the three coordinating bodies, mainly the CICO for the overall 
organization and the CIT for the Structural Funds. They valued the existence of such 
technical bodies as the determining elements of the successful implementation of the 
1994-1999 Funds. Such an optimal result was possible due to the space of manoeuvre 
left by the political class, which, instead of interfering, enabled the civil servants to grow 
and develop their own technical capacities in administrating the Funds. 
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5.2.3 Management assessment 
This section discusses the results that emerged in the answers given to the questionnaire 
and personal interviews on the issue of management activities. The overall picture that 
emerges in the case of Sicily is that only in recent years, since 2000, has the regional 
administration improved in its management of Structural Funds. Indeed, from 1989 until 
1999 the management system that was in place was very weak, disorganized and 
inefficient and did not fully incorporate the rules and regulations of the EC. The 
interviews revealed this was mainly due to a lack of clarity of roles among 
administrative personnel and, furthermore, to the poor coordination abilities of the MA. 
As discussed above, in 2000, with the beginning of the new planning period there was 
some improvement in the management of Funds. Indeed, whereas before there was no 
substantial coordination of activities, there is now a whole department dedicated to this 
task. Above all, the turning point was the increased engagement of the political class 
with the administrative class, which aimed to try to improve the level of performance. 
Some problems remain, however, as the analysis of the questionnaires reveals (Table 
5.4). An opposite picture emerged in Basilicata, where coordination has always been a 
priority for the whole regional organization and has been the key contributory factor to 
the successful management of the Funds. 
In Sicily, with reference to the planning period 2000-2006,60% of the respondents 
judged the coordination activity of the MA to be "good" and the same percentage felt 
that clarity of roles among personnel had improved compared to the past (question 1). 
However, there was still some resistance to collaboration in each department, leading 
69% of the interviewees to declare that each assessorato worked independently from the 
others (question 2). As confirmed by the entire sample interviewed: 
"this lack of collaboration has always been part of the administrative culture 
in Sicily and it is still difficult to change. Indeed, each department has 
always had its own decision-making, political and organizational autonomy; 
therefore it is hard to dismantle 50 years of such a trend". 106 
1°6 Interviews with Emanuele Villa, Region of Sicily (Palermo: 29 June 2005) 
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Table 5.4 Answers to the questionnaire on Structural Funds management 
a) Good 60 90 
h) Satisfactory 40 10 
c) Unsatisfactory 0 o 
º Does the MA carry out an efficient activity of horizontal coordination? 
a) Yes 54 70 
b) Not enough 46 30 
C) No 
3) How would you define the vertical hierarchy in your regional government? 
O 0 
,u Strong 85 35 
h) Weak 15 65 
c) There i,, no -erti. al hierarchy 
Do you think that the vertical hierarchy is an impediment to the correct horizontal 
coordination of activities? 
O O 
54 77 
h) No 46 11 
1 Do you think that there is clarity of roles between the different assessorati and within 
ach assessorato as far the Structural Funds are concerned? 
:u Yes. Compared to the prev iou period the roles are more clearly divided. 65 90 
h) There is not enough clarity in the division of roles. 25 10 
ct There is no do ision of roles and this causes work to be duplicated. Ip p 
) The different assessorati involved work...: 
a).... in a coordinated fashion with each other. i1 85 
h) .... independently from each other. 69 IS 
Is the MA structured and organized in order to carry out its duties? 
a) Yes, it is fully structured. 31 70 
h) Partially: it still needs improvement. 
-ý--- 
69 30 
cl No. it is not adcyuatelý ., fractured------------------ ll 0 
Is the number and quality of the MA staff adequate to carry out the MA duties as listed 
in art 34 Council Regulation 1260/99? 
a) 'i es, the number and quality of . staff 
is adequate. 39 85 
h) No, the number and quality of staff is not adequate. 0 0 
c) Partially: the number of staff is not adequate. 53 15 
d) Partially; the quality of staff i,, not adequate. 9 0 
u) Understanding the EV rules and procedures. IS 100 
b) Resistance within the various departments to co-operation. 40 / 
c) Political class resistance/interference. 45 /ý 
Oucslionnaire carried out in. huºN 2005 in Sicily und in . 
luny 2006 in Basilicata 
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Refering to question 2, someone else added: 
"the regional organization of Sicily is based on strong vertical hierarchy, 
which impedes a smooth and collaborative horizontal coordination of 
activities. There is a tendency to keep each department's activity within the 
boundaries of the department itself and to avoid any sharing of knowledge or 
experience across departments. Furthermore, the region has the drawback of 
being divided into 12 assessorates and 22 departments, which represents a large 
regional administrative structure that in itself constitutes a further obstacle when it 
comes to coordination of overall activities". 107 
Finally, when asked if the MA was structured and organized sufficiently to carry out its 
duties, in Sicily 69% of the respondents answered that it still needs improvement; 
mainly the number of staff appears to have been inadequate in relation to the required 
duties (question 7). The answer to the last question of the questionnaire is the most 
striking. Indeed, respondents in Sicily declared that the main obstacles faced by the MA 
in managing the Structural Funds were, firstly, political interference and, secondly, the 
resistance to collaboration within the various departments, which was ultimately 
attributed to the "political equilibrium" (question 9). This last answer itself validates h 
corollary of the second part of my central hypothesis, which is that management 
performance is ultimately determined by the nature of political interference. I will 
investigate this relationship further in Chapter 6. 
As the data in Table 5.4 show, a completely different picture emerged in Basilicata. 
Indeed, here 80% of responses defined the coordination activities of the MA as "good" 
(question 1). According to 90% of the respondents, the role of administrative personnel 
had always been clearly stated, as was the case with the role of each assessorate 
involved in Structural Funds implementation. They were able to work in a co-ordinated 
fashion (questions 5 and 6). These features allowed the regional administration to 
achieve relatively optimal levels of performance. From the questionnaire, it emerged that 
the vertical hierarchy in the region was not very strong and that this facilitated a 
horizontal coordination of activities (question 4). Furthermore, the 26 people 
interviewed agreed that the region benefited from being divided into only six 
107 Interviews with Giuseppe Scorciapino and Francesca Marino, Region of Sicily (Palermo: 27 June 
2005) 
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assessorati, vis-ä-vis the twelve of the Sicilian administration. However, everyone 
remarked that it was not only a matter of size, in terms of number of 
assessoratildepartments involved, but also, and mainly, about the number of people 
involved. In Basilicata forty people were involved in the overall activities related to 
Structural Funds administration. 108 This is an ideal number, being large enough to 
manage such a task but small enough to maintain an efficient horizontal co-ordination. 
The reduced size of the regional organization, along with the limited number of people 
involved, appears to be a further advantage when it comes to co-ordinating overall 
activities. When asked if the MA was structured and organized enough to carry out its 
duties, 70% of respondents in Basilicata affirmed that the MA was fully structured and 
that the number and quality of staff were both sufficient for them to carry out their duties 
(questions 7 and 8). The answer to the question on the main obstacle faced by the MA in 
managing the Structural Funds was again in this case the most interesting. Indeed, in 
Basilicata everyone felt that the main problem was the understanding of the EU rules 
(question 9). In order to investigate further how this problem was overcome I asked the 
opinion of the 26 people interviewed. Again, the answer I was given was very 
homogenous: 
"At the beginning in 1989 the main problem was to understand and 
familiarize oneself with the new EU rules and procedure. This process, 
although difficult, was possible thanks to two main factors: (1) the 
cooperation between the political and administrative class; and (2) the 
background of the regional administration, which since 1980 has always 
worked together in a form of horizontal coordination and the sharing of 
information which made the process of understanding the novelty of the EU 
rules easier"(Recorded interview). 
Ranking109 the primary and secondary source material and the evidence that emerged 
from the fieldwork on the basis of the definition given to the management indicators, it 
lox In Sicily, approximately 50 people were involved in Structural Funds activities. 
109 As discussed in chapter 2, each indicator is rated on a scale from 0 to 3, as follows: 0= absent; 1= 
starting: 2= developing; 3= consolidated. Consequently, all components are averaged together to provide a 
summary score for the administrative area. The score bands for each area are as follows: 
Score 10-0.5 10.6-1.5 1.6-2.5 2.6-3 
Stage Absent Starting Developing Consolidated 
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seems that the management was at a starting level in Sicily and at a level of high 
development in Basilicata (Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5 Ranking of management in Sicily and in Basilicata over the period 1989-2004 
First key Indicators POP POP POR Overall 
determinants of 1989- 1994- 2000- score 
administrative 1993 1999 2006 
capacity 
Management in a) Clarity in the definition of roles 0 0 1 0.3 
Sicil y b) Co-ordination and co-operation 0 1 2 1 
among assessorati 
Overall score 0 0.5 1.5 0.65 
Management in a) Clarity in the definition of roles 1 2 3 2 
Basilicata 
b) Co-ordination and co-operation 1 2 3 2 
among assessorati 
Overall score 1 2 3 2 
The next section will assess the second key component, namely programming. We can 
already anticipate that, since these activities are part of a loop, a weak management will 
definitely influence the level of programming performance. 
5.3 Programming Performance 
Programming is the second key determinant that needs to be addressed. Ideally, once the 
MA has been set up and roles have been clarified among personnel and various 
departments, the next step is to design and approve a development plan. 
The long-term nature of Structural Funds interventions makes this factor a very valuable 
means of ensuring legal and financial certainty for planners, policy implementers, 
project promoters and managers over a prolonged period of time. The advantage of 
using programming as an implementation mechanism is largely that 
"programmes are logical structures, they work from analysis to objectives, 
priorities and interventions and are complemented by indicators. They are 
multi-sectoral in scope, multiannual in duration and geographically targeted. 
In this very real sense, it can be said that the Structural Funds aims to 
promote strategic thinking and strategic planning beneficial for all public 
policies" (ÖIR, 2003: 124). 
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In this context a programme is defined as an 
"organised set of financial, organisational and human interventions 
mobilised to achieve an objective or set of objectives in a given period. A 
programme is delimited in terms of a timescale and budget. Programme 
objectives are defined beforehand; an effort is then made systematically to 
strive for coherence among these objectives" (Tavistock Institute, 2003: 
Glossary). 
Based on this definition, as previously discussed, two indicators have been considered in 
order to assess the degree of programming at the regional level: programme design and 
programme approval (cf. Section 2.4.1). In terms of programme design, there are two 
essential elements to address: the correctness of the SWOT analysis, and the consequent 
development of a coherent strategy. These two steps are closely interrelated, so any 
imprecision in the SWOT analysis will compromise the success of the strategy. A 
SWOT analysis is a basic, straightforward model that provides direction and serves as 
the basis for the development of investment priorities. It accomplishes this by assessing 
socio-economic strengths and weaknesses in addition to opportunities and threats. This 
assessment provide vital information that will assist the organization in accomplishing 
its objectives -a strength or an opportunity - or if it indicates an obstacle that must be 
overcome or minimized to achieve the desired results - i. e. a weakness or threat (Ferrell, 
1998). Consequently, this shapes the strategy to improve on weaknesses and meet the 
challenges of threats. 
The second factor necessary for successful programming is "timing". Indeed, the 
programme to implement Structural Funds, or any long term policy interventions, is 
spread over a length of time that usually spans between five to seven years, and 
coincides with the beginning and end of the EU budgetary cycle - i. e. 1989-1993,1994- 
1999,2000-2006. The logic behind multiannual programming is that there is a certain 
amount of resources allocated that needs to be spent within the set period of time, or else 
lost. Therefore, any delays in approving the beginning of the programme reduce the time 
available to spend the resources. 
In many Objective 1 regions, timing has been one major issue of concern, not only in 
terms of approval but also in terms of programme preparation. The preparation of 
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operational programmes has been seen as a time-consuming exercise, which can be 
speeded up by an efficient MA (ÖIR, 2003: 82). In the next section, I will investigate the 
characteristics of both programme designs and programme approval practices in Sicily 
and in Basilicata. 
5.3.1 Programme design and strategy coherence 
Sicily 
Programme design, in terms of appropriate strategy and coherence with real territorial 
needs, was not a familiar practice in Sicily: indeed, the drafting of the IMP programme 
and of the first POP 1989-1993 was the only real programming exercise undertaken by 
the region during its long history (Regione Sicilia, 1990). 
In reality the first two POPs (1989-1993 and 1994-1999) were deficient in many 
respects. First, they did not contain an exhaustive SWOT analysis of the territory: 
"the programme was written sitting around a table - i. e. it was written by a 
few people in charge who had conducted no territorial analysis and assumed, 
based on their own personal knowledge, that they knew what interventions 
were necessary for the region. The same people developed a strategy which 
was very shallow and in no way successful. "'" 
The strategy addressed all of the principal regional disparities and approached individual 
problems (i. e. roads, industrial fabric, tourism, etc. ), but without adopting an integrated 
model of development that considered the region as a whole (Regione Sicilia, 1990). 
The characteristics of the region were not considered in the initial programming. Over 
the first two periods of planning, 1989-1993 and 1994-1999, the territory remained a 
neutral base onto which productive activities had to be placed (Regione Sicilia, 1996). 
This approach was in large part the result of sectoral programming, based on the 
separate needs identified by each individual department without any recognition of 
possibly links with other interventions. This is a consequence of the lack of coordination 
among the different assessorati. 
110 Interview with Emanuele Villa, Region of Sicily (Palermo: 29 June 2005) 
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"The most common situation is that individual initiatives are self-justifying. 
It is sometimes possible to identify links between different measures and to 
reassemble pieces of strategies but actions have never been carried out in an 
integrated fashion. It is common for those in charge of a measure to know 
absolutely nothing about other measures even within the same sub- 
project""'. 
Consequently many development problems were left unsolved and very little was done 
(CENSIS and Vision and Value, 2001; 2002). 
On the other hand, when scrutinizing the 2000-2006 ROP, it emerges that use of the 
SWOT analysis had improved, and there was an attempt to integrate interventions 
carried out by different departments (Regione Sicilia, 2000a). This indicates the 
adoption of a more horizontal cooperative model, to replace the existing vertical, 
isolated one. Although, this time, in attempting to be more inclusive, the analysis 
conducted became insufficiently selective, so that the programme developed was far too 
ambitious, addressed too many issues, and was extremely fragmented (Ernst & Young, 
2003a). 
The result of this approach to programme design was that the strategy was spread 
between 77 intervention measures, far too many to manage in an integrated fashion 
(Regione Sicilia, 2000b). As an interviewee confirmed, 
"these characteristics are typical of an organization which is trying to adjust 
its past programming approach. It is a process that takes time, and it is 
physiological that now there are too many measures compared to the past. 
Eventually in the future plan we will rind a better balance between 
interventions". 112 
The main downfall of having too many interventions in a context where coordination of 
actions is still unsatisfactory is that not only does it create ineffective dispersion in terms 
of resources, but it also exacerbates the existing problems of coordination among the 
considerable number of departments involved in programme implementation. 
11 Interview with Giuseppe Morale. Region of Sicily (Palermo: 4 July 2005) 
112 Interview with Giuseppe Scorciapino, Region of Sicily (Palermo: 27 June 2005) 
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Basilicata 
The information on programming activities during the period 1989-1993 was collected 
mainly through interviews. Various key actors have pointed out two elements that set 
apart the programming activities in Basilicata. First, the experimental experience of the 
IMP, which was taken very seriously and used as an opportunity to learn about how to 
engage in integrated planning (Regione Basilicata, 1996c). This was not the case in 
Sicily, which continued to rely on the Funds of the Casmez; these were more easily 
accessible and were not accompanied by restrictive rules on their use. The second 
element was the efforts that the regional organization made towards closing the gap 
between the ordinary administration of funding for development and the Structural 
Funds procedures. Indeed, Basilicata immediately understood that the Structural Funds 
principles could be more effective than the logic behind the Casmez interventions, and 
tried to apply these principles in its overall management and programming activities 
(Regione Basilicata, 1996c; 1997). 
An investigation of the two benchmarks for programming activities, reveals a positive 
situation in Basilicata. Here, the definition of the strategy for the implementation of the 
funds began with what was considered an accurate SWOT analysis of the region's socio- 
economic structure (Regione Basilicata, 1989,1995b, 2000a). The programming 
document for each period - i. e. POP 1989-1993, POP 1994-1999 and ROP 2000-2006 -- 
was characterized by a strategy of continuity with the previous period. Indeed, the aim 
was to tackle the obstacles that have impeded the success of some actions in the previous 
period and to keep improving those actions that had been successful. Furthermore, the 
interventions appeared to be strongly coordinated (Regione Basilicata, 1989,1995b, 
2000). This was possible because of the existence of the Cabin of Direction and the CTI 
(cf. Section 5.2.2). These two coordinating bodies made it possible to create an arena for 
discussion between all the departmental general managers and managers with a view to 
sharing strategy. 
Naturally, the documents show a clear improvement in the use of the SWOT analysis 
over the course of the three planning periods. However, two common elements were 
always present: (1) a clear definition of priorities and an operationalization of the 
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interventions designed to provide solutions to the problems identified; and (2) a broad 
agreement between departments on the selection of priorities (Regione Basilicata, 1989, 
1995b, 2000a). 
I have scrutinized the latest ROP (2000-2006), and the elements which emerge in 
opposition to the contents of the Sicilian development programme are: (i) a clear focus 
on four main development issues which the region aims to tackle; and (ii) a limited 
number of measures (45) into which the program that concentrates on achieving those 
goals was divided (Regione Basilicata, 2000a: 39-41). All the people interviewed agreed 
that 
" the number of measures is adequate to answer the territorial needs, and the 
programme is well co-ordinated and this makes it possible to eventually 
adjust the interventions to any changes in the scenario" (Recorded 
interview). 
5.3.2 Programme approval 
Along with poor programme design, another main problem that compromises 
programming performance is the pace of programme approval - the second selected 
indicator. Indeed, one of the greatest frustrations in the programming process was 
related to the approval process governing the plans and their administrative procedures. 
In Sicily, there was evidence of considerable delays in the approval of the three 
programming documents - i. e. POP 1989-1993, POP 1994-1999 and ROP 2000-2006 - 
which resulted in the late start and further delays in putting implementation structures 
into place. As far as the first POP (1989/1993)113 was concerned, the programme that 
was supposed to start in 1989 was approved with significant delays on 14 December 
1990,114 almost two years after the CSF began, and it received an extension until 31 
113 The situation for the IMP appears to have been very similar: the programme was supposed to start in 
1986 but was approved after significant delays in May 1988. During the IMP implementation phase the 
original programme was revised three times, in 1991,1992, and 1993 respectively (Arthur Andersen, 
1995: 7). This was due to a lack of correspondence between the initial strategy and the real needs of the 
region - i. e. the initial formulation of the programme was not well rooted in the reality of the socio- 
economic structure of the region. 
114 Decision of the European Community Commission N. C (90) 2516/3,14 December 1990 
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December 1997 to spend its financial allocation in full. An analysis of the documents 
from that period seems to show that this delay was physiologically related to the novelty 
of the programme and partially down to the EC. 115 Basilicata's POP was also approved 
in December 1990.116 The delays in approval justified an extension of the deadline by 
which the Funds must be spent to 1996. As shown in Table 5.1, the extension actually 
increased the possibility of expenditure. However, if we look at the end of the period, 
i. e. the end of 1993, the rate of implementation in Sicily was among the lowest at only at 
39% of available Funds, whereas Basilicata had already spent 56% of its total allocation. 
In comparison to the remaining Objective 1 regions in Italy, Basilicata's performance 
was the best. The factor that enabled Basilicata to accelerate its rate of expenditure was 
repeated by most of the interviewees: 
"The regional administration has been able to spend the resources and reach 
an admirable level due to the strong coherence between the programme 
objectives and the regional needs. Once identified what was really needed, it 
was easy to spend resources to tackle those necessities"(Recorded 
interview). 
The same type of delay that characterized the first cohesion policy cycle was repeated in 
the second. The 1994-1999 Sicilian OP was approved on 28 September 1995, again 
almost two years after the beginning of the CSF. The situation appears to have been very 
different in Basilicata, where the delay was contained to less than a year. "" The 
reduction of the delay in Basilicata exemplifies the capacity of the region to adapt and 
improve its own performance, while Sicily remained wedded to its usual procedures and 
delays. Indeed, this time the reason for the delay in approval was the inadequacy of the 
POP presented by Sicily to the EC, which asked for changes and improvements to the 
document before it was able to approve it. ' 18 
If we look at the other regions, we can identify a strong correspondence between the 
time of approval and delays in expenditure. Indeed, Molise, Sardinia and Calabria which 
had their respective POPs approved by the end of 1994, with less than a year of delays, 
i 
is During the first period (1989-1993) the POPs of the other regions were approved an average of two 
years later - i. e. at the end of 1990. 16 Decision of the European Community Commission N. C (90) 2989/2,20 December 1990 
' Decision of the European Community Commission N. C (94) 3765,16 December 1994 
tta interview with Giuseppe Morale, Region of Sicily (Palermo: 4 July 2005) 
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had by 2001 spent, respectively, 99%, 84% and 92% of their total allocation. The 
remaining regions, on the other hand, suffered a delay of two years in the approval of 
their programmes and this had an impact on the expenditure (cf. Section 5.1, Table 5.2). 
Finally, the delays in Sicily were much less notable in the third planning period, 2000- 
2006. The ROP was approved on 8 August 2000,19 but the PC, which specified how the 
measures would be implemented, had to wait until 21 March 2001, for approval. It took 
the same length of time for the ROP to be approved for Basilicata'20, but the PC was 
approved straight away during the same year (28 November 2000). The quarterly data 
on Structural Funds expenditure available for the latter period clearly reveal how a delay 
in approval compromises the rate of expenditure (cf. Section 5.1, Table 5.3). Indeed, 
Sicily had not spent anything by the end of the first year (31 December 2000) because 
the PC had not been approved: Basilicata managed to spend 1% of its allocation. A 
delay in the start-up of the programme created a gap between the regions in terms of 
expenditure. At the end of 2001, Sicily had spent a meagre 0.74% of its total allocation 
and Basilicata had already spent almost 5%. 
5.3.3 Programming Assessment 
The answers to the questionnaire (Table 5.6) support the finding that in Sicily the 
programme was not based on an accurate SWOT analysis, which, if correctly performed, 
would allow the region to highlight the weaknesses and threats to its economic 
development. Indeed, in Sicily 70% of the sample declared that the SWOT analysis was 
not accurately carried out, whereas in Basilicata 85% confirmed that it was effective 
(question 4). Furthermore, only 62% of the respondents in Sicily agreed that the 
allocation of resources among the different priorities was correspondent with the needs 
of the regional territory. This percentage looks small when compared to the 100% 
answer given in Basilicata (question 5). Additionally, in Sicily 85% of the sample of 
people covered affirmed that the number of interventions into which the programme is 
divided was too high and that this caused the programme to become extremely 
"9 Decision of the European Community Commission NC (2000) 2348,8 August 2000 
120 Decision of the European Community Commission N. C C (2000) 2372,22 August 2000 
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fragmented. An opposite situation emerged in Basilicata, where 95%, of respondents felt 
that the number of measures was adequate for the needs of the region (question 6). 
Finally-, 8511( of the respondents in Sicily pointed to government instability as the cause 
of delays in programme approval (question 9). 
Table 5.6 Questionnaire on Structural Funds programming 
Sicily (Basilicata 
nswers Answers 
at Lack of tlcxibilit\ in order to adapt to socio-economic contest changes 15 45 
b) Weak strategic coherence with ordinary programming IS 15 
c t)clasti in appro\in- implementation procedures 70 40 
a) eN 77 85 
b) No o 
c) Partially 23 15 
Is regional planning integrated and coherent with the European Commission Guidelines? 
a) Yes 62 90 
ht No p p 
C) Partially 38 10 
Is the definition of the programme priorities based on an accurate SWOT analysis? 
u Yes: a S'. VOT analysis is performed in order to assess the strength and weakness of the region 1.5 85 
hi Partial): a SWOT : mall sis is performed but it is not always accurate 70 15 
ct No: a SW( T anal\ sis is not canted out 15 0 
The allocation of the resources among the different priorities is.... 
a) .... consistent Nith the needs of the regional territory 62 100 
h).... determined b} political issues which not always take in account the real territorial needs 38 p 
c).... not responding to the territorial needs due to a lack of capacity among those in charge of 
rograrntning 0 O 
_ ) The number of measures in which the programme is divided are... 
at ... too mars and the programmnme 
is extremely fragmented 85 0 
h) ... 
few and not sufficient to meet the territorial needs f) p 
cý..., uff icnt to answer the territorial needs 15 95 
Are the measures described as to clearly identify the actors involved and the projects requi 
a) Yes the measures are clearly described in the PC 85 911 
bi No. the measures are not clearly described and do not identify the actors and roject involved. 15 10 
The four Structural Funds are... 
;,.... planned in a coordinated and synergic fashion with each other 38 100 
hi.... planned in a independent and uncoordinated way 62 0 
) What is the main causes that account for the delay in the approval of the ROP? 
a) Go\ernment instability 85 / 
b) Lack of clarity in the procedures 15 / 
c) Other (specify) 0 / 
Ic Political class resistance/interference. 0 / 
Questionnaire curried out in June 2005 for part u/'Sicily und in June 2006 for the Basilicata 
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Furthermore, the weakness of the programme design was increased by the constant 
revisions of the programme over the years. As an example, in the last planning period 
(2000-2006), the programme in Sicily underwent 17 revisions, against only 7 in 
Basilicata. On one hand these amendment are necessary in order to adapt the programme 
to inevitable changes in the economic scenario over time, but on the other, the situation 
in Sicily was extreme and ultimately led to a decline in the coherence of the final 
programme. 
Comparing the findings that emerge from the analysis of the documents and results of 
the field interviews on the programming indicators, it seems that the programming 
performance was still very weak in Sicily and was being consolidated in Basilicata 
(Table 5.7). 
Table 5.7 Ranking of programming in Sicily and Basilicata over the period 1989-2004 
Second key 
determinant of 
administrative 
capacity 
Indicators POP 
1989- 
1993 
POP 
1994- 
1999 
POR 
2000- 
2006 
Overall 
score 
Programming in a) Programme Design 0 0 1 0.3 
Sicily b) Programme Approval 0 0 1 0.3 
Overall score 0 0 1 0.3 
Programmino in 
B ili t 
a) Programme design 1 2 3 2 
as ca a b) Programme Approval 1 2 3 2 
Overall score 1 2 3 2 
So far, I have measured two key components of administrative capacity, management 
and programming, and they both appear to be lower in Sicily than in Basilicata. 
To conclude my assessment of administrative capacity, the next two sections will 
ascertain the features of the remaining two key components, monitoring and evaluation. 
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5.4 Creation of a regional monitoring system 
Monitoring was introduced during the first programming period (1989-1993). The 
provisions for monitoring requirements were laid out in Council Regulation 2052/88 
article 6: 
"Community operations shall be constantly monitored to ensure that the 
commitments entered into as part of the objectives set out in Articles 130a 
and 130c of the Treaty are effectively honoured. Such monitoring shall, 
where necessary, make it possible to adjust operations in line with 
requirements arising during implementation". 
However, despite the stated objectives of the 1988 regulations, monitoring activities 
were not carried out systematically in Italy or in other countries with Objective 1 or 
other areas during the first period of planning. The requirement was revisited during the 
second programming period (1994-1999) and it only really took off as a strict legal 
requirement and an integral part of the administration of Structural Funds during the 
third period (2000-2006). Indeed, monitoring activities were significantly expanded in 
quality and quantity during the most recent period. Article 34 of Council Regulation 
1260/1999 states that 
"[t]he Managing Authority, as defined in article 9, shall be responsible for 
the efficiency and correctness of management and implementation, and in 
particular for setting up a system to gather reliable financial and statistical 
information on implementation for the monitoring indicators referred to in 
art. 36". 121 
The basic criteria for the creation of a monitoring system for the period 2000-2006 were 
set in accordance with the following principles: (i) optimization of the best monitoring 
experiences adopted during the 1994-1999 programming period; (ii) adoption of the 
programme indicators system (financial, processing and physical indicators of the state 
of implementation); (iii) standardization of monitoring models in 2000-2006 CSF 
programmes (data tables, synthesis indicators, benchmarling, data processing) most 
121 The general characteristics and purpose of the indicators are described by art 36: "the indicators shall 
show the stage reached in terms of procedural, financial and physical implementation, results, and 
impacts". 
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suitable for the evaluation system and surveillance activity. Undoubtedly, the 
requirements concerning indicators and monitoring posed serious challenges to all MA. 
The creation of a viable monitoring system was supposed to contribute, according to the 
plans of the Commission, to increasing the professionalism of the PA by encouraging 
the creation of databases of relevant information on programme implementation, and the 
creation of mechanisms for incorporating the use of these data into the management 
process. For this to work it was essential that there was a high level of co-ordination and 
co-operation between the various actors. 
The impact of monitoring on implementation was that, as it required a systematic 
collection of data on specified indicators and the presentation of periodic evaluations, it 
provided management with an ongoing update on the progress of the programme and on 
any bottlenecks. In this respect, it supported the MA in spotting possible problems that 
might arise during the implementation, so that the MA could intervene during the 
process and initiate adjustments. 
Evidence from other EU Objective 1 regions suggest that, if performed correctly, both 
monitoring and evaluation will contribute to the improvement of the implementation of 
Funds (OIR, 2003). Furthermore, both activities are beneficial for any public policy 
process. Indeed, in Portugal, the daily utilization and constant development of a "tailor- 
made" monitoring system was one of the key reasons for its success in implementation 
and the basis for the improvement of the Programmes implementation rate between 2001 
and 2002 (ÖIR, 2003: 97). At the same time, in Valencia (Spain), major changes based 
on the introduction of effective ongoing monitoring instruments increased the rate of 
expenditure (ÖIR, 2003: 98). However, it has to be said that not all of the regions came 
to terms with monitoring and evaluation procedures from the outset. According to 
Taylor et al. (2001), it took time for the requirements of the monitoring procedures to 
permeate the administrative machinery and to function fully. 
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In the next paragraphs, I will assess the degree of monitoring evident in my selected case 
studies, according to the indicators introduced in Chapter 2. The benchmarks for 
monitoring are: (1) the introduction of a system of indicators and of monitoring 
procedures responding to nationally agreed standards; and (2) a guarantee of the 
availability of financial, physical and procedural data to the MA. 
5.4.1 Constraints in monitoring procedures in Sicily 
An investigation into the features of monitoring in Sicily has revealed that over the 
period 1989-1993 no monitoring system was in place (Arthur Andersen, 1997; 72). The 
costs in time and money of setting up a monitoring system were perceived as being too 
large relative to the value that they produced. Furthermore, the administration had to 
deal with problems encountered in managing the Funds, which absorbed a lot of energy 
and effort. 
Indeed, the regional administration only set up a system of data monitoring in 1995, with 
the support of the technical assistance service. 122 However, there is evidence to suggest 
that in Sicily the monitoring system did not correspond fully to national and European 
standards over the whole period (Arthur Andersen, 1995; 1997; Ernst & Young, 2003a). 
Indeed, the system adopted by Sicily failed to satisfy the need for accountability, and in 
particular the need for the Commission to report on the proper use of public funds. Apart 
from the lack of inter-departmental coordination in the operationalization of the 
monitoring system, there was also the complexity associated with the exigencies of 
different fund-specific monitoring systems, which were time-consuming and costly. 
Furthermore, the monitoring functions were not integrated into the institutional 
framework of the public administration systems, which resulted in the proliferation of 
information that was of little use in developing a full understanding of programme 
'22The Technical Assistance service was created at the national level to improve the institutional 
performance of public administration, and to enhance the implementation process of OPs and actions co- 
financed by Structural Funds. Such a task implied technical assistance in helping regional and local 
governments to implement their programmes with the support of standard models and guidelines, analysis 
and surveys, shared indicators and databases, the exchange of best practices, and assistance to those in the 
network. 
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implementation. In response to a question about the efficiency of the system during an 
interview, the manager of the monitoring activities in the 1994-1999 and 2000-2006 
periods said, 
"During the first two planning periods, 1989-1993 and 1994-1999 the 
monitoring system was not a "system": it was a random mass of 
information". 23 
Finally, some improvements were made during the period 2000-2006. Sicily created a 
web-based system in line with European and national standards. The system was 
organized in a decentralized fashion. Indeed, each department had a monitoring unit, 
which was in charge of feeding data into the central system and updating them every two 
months. The MA was to supervise the merging of departmental information into the 
central system. This should allow the MA always to have a complete picture of 
programme results. During the first two years, the system experienced a lot of start-up 
problems due to the novelty of the web-based method, and still today not all of the 
departments input their data into the system according to schedule. Nevertheless, the 
regional administration has made a lot of improvements in monitoring (Ernst & Young, 
2003: 32). The manager of the monitoring activities confirmed that 
"monitoring of programme implementation is growing both in importance 
and in functionality, compared to the previous periods where monitoring 
activities were undervalued". " 
Although progress was made in Sicily, there still seemed to be a dichotomy between the 
gathering of data for monitoring purposes and the management of programmes. 
Monitoring systems satisfy the accountability needs of the system (in particular the need 
for the Commission to report on the proper use of public funds). However, they do not 
feed back sufficiently into the management process. Indeed, as the interviewee declared, 
"Monitoring systems were developed to meet the requirements of Structural 
Funds implementation rather than as the result of a perceived need at the 
regional level to improve the implementation process". '25 
123 Interview with Francesca Marino, Region of Sicily (Palermo: 27 June 2005) 
124 Interview with Francesca Marino, Region of Sicily (Palermo: 27 June 2005) 125 Interview with Francesca Marino, Region of Sicily (Palermo: 27 June 2005) 
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The challenge therefore is to develop these systems in a manner that is seen to be more 
relevant and useful to the real needs of the managers of the programmes and the 
projects. The missing connection between the data gathering . process and the 
management process suggests that monitoring activities still need improvement and full 
integration into the functioning of the administrative system. 
5.4.2 The monitoring system in Basilicata: a model of best practice 
Basilicata began its monitoring activities on the basis of the initial IMP programme 
experience and even earlier with the ERDF programmes in 1979 (Regione Basilicata, 
1996b). Indeed, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, the Structural Funds existed before the 
reform of 1988, which brought them together under one regulation. The monitoring 
activities began in a very basic manner. Indeed, monitoring information was written on a 
file card, and later copied onto an electronic file. Although the system was 
unsophisticated, it did meet the need dictated by the regulation, which at the time 
required just that the "physical data"- i. e. the outputs of the measures - be recorded 
(Regione Basilicata, 1995a). 
The systemic demands increased during the period 1994-1999. Indeed, the Commission 
asked for a web-based monitoring system capable of capturing not only the physical data 
but also the financial information on programme outputs. The region, supported by a 
service of technical assistance, succeeded in implementing its first full monitoring 
system by the end of 1999 (Ecosfera et al., 2002). The existence of this system was one 
of the reasons that the region was able to spend its entire Structural Funds allocation: 
"Moreover, the achievement of such a successful result has been possible 
due to the existence of a complete and efficient monitoring system. The 
system has guaranteed the availability of both financial and physical data 
that has allowed the regional administration to keep under constant control 
the evolution of the expenditure and to intervene in correcting potentially 
critical bottlenecks" (Ecosfera et al., 2002: 144). 
On scrutinizing the documents that describe the monitoring system during the period 
1994-1999, it appears that it was based on a complete and exhaustive set of indicators 
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(Ecosfera S. P. A, 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002). Furthermore, this selection was supported by 
research and the consultation of experts in order to design a monitoring system in line 
with EU and national guidelines. The explanation for such a high level of performance 
in the area of monitoring was attributed by the two managers in charge of monitoring 
activities to the shared idea that monitoring was vital among the administrative 
personnel and the political leadership: 
`"The reason behind such commitment to improving the monitoring system is 
that the regional government fully shared and understood the importance of 
126 such a system and its utility in improving public spending overall" 
During the period 2000-2006, the regional administration focused on two aspects. First, 
it tried to improve the degree of coordination among the different departments in 
collecting the necessary information to feed into the monitoring system. Second, it 
carried out further analysis to adjust the new set of indicators to the eventual changes in 
policy objectives and to keep it coherent with the EU and national guidelines. The result 
was a series of indicators that appears to be "adequate and exhaustive" (Ernst & Young, 
2003b: 54). In conclusion, the independent evaluator of the ROP in Basilicata in the 
period 2000-2006 affirmed that 
"the monitoring model set up in Basilicata represented an example of best 
practice for the other regions" (Ernst & Young, 2003b: 65). 
5.4.3 Monitoring assessment 
In this paragraph, I want to report the results of the questionnaire (Table 5.8), the 
answers to which confirm that the monitoring system was far more efficient in Basilicata 
than in Sicily. 
In Sicily 55% of the people surveyed felt that an adequate system of monitoring 
indicators has been introduced, but with significant delays, and that it was still in its 
introductory phase. Conversely, in Basilicata 100% of respondents agreed that the 
monitoring system was adequate and that it had been introduced at the beginning of the 
126 Interview with Luisa Lomio and Franca Giorgio, Region of Basilicata (Potenza: 14 June 2006) 
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planning period (question I ). 6217c of respondents in Sicily said that information was 
partially updated and that therefore the availability of financial, procedural and physical 
data was often delayed. Meanwhile, in Basilicata 90% declared that the data were 
constantly updated (question 2). 
Table 5.8 Questionnaire on monitoring of Structural Funds 
Questions Sicily Basilicata 
Answers Answers 
(%) (%) 
1) Has an adequate system of monitoring indicators and procedures been introduced in 
the region, in order to monitor the ROP results? 
a) Yes, it was introduced at the beginning of the planning period 30 IOU 
h) Yes, it has been introduced but with significant delays and it is still in the introductory 
hase 55 0 
c) The system ut indicators and procedures is not adequate to monitor the ROP results 15 p 
2) Does the monitoring system guarantee availability of financial, physical and 
procedural data updated? 
at Yes, the data are constantly updated 1 91) ýIhl 
The data are partially updated with delays 62 10 
c) No, most of the data are not available 11 
a) Adequate 35 85 
61 Adequate but need improvement 65 15 
C) Inadequate oo 
a) Yes 54 86 
h) Pailially 46 14 
c) No 46 0 
a) Very useful for supporting the implementation 40 75 
h) An extra workload which is time consuming and will add little improvement 60 25 
c) A mere bureaucratic requirement to enable access to FtI funding 00 
6) How are the monitoring activities perceived by the political clam? 
a) Very useful for supportirr the implementation 
- so 
h) An extra workload which is time consuming and will add little improvement 20 
c) A eiere bureaucratic requirement to enable access to EU funding 90 0 
Questionnaire curried out in June 2005 fur Sicih, und in June 2006 fc)r Basilicata 
As far as the procedures and structures in charge of monitoring were concerned, these 
were perceived as adequate by 35% of those questioned in Sicily, versus 851.1c in 
Basilicata (question 3). Indeed, 65% of respondents in Sicily confirmed, "there still is 
room for improvement". The same consideration was shared by a minority of 
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respondents in Basilicata (15%). When asked about the benefits of monitoring system, 
only 40% in Sicily considered monitoring "very useful for supporting the 
implementation of resources, vis-a-vis a much higher percentage in Basilicata (75%: 
question 5). In Sicily, 60% of civil servants judged monitoring as an "extra workload, 
which is time consuming and will add little improvement to programme administration". 
This latter opinion was shared by only 25% of respondents in Basilicata. As regards the 
perception of the political class, 90% of respondents in Sicily answered that the political 
class perceived monitoring as a mere bureaucratic requirement through which to access 
EU funding. In Basilicata, on the other hand, 80% answered that the political class 
perceived monitoring as a very useful instrument for implementation (question 6). 127 
Undoubtedly the results of the questionnaire confirm that in Sicily, unlike in Basilicata, 
the practice of monitoring, although in place, needs improvement in order to become an 
important element in enhancing the implementation of the resources. Therefore, through 
matching the outcome of my analysis with the indicators set to measure monitoring 
levels, it appears that monitoring activities are at starting point in Sicily and already well 
developed in Basilicata (Table 5.9) 
Table 5.9 Ranking of monitoring in Sicily and Basilicata over the period 1989.2004 
Third key Indicators POP POP POk Overall 
determinant of 1989- 1994- 2000- score 
administrative 1993 1999 2006 
capacity 
Monitoring in a) Introduction of a system of indicators 0 1 2 1 
Sicily and of monitoring procedures responding 
to national agreed standards. 
b) Guaranteeing the availability of 0 1 1 0.6 
financial, physical and procedural data 
Overall score 0 1 1.5 0.8 
Monitoring in a) Introduction of a system of indicators 1 2 3 2 
Basilicata and of monitoring procedures responding 
to national agreed standards. 
b) Guaranteeing the availability of 1 2 3 2 
financial, physical and procedural data 
Overall score 1 2 3 2 
127 These answers will be very useful in backing up the second part of my central hypothesis on the 
relevance of the political class in determining administrative capacity performance. 
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5.5 Diffusion of the evaluation culture 
Tied to the monitoring system is the issue of evaluation activity and culture which relies 
both on the monitoring of results and on the collection of supplementary information. 
"Evaluation is a task that has grown over the three implementation periods. 
In the period 1989-1993, ex-ante and ex-post evaluations were required, 
where the efficiency of interventions was examined at the level of general 
socio-economic cohesion, and the effects of the measures within the CSF 
and the OP. 128 There were no specific requirements placed on the body 
(internal or external) in charge of the evaluation. In the second period, 1994- 
1999, a much more detailed definition and distinction of assessment, 
monitoring and evaluation was achieved. Methodological guidelines for ex- 
ante and ex-post evaluations were elaborated. In addition, during the second 
period, a third type of evaluation, the mid-term evaluation, was introduced, 
which served as an instrument for the modification of the programme at the 
halfway mark. In the third period, 2000-2006, the required level and depth of 
analysis for all three types has increased significantly" (OIR, 2003: 22). 
At present, the ex-ante evaluation is carried out by the regional administration, whereas 
the intermediate and ex post evaluations are usually contracted out to private 
independent companies. Thus, there is a large reliance on the outside professional 
community for evaluation skills and competencies. Besides, an external assessor is in a 
better position to ensure an objective analysis of performance. Also, it was expected that 
the need - to interact with independent evaluators would encourage the public 
administration to rationalize and render more efficient its activities. 
The impact of evaluation on implementation is two-fold: 
"First, the systematic identification of the best alternatives, as well as the 
careful consideration of the ability of ongoing or past programmes to reach 
their objectives in an efficient way. This can become a powerful tool for 
modernisation in the public sector for cost reduction and for greater 
responsiveness to citizens. Second, the opening up of the administrative 
"black box" to the scrutiny of external stakeholders, as well as taking the 
interests of stakeholders and citizens into account when designing evaluation 
questions, is in itself an embodiment of the principles of democratic 
governance" (Tavistock Institute, 2003: 85). 
128 During this period, evaluation was still not strongly emphasized by EU regulations. Indeed, the same 
article that stated the need for monitoring called for the establishment of "assessment procedures" for this 
purpose: "In order to gauge their effectiveness, Community structural operations shall be the subject of an 
ex-ante and an ex-post assessment designed to highlight their impact with respect to the objectives, set out 
in Article I and to analyse their effects on specific structural problems" (Reg. 2052/88 art. 6). 
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Evaluation has become a standard tool and is widely used as an instrument to support the 
implementation process and mostly acknowledged as an instrument to enhance 
transparency. Processes and outputs of the evaluation system are usually documented 
and used as a basis for future planning and management (ÖIR, 2003: 101). 
Moreover, both monitoring and evaluation aim to ensure, on an ongoing basis, proper 
management of resources in accordance with standards of accountability. 129 In this 
section I am concerned with measuring the practice of evaluation, whereas in Chapter 6I 
will return to the issue of accountability. 
In the next paragraphs, I will assess the degree of evaluation used in my selected case 
studies, according to the indicators introduced in Chapter 2. Indeed, the benchmarks for 
evaluation are: (1) Production of the evaluation reports according to EU standards; (2) 
Integration of the evaluation method and culture in the implementation system. 
5.5.1 "Inspection" rather than "evaluation" in Sicily 
Similarly to those of the monitoring function, the evaluation activities were very poor in 
the first planning period. In Sicily, the 1989-1993 POP was not supported by an ex-ante 
evaluation and the ex-post evaluation was carried out four years after the end of the 
programme, in 1997 (Arthur Andersen, 1997: 82). The administration was not prepared 
to manage this function, and often felt that the evaluation represented more of an 
external control or obligation than a support for improving the nature of the 
implementation. In addition, the Monitoring Committees130 very rarely dedicated 
sufficient space to debating the results of the evaluation or created a task force to 
129 Together they create the defining characteristic of the implementation method in that they lie at the 
heart of an accountability loop involving all key players in the EU decision-making process and which 
requires the EC to account for the expenditure of public money to Parliament and to the European Court 
of Auditors. From the point of view of the implementation method it has implications for all of the actors 
and involves the collection of data as a basis for arriving at an assessment of compliance with all of the 
rules, procedures and technical support measures provided for in the Regulations. 
130 Regulation 1260/99, art. 35 provides for the setting up of a Monitoring Committee which supervises the 
implementation of Structural Funds. A representative of the Commission should participate in the work of 
the Monitoring Committee in an advisory capacity. The committee should discuss the implementation of 
the Funds every six months. Members of the Committee are the general managers of each department, 
representatives of the political class, socio-economic partners, non-governmental organizations, and 
representatives of the national government. 
194 
accompany the evaluator. This approach derived from the tradition of the administration, 
which was never receptive to formal controls or to the verification of results and 
accountability. This attitude was the main constraint on the introduction of evaluation to 
the decision mechanisms. In addition, the regional administration experienced 
difficulties in expressing an "evaluation demand" and often misinterpreted the role and 
function of the independent evaluator, who was seen as "an inspector" rather than a 
supportive figure. 
The situation seemed to improve in the second period (1994-1999), when both an ex- 
ante and an ex post evaluation was carried out (CENSIS et al. 2001; 2002), but, as the 
interviews revealed: 
"there was no real interest in evaluation activities; neither were they 
considered of any importance in the implementation of the funds; the only 
reason to perform them was to conform to EU standards"(Recorded 
interview). 
Furthermore, the ex-ante evaluation did not fulfil its role of providing the basis for the 
development plan. Indeed, it lacked the ability to assess the consistency of the strategy 
with the specific features of the region (CENSIS et al., 2001). 
Again, it was only in the most recent planning period (2000-2006) that the evaluation 
culture spread throughout the administration. Indeed, until then the evaluation process 
was considered merely as an extra workload whose beneficial effect was not understood. 
As one interviewee said: 
"Recently the perception of evaluation has improved, but there is still a long 
way to go before it will become an integrated instrument not only in 
improving Structural Funds, but public policy implementation in general". '31 
On scrutinizing the region's ex-ante evaluation report for 2000-2006, it appears to be 
more thorough and to show progress in the ability of the region to understand the 
importance of such a task (Regione Sicilia, 2000d). As regards the intermediate 
evaluation, this was commissioned to Ernst & Young in due course (Ernst & Young, 
2003a). An interview with the independent evaluator revealed that: 
131 Interview with Emanuele Villa, Region of Sicily (Palermo: 29 June 2005) 
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"The regional administration has definitely understood the utility of the 
evaluation activities, compared to the last planning periods; the results of the 
intermediate evaluation are actually taken into account by the administration. 
Furthermore, every member of staff has collaborated in providing 
information and material essential for the evaluation to be performed". 132 
5.5.2 Evaluation culture in Basilicata: developing internal expertise 
In Basilicata, the Monitoring Committee itself carried out the evaluation activities 
during the first planning period (1989-1993). This responded to a practical need to 
spread the evaluation culture throughout the departments and to make everyone 
understand the importance of such an instrument. Indeed, the Monitoring Committee 
due to its inclusive nature, seemed appropriate to share this new activity within the 
regional organization rather than assigning it to an external firm. The logic behind this 
choice was that the regional organization needed to develop its skills from the inside 
rather than relying on external consultants. 133 This would have helped to spread the 
evaluation culture and awareness of its importance within the organization. The 
Monitoring Committee produced both an ex-ante (Regione Basilicata, 1989) and an ex- 
post evaluation report (Regione Basilicata, 1995a). 
In the period 1994-1999 the ex-ante evaluation of the programme was carried out by the 
Programming Department. The intermediate and ex post evaluations were contracted out 
to a consultancy group consisting of Ecosfera S. P. A., Reconta Ernst and Young S. P. A., 
and Ernst and Young Corporate Finance S. M. The appointment of the external evaluator 
was delayed until the end of 1998. A similar delay was experienced in the other Regions, 
but in the case of Basilicata it was not down to a lack of recognition of the advantages of 
evaluation activities (Ecosfera S. P. A. et at., 1999: 73). Indeed, both the administrative 
and the political class were convinced of the importance of evaluation as an instrument 
for improving implementation performance. Therefore, the delay was caused by the need 
of the regional administration to develop an 
132 Interview with Francesco Sbattella, independent evaluator for the period 2000-2006 (Rome: 17 April 
2005) 
133 Interview with Andrea Freschi, Region of Basilicata (Potenza: 7 June 2006) 
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"understanding of what to ask an evaluator and how to use the evaluation to 
improve the expenditure of Funds - i. e. the administration needed to become 
familiar with the evaluation mechanism before appointing an external actor" 
(Ecosfera S. P. A. et al., 1999: 73). 
In 2000-2006 the ex-ante evaluation was again carried out by the Programming 
Department. A thorough analysis of the ex-ante evaluation reveals a great knowledge of 
regional territorial needs, a clear set of goals to be achieved and a coherent strategy of 
how to improve regional conditions (Regione Basilicata, 1999). When asked about the 
relevance of the ex-ante evaluation in the implementation process, those interviewed 
declared that: 
"The ex-ante evaluation activities have gained in value over time as a result 
of providing a very useful tool in understanding what to do and how to do it, 
plus it gives one a direction to follow and a clear goal to reach" (Recorded 
interview). 
In contrast with the delays registered in the previous period, this time the independent 
evaluator, Ernst & Young, was appointed in time, 134 within the deadline set by the EU. 
One of the members of the evaluation group affirmed that: 
'The region of Basilicata is already familiar with the practice of evaluation. 
Here the evaluation culture has spread within the region, both in 
administrative and political spheres, which pay great attention to the results 
emerging from the assessment". 135 The leader of the evaluation group 
supported this statement by adding that: "the regional administration 
considers both monitoring and evaluation two significant activities to 
improve resources implementation". 136 
5.5.3 Evaluation assessment 
In this paragraph, I will present the results of the questionnaire (Table 5.10), which 
. confirm that: (1) evaluation activities, in terms of respecting the production of evaluation 
134 The independent evaluator was selected from among various contenders on 28 December 2001 
135 Interview with Antonella Scotese, Ernst and Young (Rome: 17 April 2005) 136 Interview with Francesco Sbattella, Ernst and Young (Rome: 17 April 2005) 
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reports, appeared to be more efficient in Basilicata than in Sicily; and (2) that the 
evaluation culture spread faster in Basilicata than it did in Sicily. 
Table 5.10 Questionnaire on evaluation of' Structural Funds 
(nöl (%) 
1) How is the evaluation perceived by the civil servants? 
a) Very useful for supporting the implementation 40 1110 
h) An extra workload which is time consuming and will add little improvement 60 (1 
Ic) 
A mere bureaucratic requirement to enable access to 6U funding tl 0 
a) Very useful for supporting the implementation _ 80 
h) An extra workload which is time consuming and will add little improvement 
c) A mere bureaucratic requirement to enable access to EU funding _0 
a) Ye., 31 80 
b) Slowly and partially 69 20 
c) No O I) 
1 Have the recommendation of the intermediate evaluation been implemented? 
a) Yeti iK 73 
b) Partially 62 27 
c) No 0 0 
Ouectionnuire carried out in June 2005 tor Sicily and in June 2006 (or Basilicata 
In Sicily 60% of the sample covered considered that evaluation constituted an "extra 
workload" which is just time consuming and will add I ew improvements to the 
implementation of the resources, while in Basilicata, along with monitoring, evaluation 
was considered to he "very useful" by all of those interviewed (question I ). Again, as far 
as the political class was concerned in Sicily there seemed to he not much interest in 
evaluation activities, whereas in Basilicata 80%% answered that the political class 
considered them to he "very useful for supporting the implementation process" (question 
2). In Basilicata 80%Yr agreed that the culture of evaluation was spreading across the 
overall regional administration. This percentage was only 311/c in Sicily, where the 
majority (69%rß) believed that the evaluation culture was spreading slowly and only 
partially (question 3). The attention paid to the contribution of evaluation within each of 
the two regions can also he understood by looking at how each region reacted to the 
suggestions and recommendations that emerged from the intermediate evaluation. 
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Indeed, in Sicily, 62% affirmed that those recommendations had been partially 
implemented, whereas in Basilciata 73% said that the recommendations had been fully 
implemented (question 4). Undoubtedly the results of the questionnaire confirm that in 
Sicily, unlike in Basilicata, the practice of evaluation still needs to be improved, and to 
become instrumental in enhancing the implementation of the resources. Table 5.11 
summarizes the outcome of the analysis using the indicators adopted to measure 
evaluation. 
Table 5.11 Ranking of evaluation in Sicily and Basilicata over the period 1989-2004 
Fourth key Indicators POP POP POR Overall 
determinants of 1989- 1994. 2000- score 
administrative 1993 1999 2006 
capacity 
Evaluation in a) Production of evaluation reports 0 1 2 1 
Sicily b) Integration of the evaluation method 0 0 1 0.3 
and culture in the implementation system 
Overall score 0 0.5 1.5 0.65 
Evaluation in a) Production of evaluation reports 1 2 3 2 
Basilicata b) Integration of the evaluation method 1 2 3 2 
and culture in the implementation system 
Overall score 1 2 3 2 
The outcome of the measurement shows that evaluation activities were in the 
introductory stage in Sicily and at a level of substantial development in Basilicata. 
5.6 Conclusions 
This first empirical chapter aimed to answer the first question of my central hypothesis 
question - i. e. what accounts for the observed regional variation in the implementation 
of Structural Funds? The answers I find in the established literature point to absorption 
capacity, regional economic factors and/or social capital. However, as shown in Chapter 
1, testing the above variables shows that they do not fully explain the variation observed 
in the selected case studies. Therefore, I suggested an alternative hypothesis redefining 
administrative capacity as an independent variable that better explains the ability of the 
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regions to implement Structural Funds - i. e. where there is a higher degree of 
administrative capacity there is a higher degree of resources expenditure. 
In order to test my hypothesis I have measured in this chapter the degree of 
administrative capacity evident in each case study. In carrying out this assessment, I 
have analysed the four key components of administrative capacity, namely: 
management, programming, monitoring, and evaluation. The analysis of each area of 
administrative capacity covered the three planning periods - 1989-1993,1994-1999 and 
2000-2006 - and was supported by primary and secondary sources. The findings that 
emerged from the analysis of documents were corroborated by fieldwork - i. e. 
interviews and questionnaires - according to the stated methodology. 
Table 5.12 summarizes the assessment of each key component based on the established 
indicators. 
Table 5.12 Administrative capacity overall score 
Region Key determinants of administrative capacity Overall score 
Sicily Management 0.65 
Programming 0.3 
Monitoring 0.8 
Evaluation 0.65 
Overall Score for administrative capacity 0.6 
Basilicata Management 2 
Programming 2 
Monitoring 2 
Evaluation 2 
Overall Score for administrative capacity 2 
It clearly emerges that administrative capacity was weak in Sicily but much more 
developed in Basilicata. The key findings can be summarized under four main headings. 
(1) Management 
Well-developed management abilities seem to have been absent in Sicily during the first 
two periods and have started to appear only recently. The weaknesses of management 
were located in an ineffectual central co-ordination, which was not in a position to 
control the activities carried out by the various departments involved in the 
implementation of Structural Funds. This lack of horizontal coordination left each 
department to act on its own and did not allow an integrated approach to develop. Most 
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of the time, the lack of effective co-ordination led to the duplication of activities. In this 
system of uncoordinated activities, the administrative personnel were not always clear 
about their role and responsibilities, which slowed down the process of implementation. 
It was only in 2001 that the regional organization created a body for horizontal 
coordination, the CODIPA, which led to a significant improvement in administrative 
outputs. 
An opposite situation emerged in Basilicata, where progressive improvements in 
management took place and it reached a high level of performance. Here, a strong and 
efficient central co-ordinating level organized the actions taken by the various 
departments involved, giving the personnel a clear vision of their duties and ensuring 
significant administrative outputs. When the reasonability for the implementation of the 
resources is distributed across more departments, it is important that a central 
management structure is set up in order, first of all, to control the overall situation and to 
intervene where problems emerge, and secondly to create horizontal co-operation 
between the various departments. 
The fieldwork carried out highlighted that the regional organizational structure and size 
might have contributed to the low capacity of management in Sicily vis-h-vis Basilicata. 
Indeed, the organization of the Sicilian regional administration was characterized by a 
strong vertical and compartmentalized administrative hierarchy, which did not favour 
exchanges between different assessorates and made management an individual concern. 
As the interviews confirmed, this lack of collaboration has always been part of the 
administrative culture in Sicily and it is still very persistent. Each department has always 
had its own decision-making, political and organizational autonomy. Therefore, once an 
administrative culture is implanted, it is very difficult to dismantle. In Sicily, there was 
the tendency to keep each department's activities within the boundaries of the 
department itself and to avoid any sharing of knowledge or information. Furthermore, 
the regional administration had the disadvantage of being divided into 12 assessorates 
and 22 departments, which appeared to be a further obstacle to overall coordination of 
activities. This situation was made worse until recently by the absence of a central 
coordination structure. 
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In Basilicata the vertical hierarchy was weaker and this facilitated a horizontal co- 
ordination of activities that eased management and programming activities. Moreover, 
the region had the advantage of being divided into only six assessorates, which 
corresponded to an equal number of departments - i. e. each assessorate had only one 
department. It appears that the reduced number of internal departments and the limited 
number of people involved encouraged a more effective coordination of activities. 
(2) Programming 
The second component analysed in this chapter was programming, in terms of the ability 
to design an efficient programme and to begin without delays. Again, in Sicily both of 
these features appeared to be absent in the first two periods and started to emerge during 
the 2000-2006 planning period. Indeed, it was only in this planning period that the ROP 
was based on a clearer SWOT analysis and was linked to empirical regional needs, 
whereas before it was based on the "thoughts and suggestions of a few people" 
(Recorded interview). Similarly, it was only recently that there were shorter delays in 
having the programme approved, compared to the past where it took up to two years for 
the programme tobe agreed upon with the Commission. Naturally, the lack of coherence 
between the programme and the territorial needs, and the delays in beginning 
implementation caused severe impediments to the smooth implementation of the policy 
and to spending the available resources. Again, the situation in Basilicata was 
completely opposite. Here, the regional administration was always very thorough in AW 
analysing the strengths and weaknesses of the regional territory and in formulating 
policy strategies that could improve the circumstances. This allowed the region to 
achieve a considerable level of expenditure, overcoming the first period of delays in 
programme approval. 
(3) Monitoring and Evaluation 
The last two components of administrative capacity to be analysed were monitoring and 
evaluation. Although these two components have been ranked separately, they are 
closely interconnected. Indeed, deficiencies in monitoring activities compromise the 
possibility of carrying out a complete evaluation. The importance of these two 
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components in improving the implementation of resources is demonstrated by the fact 
that, where performed correctly, they allow the regional administration to identify 
possible future problems and to intervene to correct the problems in due course. 
In Sicily, like the other components, monitoring and evaluation have only started to 
improve recently, whereas in Basilicata they have been important since the beginning of 
the 1980s. Furthermore, for these activities to work it is essential that there is a high 
level of co-ordination and co-operation between a number of different actors. This is a 
further confirmation of the validity of the loop that represents administrative capacity 
(Figure 5.3). Indeed, in Sicily it seems that there was a dichotomy between the gathering 
of data for monitoring purposes and the management of programmes and projects. In the 
latest programming period, 2000-2006, monitoring systems satisfied the accountability 
needs of the system (in particular the need for the Commission to report on the proper 
use of public funds). However, they did not feed back sufficiently into the management 
process. 
(4) Overall administrative capacity 
The above findings confirm the connection between the various components of 
administrative capacity (Figure 5.3). Therefore, a first observation is that poor 
management leads necessarily to a poor quality of programming. Indeed, a development 
programme that covers the whole territory needs to include the contributions of each 
department, assembled by the central management body. The absence of the latter leads 
to a lack of co-ordination and effective management in the decision-making and policy 
implementation system, and the ROP is conceived as a knowledge-based program 
(Barca, 2001). The "knowledge" needed to design, the ROP strategy is often tacit and 
distributed among various levels of government (Anselmo and Raimondo, 2000). 
Therefore, it is necessary that a strong process of knowledge-sharing is established to 
enable the programme to function and reach the stated goals. This is possible if there is 
strong horizontal cooperation. 
Secondly, monitoring data needs to be collected in order to provide a feedback of 
necessary information to the MA so that problems can be solved. Thirdly, evaluation 
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reports should he produced in order to Support not only the actual planning process, but 
also the future programming activities. 
Figure 5.3 Administrative capacity loop 
1. Management 
" Ex-post 
4. Evaluation " Ex-ante 
" Initinere 
2. Programming 
3. Monitoring 
The results of the scrutiny of regional documents and of the interviews provided the 
essential data to test the first part of the central hypothesis - i. e. that there is a positive 
relationship between the degree of administrative capacity present in a regional 
administrative structure and the ability of that structure to implement Structural Funds 
and increase its expenditure. Data from the two cases studied, Sicily and Basilicata, 
confirm this relationship. 
At this point, a second question arises: why are the management, programming, 
monitoring, and evaluation activities not performed as efficiently in Sicily as they are in 
Basilicata: ' Or, in other words, why does administrative capacity vary at the regional 
level'? To answer this question, in Chapter 6,1 will test the second part of the central 
hypothesis, which investigates the role of political factors in influencing the features 
acquired by the key component of administrative capacity 
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Chapter 6 
Explaining administrative capacity variation. 
Interaction between political factors and administrative key components 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter tested the first part of my central hypothesis. It assessed 
administrative capacity and provided evidence to suggest that the observed variation 
between regions in the implementation of Structural Funds is positively correlated with 
the degree of regional administrative capacity. Therefore, it is related to the activities of 
managing, programming, monitoring and evaluating development programmes. 
The aim of this chapter is to continue the analysis by answering the second question, 
which asks what it is that determines the degree of administrative capacity - i. e. why is 
administrative capacity higher in Basilicata than in Sicily? 
In Chapter 2, I tested the three main competing explanations I found in the established 
literature. The first identified the degree of education and training as the important 
intervening variable in determining capacity: data on the educational level of 
administrators gathered at the individual level show substantial similarities exist 
between Sicily and Basilicata in this respect. The second explanation looked at the 
centralization of policy by the government, which impeded the development of capacity 
at the regional level. In Chapters 3 and 4,1 tried to demonstrate that this explanation 
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cannot be used in the case of southern Italian regions because all were subject to a 
centralized approach that ended in the same year, 1992. Conversely, this reinforces the 
hypothesis that the intervening variable accounting for the variation in administrative 
capacity must be found within the region. The third explanation advocated by the 
literature focuses on a mafia component. An investigation of the respective backgrounds 
of' Sicily and Basilicata reveals that the existence of criminal organizations has been 
identified in both regions, although there is a more established literature on the Sicilian 
mafia. However, we do not have any systematic measures of the level of corruption or 
the penetration of the regional administration by organised crime. Therefore, it is 
difficult to establish any causal relationship between corruption/organised crime and 
administrative capacity. I suggest that we should find an alternative explanation that can 
be quantified and measured in both regions. 
The second part of my central hypothesis suggests that the features acquired by the four 
key components of administrative capacity, as exemplified by Sicily and Basilicata, 
might be influenced by three political factors, namely political interference, government 
stability and political accountability 
I believe that each political factor not only affects administrative capacity in general, but 
also affects specific key components (Figure 6.1). Indeed, I want to test the following 
three corollary relationships, where: 
(1) A weak/strong management performance is influenced by a high/low level of 
political interference; 
(2) A low/high programming coherence, in terms of strategy continuity and time 
taken for approval, is attributable to an instable/stable government subject to 
frequent/infrequent changes in leadership; and 
(3) The existence and functioning of a monitoring system and the spreading of an 
evaluation culture within the regional government is related to political 
accountability. 
These three relationships will be tested, respectively, in the three sections that constitute 
this chapter. I can anticipate that although a relationship may be identifiable, the political 
and administrative factors will not be so neatly correlated. Certainly political 
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interference acts mainly on the management system but also appears to influence 
programming performance. Similarly, government instability affects programming 
coherence and approval, but seems also to have some bearing on management 
performance. Finally, both political interference and government instability characterize 
a political class that does not appear to be accountable (Figure 6.1). 
Figure 6.1 Interaction between political factors and key administrative components factors. 
2nd ist 
Hypothesis Hypothesis 
POLITICAL FACTORS ADMINISTRATIVE __0, IMPLEMENTATION 
Political interfernce Weak management: lack 
(Need for politicans to of horizontal coordination 
use resources to secure and clarity of role among 
their position) narcnnnAi 
Government Low programming: 
instability incoherence in strategy 
land late approval 
Political Monitoring system and 
Accountability evaluation culture 
Low % of 
expenditures 
I expect to find that in Sicily, where the administrative capacity is low, the political 
factors will have the following features: (1) disruptive political interference, where the 
political class dominates the administrative sphere and restricts its action; (2) high 
government instability with constant change of leadership or reshuffles of key positions; 
(3) a closed attitude towards any form of evaluation or monitoring among the political 
class. If my hypotheses are correct, an opposite situation should emerge in Basilicata. 
6.2 Separation of political and administrative powers 
6.2.1 Privatisation of civil service and the "spoils system" 
Recognising that a major source of delays and inefficiency was to be found in the 
working methods and general attitude of the civil service, Italy embarked in 1993 (D. 1gs. 
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29/1993), and more emphatically in 1998 (D. lgs. n. 80/1998), on a series of reforms with 
three aims: (1) to de-politicize the civil service; (2) to separate the political sphere from 
administrative tasks; and (3) to instil new management practices across the Public 
Administration system (PA). 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the set of policies, which contained an assortment of 
measures to reach the three goals, was dubbed by both proponents and critics of the 
reform as the "privatisation of the civil service". The D. lgs. n. 29/1993 Razionalizzazione 
dell'organizzazione delle Amministrazioni pubbliche (Rationalization of the 
Organization of the Public Administrations) established new labour contracts that 
needed to be decided through collective bargaining agreements at the national and local 
levels instead of being set by Parliament via an annual law. 
A new merit-based payment system and performance evaluation system was introduced 
into the PA, and the first labour contracts under the new provisions became effective in 
2000 and early 2001. An audit unit in each ministry, co-ordinated from a central agency 
in the Prime Minister's Office, set the definition of objectives and supervised the 
performance indicators. 137 The government issued a new code of ethics to be observed 
by all public administrators at the national and sub-national levels. 138 
The overall aim of the D. lgs. n. 29/1993 was to improve the efficiency of the PA in Italy 
by pushing the civil servants to be more proactive and efficient. The improvement in 
efficiency was supposed to be achieved by linking the duration of the contract to 
performance indicators. This was a tremendous innovation in the Italian PA, and 
changed the perception of the civil service. Indeed, previously a civil service job had 
been considered a "job for life", whereas following the changes it was no longer a 
certainty and pay scales were determined by performance indicators. 
As with every new process, the change was not immediate. Indeed it took several years, 
during which various amendments were made to the original D. lgs n. 29/1993, which 
137 The old system where pay and promotion were based on laws, procedures and paid little regard to 
quality and results was replaced by performance controls, and in particular financial incentives for 
managers based on position and performance. In addition, a fixed term of seven years was set for all the 
managers appointed, which could be terminated by poor performance. Lastly, 5% of the state managers 
could now be selected from outside the civil service. 
138 In 1995 the government issued a code of ethics for civil servants (Codice di comportantento del 
pubblici dipendenti). 
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reached its final form in 2001 with D. lgs. n. 165/2001. Among other innovative changes, 
the D. lgs. n. 29/1993 ratified a clear demarcation of duties and responsibilities between 
the administrative and the political sphere. Indeed, article 3 establishes that: 
"The government exercises the functions of providing political- 
administrative direction by defining the objectives and programmes to be 
implemented and by adopting any other action associated with these 
functions. It verifies the correspondence of the administrative activity with 
the carrying out of the given objectives". 
It follows that: 
'7he managers are responsible for the adoption of the administrative actions 
and provisions, in addition to all contacts with the outside; they are in charge 
of the financial, administrative and technical management by means of 
independent powers as far as the expenditure and organisation of human 
resources are concerned. They are the sole persons responsible for 
administrative activity, management and the consequential outcomes". 
Furthermore, the D. lgs. n. 165/2001 definitively ended the long march of the 
administrative/managerial class towards the goal of full responsibility in the 
administration of programmes. Indeed, article 14 states that: 
"The political class cannot, in any circumstances, revoke, reform, reserve to 
themselves, move to a higher level, or otherwise adopt provisions or actions 
which are the competence of the administrator". 
The above articles eliminated any residual form of interference between politics and 
management by placing the latter exclusively in the hands of the administration. 
Nevertheless, the bureaucracy did not always fully use its newly acquired powers, 
because of the distorted effects of the "spoils system" which was introduced in Italy in 
1998 (Cerbo, 2002). The political system (government) had the power to appoint top- 
level executives (or general managers), a power intended to create a relationship based 
on trust between the politician and his top bureaucrats, and to ensure the that the 
political class was still in a position to maintain control over decisions (Cerbo, 2002). 
The introduction of the spoils system was justified by the fact that, given the 
bureaucracy's role in managing and implementing policies introduced by the political 
class, it was necessary to re-establish a strong relationship between the two (Cassesse, 
2002). In reality, the appointment of top managers was used by the political class mainly 
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to obtain consent and compliance from the bureaucracy, rather than to put capable 
people in charge of the administration. Furthermore, the political class used its power 
vis-ä-vis the appointed personnel to interfere and control implementation (Checchi and 
Garibaldi, 2002). Fortunately this was not a general trend, and some regions, such as 
Basilicata, were able to exploit the benefit a separation of powers between managers and 
politicians, and the advantage for the politician of selecting trusted and capable general 
managers. 
In conclusion, the PA reform initiated in 1993 was the beginning of a series of 
innovations both at the central and regional levels, which aimed at the modernization of 
the whole system and improvement of the administrative machinery by giving more 
space for manoeuvre to the managerial class. It had its distorting effects, which, 
although they limited the real separation of powers, did not halt the progression towards 
an entirely de-politicized administrative system. 
The reform, which first was implemented at the national level, was not immediately 
adopted in all regions. One reason for the differences in response may be tied to the 
desire of the political class to retain power and. to limit the responsibilities transferred to 
the administrative class. This view is supported by the opinion expressed by some of the 
politicians interviewed in Sicily. Indeed, when asked about their views on the separation 
of powers, one openly declared: 
"I do not sympathize with the new legislation which, by giving much more 
room to the managerial class, not only diminishes political power but also 
moves towards a form of government based on technocrats rather than on 
politics. The politician should not work at the same level with the 
bureaucrat, but he should be the leader and should use the bureaucrat as a 
tool or collaborator in achieving his ends". 139 
The logic behind this declaration was shared by most of the politicians interviewed in 
the region, who unanimously expressed their unease at witnessing such a restriction of 
power and responsibility. As revealed in the following sections, an opposite situation 
emerged in Basilicata, where the political class had always worked in full cooperation 
with the administrative class, even before the introduction of the mentioned D. lgs. 
139 Interview with Michele Cimino, Region of Sicily (Palermo: 28 June 2005) 
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6.2.2 Sicily dominated by disruptive political interference 
The results of the investigation into management activities in Sicily, presented in 
Section 5.2, revealed that the introduction of novel financial instruments such as the 
Structural Funds was not accompanied by any radical change in the regional 
administration structure. Indeed, what should have been a stimulus for the renewal and 
modernization of the management and the organizational structure was perceived merely 
as a burdensome extra workload. Above all, the civil servants and managers of the 
different departments declared during the interviews that, since the introduction of 
Structural Funds, they had been subject to even greater interference from the political 
class. 
In Sicily, the dominant party (and its internal factions) was able to use the administration 
to support its clientelistic style of politics by creating a "political market" based on the 
exchange of political support for either the procurement of posts within the 
administration itself, or benefits for clientele and "friends" (Cassese, 1984). Thus, the 
politicians, in order to increase their influence, would typically either fully infiltrate the 
administration, down to the lower levels, or bypass it altogether by carrying out directly 
tasks that should have belonged to the administration (Melis, 1996; Ferrera, 1984). Civil 
servants were willing to accept politicians' intrusions into the administrative sphere in 
exchange for privileges and benefits (D'Amico, 1992). 
As mentioned in Section 6.2.1, the process of power separation started in Italy in 1993 
with D. lgs n. 29. In reality, it was only in 2000, with L. R. n. 10, that a proper separation 
of powers and responsibilities between the political and administrative spheres was 
formalized in Sicily, whereas in Basilicata this process was put in motion much earlier, 
in 1996. Again, this opposite reaction to implementation at the regional level for such an 
important decree provides an idea of how the political class in Sicily tried to retain 
ultimate power over the whole regional administration for as long as possible. 
However, it must be said that in Sicily before the implementation of L. R. n. 10 other 
attempts were made to organize the two spheres of action, but these attempts still left a 
lot of room for political intervention. L. R. n. 6 was approved1° in 1997 specifically to 
regulate the responsibilities of the regional cabinet in the area of Structural Funds 
140 The cabinet implemented the law on 2 July 1997 with resolution n. 268. 
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management. The reason behind the law was to simplify the approval procedure for 
tendered proposals, in order to speed up the pace of expenditure in the 1994-1999 
programme, which in 1997, after 3 years, was at a standstill. The most important 
innovation concerned the role of the assessorati in tender approval141. Until then, the 
procedure had been greatly politicized, as it came under the combined responsibility of 
the cabinet and the relevant assessorato and was articulated via a four-step process. 142 
L. R. n. 6/1997 simplified this process: from then on tender proposals were approved and 
issued by the relevant assessorato based on an earlier examination by the Joint 
Committee. Further changes in procedure were introduced in order to limit political 
intervention from the centre of the regional government and to give more room for 
manoeuvre to the competent assessorato. The process of decentralization definitely gave 
the assessorato the ability to take decisions according to the specific need to be 
addressed. However, we should not forget that the president of the region appointed the 
assessore, who remained a strong political figure connected to the main political leader. 
In reality, what happened was that each assessore pursued his own political agenda and 
did not coordinate with the other assessorati143 
To counterbalance the persistent political power, article 16 L. R. n. 6/1997 moved the 
responsibility for the implementation of the measures from the political to the 
administrative level. The division manager competent in the field of each measure was 
appointed as responsible for its implementation. Another step forward in this direction 
was made by L. R. n. 10/1999, which gave the division manager responsibility not only 
for the implementation of the measures, but also for their overall management. 
Nevertheless, the introduction of this limitation did not seem to be very effective. 
Indeed, when asked to describe the strength of political powers in Structural Funds 
management before the implementation of L. R. n. 10/2000,85% of those interviewed 
141 This is the first step, which opens up the measure for receiving applications/projects to be financed. 142 The four steps are: (1) the tender proposals are sent from the assessorati to the President of the Region, 
who forwards them to the Cabinet for the definition of the terms and conditions; (2) The Cabinet examines 
them and then passes them on to the Regional Assembly; (3) The various commissions which form the 
Regional assembly, the surveillance committee and the regional'cabinet separately examine the proposals 
and express their opinion; (4) the tender proposals are approved (Regione Sicilia -NRVVIP, 2000: 8). 
Clearly, this process is extremely long and involved in requiring the whole political system to come to an 
agreement. 
Interviews with Milena Ribaudo, Region of Sicily (Palermo: 28 June 2005) 
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answered that "it was strong and more influential than the administration" (Table 6.1, 
question 1). 
Even though there was a move toward a more independent and "productive" relationship 
between bureaucrats and politicians, the basis of their relationship was still an exchange 
of power and prestige for job and career security. The two parties reached a modus 
vivendi based on a policy of reciprocal self-restraint; it is symptomatic of this that overt 
conflicts between politicians and higher bureaucrats were very rare (Leopoldo, 2000). 
Politicians, as mentioned above, also bought off the consensus of high bureaucrats by 
granting additional benefits that could double or triple their income, such as the 
substantial indemnities deriving from being nominated as a member of the board of 
public bodies, which imply little additional workload and much more power (Morisi, 
1993). 
Interaction between politicians and bureaucrats after L. R. n. 10/2000 
In Sicily the real recognition of the administrative responsibilities was tied to L. R. 
n. 10/2000. It is only with this law that there was a clear demarcation of spheres of 
actions which established that the technical management and implementation of the 
Funds was up to the administration, whereas the general strategic guidelines for 
programming were in the hands of the political leaders. Indeed, as displayed in Table 
6.1,50% of questionnaire respondents felt that only recently had the relationship 
between the MA and political class become "collaborative with respect to each other's 
role", although 30% still believed that there was "major interference by the political 
level in the MA's role" (question 2). According to 62% of responses the separation of 
powers has had a positive impact on Structural Funds management (question 3), and 
50% of respondent felt that political interference was now quite limited compared with 
the past, while 40% declared that there was still political interference in administrative 
responsibilities (question 5). However, a successful implementation requires a balanced 
collaboration between the two levels, and not the prevalence of one over the other: both 
components have distinct roles and capacities that can produce positive results only if 
they work together (question 4). 
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Table 6.1 Questionnaire on the separation of responsibilities and powers between the political and 
administrative class in 
1) Before L. R. n. 10/2000, which separated the administrative and political spheres of action, 
the role of political power in Structural Funds management was... 
l`%) Answers 
a).... tiuun , and Ti re influential than that of the adtnini, tratkc puwrr. 85 
h..... in equilibrium with that of the ad minititiati\e Ixnvcr 15 
c I.... weak compared to that of the administrative power 0 
) How would you def ine the interaction/relation between the MA and the political class alte 
L. R. n. 10/2000? 
at Collaborative; each is respectful u1 the other's role 51) 
h) In conflict vv ith eachother _'0 
c) There is a major interference by the political level in the MA's rule 30 
:U Yes, it has had a positive impact 62 
h) No. it has had a negative impact R 
c) lt has not had anN impact 30 
Which level is more adequate for managing the Structural Funds? 
a) The administrative level 38 
hl The political level 
-- ^-_ 
8 
r 
c) A balanced collaboration between the two levels 
- 54 
nds 
a) Yes', there still is significant political interference 40 
b) Political interference is quite limited 50 
c) There is no political interference 0 
Questionnaire carried out in June 2005 
Along with the questionnaire I conducted further investigation into whether the political 
class interfered in the management of Structural Funds and, ii' so, what was the impact of 
such interference. The interviews I covered the opinions of the general managers as well 
as those of the politicians in two separate focus groups. 
In the first group, I brought together the general managers. They agreed on the statement 
that 
"the less interference there is from the political side the smoother and more 
efficient the management is". 
Usually when the political class intervenes to pursue its own interest, this slows down 
the management process. Political interference serves to disincentivize the general 
managers, who, in turn, "abdicate" their powers to the politicians and do not fulfil their 
own roles. In other words, the whole management system becomes chaotic with no 
established rules and no direction. 
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An opposite point of view emerged from the interview with the second group - the 
political class. The assessore of the programming activities made clear his objections to 
the increased authority that L. R. n. 10/2000 gave to the general managers: 
"the politician should have the last say in the management activities, and he 
should be free to intervene if he believes that actions have not been taken 
correctly. This "storyline" that the politicians intervene only to gain personal 
benefits is offensive and does not represent the reality. Indeed, political 
interventions are necessary because we live in a democratic system, and the 
citizens empower the political class to take decisions and make sure that they 
are executed. The voters do not authorize the administrative class; therefore 
it is expected that the politicians have to get involved in the management as 
well as in the other steps of the implementation process". 
The whole group of politicians shared this opinion. 
In sum, it can be said that in Sicily friction still exists between the two levels of 
management: political and administrative. The relationship has improved over the years 
and the political class has become less invasive. However, a balance between 
administrative and political powers and responsibilities has not yet been reached. This 
ultimately affects the management, which becomes confused and unclear in terms of its 
role and prerogatives. Furthermore political interference serves to de-legitimize the role 
of the managers. 
6.2.3 A more technocratic type of government in Basilicata 
The analysis of the management features in Basilicata reveals that Structural Funds 
programmes, and the IMPs before, succeeded in introducing into the regional 
administration new ways to employ the instruments for economic development that have 
led to significant innovation in the management of ordinary development programmes 
and in the overall regional administration. 
The principles underlying Structural Funds management contributed to the initiation of a 
cultural innovation process that also involved the sphere of ethical values. Substantial 
innovations were slowly introduced into the administration. This process was conceived 
by a number of individuals, who were initially few and isolated. At the beginning, they 
at times came into conflict with the political sphere but were able progressively to 
involve and motivate groups of individuals until they achieved a general 
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acknowledgment of the new model of management. The latter was based on horizontal 
coordination and the clarity of roles, which is possible to achieve if there is a clear 
relationship between the administrative and the political class with respect to their 
responsibilities. 
The interviews carried out and the documentation examined (Ecosfera et at., 1999; 
2000; 2001; 2002) have revealed that the region of Basilicata, even if with some 
difficulty at the beginning, has been able to separate the political and the administrative 
powers. Indeed, 
"when compared to the other Objective 1 Regions, Basilicata has been able 
to benefit from a political class that is respectful of the different roles and the 
separation between political and administrative competences. Therefore, 
there has not been interference in the technical aspects of the management, 
whereas in other regions the constant political interference has created long 
delays in the implementation of the programme and ultimately in the degree 
of expenditure levels" (Ecosfera et al., 1999: 80). 
Basilicata, in order to fully implement the norms of the previously mentioned D. lgs. n. 
29/1993, started with R. L. n. 12/1996 a process of overall reorganization inspired by the 
principle of responsibility and the definition of the lines of demarcation between the two 
roles in management. Indeed, Resolution of the Regional Cabinet n. 11 dated 13 January 
1998 differentiated the responsibilities of the political sphere from those of the 
administrators. This Resolution represented an important step forward in the clarification 
of role. Furthermore, the additional decision, n. 600/2002, set the criteria and parameters 
for the evaluation of the general performance of administrators. 
According to this scenario, the technicians in charge of managing the programmes were 
given more room to experiment with technical solutions for overcoming daily problems. 
Free from political interference and judged by evaluation of their performance, the 
managers of each department were encouraged to act to improve their management 
outputs. Moreover, the role and power of the political class was confined to that of 
political direction and not of technical intrusion. This model of governing the regional 
administration delivered good results not only with regard to the implementation of the 
Structural Funds, but also with regard to public policy delivery in general. 
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Interaction between politician and bureaucrats after L. R n. /2/1996 
The picture that emerged in Basilicata was opposite to the one we have observed in 
Sicily. Indeed, in Basilicata, recognition of the administrative responsibilities and of the 
technical benefits, in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of the public actions, that 
could develop fron a proactive relationship between the two spheres, was always part of 
the regional government. Indeed, as displayed in Table 6 . 2,60Ce of respondents felt that 
even before L. R. n. 12/1996, which formally separated the administrative and political 
spheres of action, the weight of political power in Structural Funds management was in 
equilibrium with the administrative power (question 1). Following L. R. n. 12/1996, there 
was a further improvement in the collaborative relationship between the two bodies, as 
declared by 95% of the respondents (question 2). In addition, three-quarters of the 
sample declared that the separation of powers had a positive impact on Structural Funds 
management (question 3). Similarly, to the respondents in Sicily, however, they still felt 
overall that a successful implementation requires a balanced collaboration between the 
two levels (question 4). Conversely, to the situation in Sicily, this balanced collaboration 
has always dominated the Basilicata government and can he identified as the 
determinant variable for the successful management of Structural Funds. Indeed, 60%Y" of 
the sample answered that there was no political interference, while 40% stated that 
political interference was very limited (question 5). 
Table 6.2 Questionnaire on the separation of responsibilities and powers between the political and 
administrative class in Basilicata 
Questions Answers 
1) Before L. R. n. 12/1996 in Basilicata, which separated the administrative and political sphere o 
action, the role of political power in Structural Funds management was... 
a).... strom-1 and mote influential than that of the administrative power. 40 
hi 
..... 
in rq uilihriwn with that of the ; Idministrativr power 60 
--- -- ---- ---- -- c).... ývc il. c01 1111ed tu that. ul the id numtitr, uive puwrr 
2) How would you define the interaction/reiution between the MA and the political class after L. R. 
n. 112/1996 in Basilicata? 
a) t. oIIah oratik c; each is respectful of the other's role 
h) In cuntlict with eachother U 
c) Thrrr is a major interference hý the political level in the MA role S 
) Has the separation of powers between the political and the administrative sphere had any Impact 
on the Structural Funds management? 
u Yeß it has had a posito e imj1 ct 75 
hJ No iI hw had a ne. atk impact 0 
-- -- --- --- ---- c) It has not had any impact 
-ý-- 
?, 5 
1 Which level is more adequate for managing the Structural Funds' 
:u The administrative level - --ý ýS 
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1) The oliticallcvel 
-- 
It) 
CA haLanCedl col lah irauun between the tvW IC%CF, 
--- 
5) Although the formalized separation of powers, is there still political interference in Structural 
Funds management? 
- --- -- 
h5 
a) Yes, there still is suonC political interference 
-- - -- U- 
b1 Political interference is quite limited 40 
c) There is no political interference 611 
Questionnaire curried out in June 2(X)6 
In order to capture more closely the opinion of the political class I interviewed two 
assessorsi, who both agreed that the administrative level was adequate in managing the 
Structural Funds: 
"L. R. n. 12/1996 has just formalized a situation that has always existed in 
Basilicata. Indeed, we believe in the demarcation of roles between the 
administrative and political sphere. In the precise case of Structural Funds 
the administrative level is more in a position to manage the Funds. A more 
technocratic model or governance does not necessarily harm the concept of 
democracy"(Recorded Interview). 
6.3 Government stability (1988-2004) 
6.3.1 A history of government instability in Italy 
The general literature on government instability mainly treats this factor as economically 
destructive (Alesina et al., 1996; Fosu, 1992) and a hindrance to growth (Londregan and 
Poole, 1990, Barro 1991,1996; Easterly and Levine, 1997). It is hypothesized that 
government instability destabilizes economic rules on resource allocation, governing 
elfort and expected outputs. Such destabilization is likely to reduce efficiency of the 
production process and, hence, restrict economic growth (Fose, 1992). Kuznets, for 
example, writes: 
"Clearly, political stability is necessary if members of the economic society 
are to plan ahead and be assured of a relatively stable relation between their 
contribution to economic activity and their rewards" (1966: 45 1). 
In Europe, Italy has experienced one of the highest levels of government instability. In 
the past, the Prime Minister of Italy was appointed through a competitive multi-party 
electoral system. The majority party (or majority coalition) in Parliament selected the 
chief executive after a long negotiation process within parties and across the potential 
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members of the governing coalition. The Prime Minister was elected by, and directly 
accountable to, the legislature, through the vote of confidence. Despite recent changes144 
(cf. Section 4.2.2), political deadlock and government instability have defined Italian 
politics over the past fifty years. Between the first election in 1946 and the latest in 
2006, full 58 governments have been appointed in Italy (cf. Annex IV). This means that 
on average, there has been one government per year, and only one has lasted for the full 
five-year term. 145 Along the same lines as the national government, regional 
governments have also experienced a high instability. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 
3, the Regional Assembly (in Sicily) and Regional Councils (in other regions) elected 
the President until 2001, when the law, L. Cost. n. 2, was changed. Now the Regional 
President is elected by direct universal suffrage along with the Regional Councils (and 
Regional Assembly in the case of Sicily). This change in election procedure seems to 
have had a positive effect on government stability. 
In fact, before L. Cost. n. 2/2001 the President could be removed by a majority vote of no 
confidence (mozione di sfiducia) from the Regional Council (and Regional Assembly in 
the case of Sicily). If this happened, the Council (or Assembly) would have had to 
appoint a new President. The motion of no confidence was used frequently until the new 
law introduced the direct election of the President. Although it would be interesting to 
investigate the reasons for the instability, my aim is to investigate the effect of 
government instability on administrative capacity in the region, especially on the 
programming functions. Besides the impact on economic growth, which is pointed out 
by the existing literature, are there other consequences of instability? In this section, I 
want to test the hypothesis that government instability is accountable for poor 
programming performance, in terms of weak development of programme design and 
delays in programme approval, ultimately leading to low expenditure of resources. 
Furthermore, I will try to highlight the destabilizing effect government instability also 
has on management activities. 
144 Since 1994 the prime minister designate has been more clearly defined during the electoral campaign, 
and the outcomes of the elections were in a position to clearly identify the person who would be 
designated as prime minister and the coalition that would rule the country (Nanetti, 2006). 145 The shortest government lasted 9 days under Andreotti in 1972, and the longest lasted 3 years under 
Craxi in 1983. The Berlusconi government began in 2001 and ran until the end of the 2006 legislature: it 
has been the longest serving government in Italian history. 
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6.3.2 Sicily: 14 governments in 20 years (1986-2006) 
Sicily has a long history of government instability, having experienced the highest level 
of all Italian regions. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 3, the data collected on regional 
governments show a high level of instability since the creation of the region in 1947 - 
i. e. 55 governments in 54 years (cf. Table 3.5). Table 3.6 shows the changes in 
government during the period of my analysis, 1988-2004, which covers the entire W, 
11th , 12th and 13th 
legislatures. 
Table 6.3 Legislatures and governments in Sicily 1986-2006 
Government Period President 
X Legislature (31-07.1986 to 10-08-1991 
41° from 31-07-1986 to 06-08-1987 R. Nicolosi (DC) 
42° from 06-08-1987 to 12-01-1988 R. Nicolosi (DC) 
43° from 12-01-1988 to 14-12-1989 R. Nicolosi (DC) 
440 from 14-12-1989 to 10-08-1991 R. Nicolosi (DC) 
M Legislature (12-08.1991 to 16-07.1996) 
45° from 12-08-1991 to 16-07-1992 V. Leanza (DC) 
46° from 16-07-1992 to 26-05-1993 G. Cam Tone (DC) 
47° from 26-05-1993 to 21-12-1993 G. Cam Tone (DC) 
48° from 21-12-1993 to 16-05-1995 F. Martino (PLI ) 
49° from 16-05-1995 to 16-07-1996 M. Graziano (DC) 
XII Legislature (18-07.1996 to 11-07-2001) 
50° from 18-07-1996 to 29-01-1998 G. Provenzano (Fl ) 
51° from 29-01-1998 to 21-11-1998 G. Drago (CCD ) 
52° from 21-11-1998 to 09-11-1999 A. Capodicasa (DS '49) 
53° from 09-11-1999 to 26-07-2000 A. Capodicsa (DS) 
54° from 26-07-2000 to 11-07-2001 Temporary Commissioner 
XIII Legislature (11.07-2001 to 27-05.2006 
55° from 11/07/2001 to 27-05-2006 S. Cuffaro (UDCC 150) 
Source: Author's elaboration on regional government data, Sicily 
146 The Partito Liberale Italiano (PLI, Italian Liberal Party), embraces the neo-liberal thinking and 
adheres to the centre-right coalition, the House of Freedoms (Casa delle Liberia). For further details on 
the different parties presented in the table (PLI, FI, CCD, DS, UDCC), see Nanetti (2007: 279-312). 
147 Forza Italia (FI) is a political party founded on 18 January 1994. It is the movement that aggregates the 
centre-right coalition, under the named. House of Freedoms. 
145 The Centro Cristiano Democratico (CCD, Democratic Christian Centre) was founded on 8 January 
1994 by moderate representatives of the Christian Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana) who refused to join 
the new Italian People's Party (Partito Popolare Italiano, PPI). The Party ended on 6 December 2002. 
149 The Democratici di Sinistra (DS) was born in 1998 out of the fusion of some forces of the Italian Left. 
It became a force of the Italian moderate and democratic left. 
1s0 The Unione dei Democratic! Cristiani e Democratici di Centro (Christian Democrats Union and Centre 
Democrats: UDCC, ) is an Italian political party belonging to the Centre. The party mainly recalls the old 
DC's moderate-liberal tradition and conforms the coalition of the Italian centre-right, House of Freedoms. 
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Indeed, over these 20 years, there was an average of one-and-a-half governments per 
year, rather than having governments lasting for the five-year term. As shown in the 
table, with the beginning of the 13th legislation, which corresponded with the new 
L. Cost. n. 2/2001, governments became more stable. 
I will argue that this constant level of instability partly accounted for the lack of 
coherence in the development policies put into place by each government. This 
hypothesis is supported by other authors, such as Piattoni and Smyrl (2002), who studied 
two northern regions, Tuscany and Liguria, along with two southern regions, Puglia and 
Abruzzo. The results showed that there were regions able to use the funds efficiently, 
when others failed. Piattoni and Smyrl argue that 
"the explanation for this differential policy efficiency lies in the different 
capacity of the regional political class to allocate the cost and benefits of 
economic development, in turn explained by its stability and commitment" 
(ibid.: 136). 
Looking outside the borders of Italy, Francis (2002) analysed the effect of government 
instability in African countries. He found that frequent changes in governments and 
leaders created discontinuity in developmental programmes and policies. 
In Chapter 5, I measured programming capacity with regard to two indicators: 
programme design and rate of programme approval. I have found that both indicators 
were weak in Sicily where the ROP lacked a coherent development strategy and suffered 
long delays in being approved. The analysis of documents, the evidence drawn from the 
questionnaires and interviews, and my own personal observations combine to suggest 
that the significant instability of the Sicilian government was primarily responsible for: 
(i) the absence of a coherent policy strategy for the creation of endogenous development 
and the investment of resources in long-term projects; and (ii) accumulating long delays 
in the approval of programmes due to the incoherence and constant revisionsof the 
programmes. Indeed, the Programming Complement was revised and amended 17 times 
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in the last four years for which full data are available (20(X)-2004) in Sicily, 15' compared 
52 with only seven times in Basilicata'. 
When they were asked about the effect of government instability on Structural Funds, 
the interviewees gave a very clear answer: 100% agreed that the effects are generally 
negative (Table 6.4, question 1). A more detailed question asked "what is the influence 
of' government instability'? " to which 54% answered that government instability 
influences "the continuity of the programme", and 46% believed that it influences "the 
strategic coherence of the programme" (question 2). As far as programme approval is 
concerned, the majority (9017c) believed that the delays were due more to government 
instability than to any administrative deadlock (question 3). Lastly, most agreed on the 
fact that, since 2001 the government had been more stable and that remarkable 
improvements in the coherence and continuity of the programming activities had been 
niade (question 4). 
Table 6.4 Questionnaire on government stability in Sicily 
Questions 
1) Government instability produces an effect on Structural Funds progranuning that is: 
Answers 
(ci) 
a) Negativ e 10Nl 
h) Positive p 
c) Indifferent tl 
Government instability influences.... 
a).... the strategic coherence of the programme 40 
h .... the budget available to be allocated to the programme 0 
c ... the continuity of the programme 54 
3) What has been responsible for delay in programme approval? 
:u Government instability 90 
h) Adnuni, uatke deadlock 
Do you think that since the government has been more stable (2001) the programming has 
improved? 
It) 
a) Yes, it is more coherent and constant 77 
h) No. because the programming is not related to political events 23 
Questionnaires carried out in June 2005 
For the details of each revision see: http: //www. euroinf'osicilia. it/ 
For the details of each revision see: http: //www. regione. hasiIicata. it/sportelloeuropa/ 
1) 1) 1) 
Further interviews carried out with civil servants revealed that after 2001 there was a 
change in the approach of the political class towards programming economic 
interventions and resources expenditure oriented towards the long-term rather than a 
short-term horizon of one year, as had been the case previously. Many speculated that 
the ability to engage in long-term planning was linked to the fact that the political class 
knew that the direct election of the regional president guaranteed a more stable 
government, and that they would therefore be held accountable for the results of the 
development programmes after five years. Previously, the high government instability 
had allowed each government to act irrespectively of any long-term plan because it 
"knew" that it would not have longer than a year in office. Indeed, according to the 
interview results, 
"each political class in the past used its year in power to pursue its personal 
interest, to strengthen the dependency of the region on outside resources, and 
invest in short-term projects that could have immediate impacts". 153 
Additionally, there is, I believe, a strong relationship between government instability 
and political interference. Indeed, if a politician knows that he has only a short period to 
"exploit" his power, then it is very likely that he will use his time in power to gain 
maximum personal rewards. The only way for him to do this is by interfering in the 
administrative activities and imposing his own will on the administration. The features 
discovered so far in Sicily, where both political interference and instability are present, 
confirm this hypothesis. A further confirmation comes from Basilicata, where I have not 
discovered strong political interference in administrative matters (cf. sec. 6.1.3), and 
where, as shown in the next section, there has been no political instability. 
6.3.3 Basilicata: a government per legislature 
The situation in Basilicata was very different from that of Sicily: each government lasted 
for the whole five-year period of the legislature. This was the case not only between 
1970 and 1985, as shown in Chapter 3, but also during the period of my analysis (Table 
6.5). 
153 Interview with Giuseppe Scorciapino, Region of Sicily (Palermo: 27 June 2005) 
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Table 6.5 Legislatures and governments in Basilicata 1985-2006 
Government Period President 
IV Legislature (20-06-1985 to 10-07.1990) 
50 from 20-06-1985 to 10-07-1990 G. Michetd (DC) 
V Legislature (11.07-1990 to 15-06-1995 
6° From 11-07-1990 to 15-06-1995 A. Boccia ( DC)) 
VI Legislature (16-06-1995 to 16-04-2000) 
7° From 16-06-1995 to 16-04-2000 R. Di Nardo (PPI) 
VII Legislature (17-04-2000 to 17.04-2005) 
80 From 17-04-2000 to 17-04-2005 F. Bubbico (DS) 
Source: Author's elaboration of regional government data, Basilicata 
I 
This stability guaranteed that the programme was approved on time and that the strategy 
planned at the beginning of the legislature remained coherent for the entire period. The 
promise made by each political leader to keep the government stable was not only a 
"sentence" in their opening speech but, as past events show, a real commitment. Based 
on the stability of the government, the political class developed a system of governance 
for the Structural Funds based on the coherence between the development plan, 
territorial needs and the concrete implementation of the strategy, which has been 
continually reinforced over the years. 
Further endorsement of the importance of government stability in the successful 
implementation of the Structural Funds can be drawn from the answers to the 
questionnaire as shown in Table 6.6. The same questionnaire as was carried out in Sicily 
was circulated among bureaucrats and politicians in Basilicata. The answers to the 
question about the effects of political instability on structural fund programming reveal 
that in Basilicata, 100% believed that high instability produced negative effects on the 
programming actions (question 1). Furthermore, half of those interviewed considered 
government stability to be a determining factor for the coherence of the programme; the 
other half considered it was so for the continuity of the programme (question 2). Finally, 
none answered the last two questions regarding approval delays and change in 
governments because the problem had never arisen in Basilicata. 
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Table 6.6 Questionnaire on government stability in Basilicata 
Answers 
(%) 
a) Negative 100 
b) Positive 0 
c) Indifferent (I 
a)..... the strategic coherence of the programme 50 
b... the budget available to he allocated to the programme 
c)..... the continuity of the programme 50 
al Gtv'emment instahihty 
h) Adminisnrati'. e deadlock 
º Do you think that since the government is more stable (2000) the programming has 
a) Yes, it is more coherent and constant 
h1 No, because the programming is not related to political events ý 
Questionnaire carried out in June 2006 
A further important element that emerged during my research is that in Basilicata during 
the changes of government the politicians tried to maintain as much continuity as 
possible in the roles covered by the administrative staff. Therefore, even if there was a 
reshuffle of general managers, or a new manager was appointed, there was always an 
attempt to keep key people in their positions to ensure programme coherence and 
continuity. 
6.4 Political Accountability 
6.4.1 The cause and the impact of low political accountability 
Philip Schmitter described political accountability in the following terms: 
"Generically speaking, political accountability is a relationship between two 
sets of persons or (more often) organizations in which the former agree to 
keep the latter informed, to offer then explanations for decisions made, and 
to submit to any predetermined sanctions that they may impose. The latter, 
meanwhile, are subject to the command of the former, must provide required 
information, explain obedience or disobedience to the commands thereof, 
and accept the consequences for things done or left undone. Accountability, 
in short, implies an exchange of responsibilities and potential sanctions 
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between rulers and citizens, made all the more complicated by the fact that a 
varied and competitive set of representatives typically interposes between 
the two. Needless to say, there are many caveats, loose linkages, and role 
reversals in this relationship, so that its product is almost always contested. 
Information can be selective and skewed; explanations can be deflected to 
other actors; sanctions are rarely applied and can be simply ignored" 
(Schmitter, 2004: 47). 
Moreover, in terms of political accountability, each citizen has the same rights and 
obligations, that is, to be informed (with limited exceptions) about official actions, to 
hear justifications for them, to judge how well or poorly they are carried out, and to act 
accordingly - electorally or otherwise. 
It has been shown that the growth and welfare of citizens is enhanced by governments 
that function well; that is, governments that abide by the rule of law, and whose 
administrative machinery delivers goods and services in an efficient manner (Knack and 
Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Easterly and Levine, 1997). Although the number of 
democratic regimes and thus the use of proper constitutional mechanisms to ensure the 
accountability of politicians has expanded substantially in recent decades, 
malfunctioning governments remain widespread phenomena globally (Adsera et al., 
2003: 445). 
An extensive literature on the sources of political accountability describes the machinery 
of government as a game between a principal - the public - and an agent - the politician 
or policy maker - in which the former delegates to the latter a given set of instruments 
with which to carry out certain goals. In the game, the interests of the parties may be at 
odds. Even while partly acting on the interests of their potential electors, policy makers 
are likely to pursue their own political agenda: they may be interested in enriching 
themselves while in office. With self-interested politicians and state elites, the delegation 
of decision-making and policy implementation responsibilities automatically opens up 
the possibility of significant inefficiencies. 
As shown in seminal articles by Barra (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), the solution to the 
delegation problem described above, where politicians may be tempted to exploit the 
lack of information that citizens have about policies and their consequences to pursue 
their own agenda, lies in the public establishing a control mechanism, such as regular 
elections, to discipline the policy maker. If electors vote retrospectively - that is, if they 
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look back to the results achieved by the incumbents before casting their vote - elections 
should make policy makers accountable to the public. The credible threat of losing 
office in the next period compels policy makers to deliver good services and refrain 
from "extracting rents". 
If we apply the above argument to the case of the Italian regions, then we can suggest 
that the regional political class lacked an important element of accountability because, as 
previously discussed, until 2001 the president of the region was elected by the council 
and not by the public. In general, this was a further motive for the political leader to 
disregard accountability to the citizens. To this purpose, the national constitutional 
reform that introduced the direct election of regional presidents aimed to strengthen the 
accountability of political leaders towards the electorate. 
A second element of the argument of Barro and Ferejohn is the lack of information 
available to the citizens. Along these lines, information and publicity are at the heart of 
Structural Funds procedures because the final beneficiaries of their implementation are 
the citizens. Indeed, one of the main principles of Structural Funds implementation is 
monitoring and evaluation practices, where the results are provided to the public, the 
socio-economic actors, the national government, the EU Commission and other third 
parties involved in programme implementation or simply interested in the policy 
process. Therefore, a political class that wants to decrease the amount of information 
available on the activities of the Funds and the utilization of their budgetary resources 
will be reluctant to submit to any form of monitoring and evaluation procedure: the 
higher the willingness to mismanage the resources, the lower the inclination towards a 
functional monitoring and evaluation system. 
I would argue that the lack of accountability is strongly related to government 
instability. This assumption is supported by other studies that have found stable political 
regimes to have some form of accountability to their constituencies (Adsera et al., 2003; 
Schmitter, 2004). According to my hypothesis I expect to find that in Sicily, where there 
is strong government instability and persistent political interference, the degree of 
accountability will be low. On the other hand, I expect to find the opposite in Basilicata. 
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It should be mentioned that the study of political accountability and its outcomes is 
mainly based on my own personal observations and on the results produced by the 
questionnaires and interviews. IM In my case study, I concentrate on two features: (1) 
how the political class is perceived by the civil servants; and (2) whether the political 
class has obstructed or manipulated the activities of monitoring and evaluation 
procedures regarding the Structural Funds. My aim is to determine whether the political 
class is considered accountable and whether there is any link between the latter and the 
performance of the monitoring and evaluation activities. 
6.4.2 Accountability and the quality of monitoring procedures in Sicily 
The bulk of the literature on Sicily during the last forty years agrees on the fact that the 
political class is not accountable (Boissevain, 1966; Giner, 1982; Viesti, 2003; 
Finocchiaro and Rizzo, 2006). According to some authors, the priority of the regional 
political class in Sicily is to reinforce itself, and the easiest way seems to be to build 
strong preferential linkages both with the administrative class and with the local 
government level (Piattoni, 1997). The latter, in order exchange for guaranteeing the 
support required, demands increasing resources for the strengthening of clientelistic 
networks. lss Therefore, regional political leaders to "buy" consensus from local political 
leaders use additional funding, and there is no economic development logic behind this 
allocation of resources (Trigilia, 1992). The distorted mechanism of private bargaining 
between the regional and the local political class is increased by the local politicians' 
desire to preserve their unequal power position vis-a-vis the citizens (Chubb, 1982). 
154 Indeed, political accountability has still not been institutionalized as a concept. The literature on 
accountability agrees that it has to be embedded in a mutually understood and pre-established set of rules 
(Persson et al., 1997: 1164). Some of these may be formalized in constitutions, legal codes, or sworn 
oaths, but political accountability is not the same as legal, financial, or ethical accountability. "More 
broadly, rulers can be investigated and held to account for actions that did not break the law or result in 
illicit personal enrichment or violate common mores, They may have simply made bad political choices 
that failed to produce their intended effect or cost vastly more than initially announced" (Schmitter, 2004: 
48). 
'ss. he logic is to allocate resources to the local government in order to further the local clientelistic 
boundaries, and ultimately to strengthen, at the local level, its own power. The internal antagonism at 
regional level leads the political class to reinforce the local request, and uses it to assert its power either 
within the belonging party or in front of other parties. 
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Eventually, the clientelistic network substitutes the citizens as the relevant point of 
reference for regional politicians. 
My study supports this proposition and adds two further elements, which lead to low 
accountability: political instability and the electoral system. Regarding the first factor, as 
examined in Section 6.3.2, Sicily has experienced a high rate of changes in government 
- i. e. a new government almost every year. Therefore, government officials may make 
decisions that are not purely development oriented because their policy horizons are 
limited to their time in office. The shorter the timescale, the more likely it is that they 
will take actions that do not provide an overall regional gain. The goal, instead, is short- 
term political gain. 
Until 2001, the second factor, the electoral system, provided for the president of the 
regional government to be elected by the Council and not by the citizens, thereby 
undermining the basic control system that would guarantee accountability. With the new 
policy of direct election of the President, it is possible to foresee a growing 
accountability of the president vis-ä-vis the voters. 
The questionnaire carried out over the summer of 2005 confirmed this hypothesis (Table 
6.7). When asked their opinion on the accountability of the political class, 42 % of 
interviewees answered that they considered the political class to be partially accountable 
(question 1); 40% said that there was no procedure in place to ensure accountability 
(question 2), and an impressive 85% of those interviewed declared that the poor 
accountability of the political class was due to high government instability (question 3). 
On the other hand, the point that the political class obstructed the practice of monitoring 
and evaluation was not fully validated by the results. Indeed, as reported in the 
questionnaire (Table 6.7), there was not enough evidence to back up such a hypothesis. 
When asked about a clear connection between the political will and the 
performance/improvement of the monitoring and evaluation activity, the answers clearly 
denied a link between these two aspects (question 4). Furthermore, in answer to the 
question of whether the political class supported or obstructed the monitoring and 
evaluation of Structural Funds, 85% declared that the political class was indifferent to 
229 
and distant from these activities (question 5). In addition to these answers, almost all of 
those interviewed defined the political class as 
"far too interested in their own activities to consider monitoring and 
evaluation as an instnnnent of improving management or as, manipulative 
tools"(Recorded interview). 
One respondent added: "our political class is far too negligent to understand how 
powerful these instruments could be! " 1,56 
Table 6.7 Questionnaire on political accountability in Sicily 
Questions Answers 
1) In your opinion, is the political class accountable? 
a) Yeti 35 
b) Partially 42 
c) No 23 
_ )Are there ad equate rocedures in place to ensure political accountabilit 
at Yes 25 
h) Partially 35 
c) No 
3) In your opinion is the degree of political accountability related to the instability of the 
government? 
a) Yeti 85 
h) Partially 10 
c) No 5 
In your opinion, is the performance/improvement of monitoring and evaluation activity 
related to political preferences? 
: t) Yes 15 
b) Partially 8 
c) No 77 
5) Is the political class open to the practice of monitoring and evaluation? 
a) Yes 8 
b) No 8 
c) It is indifferent 85 
) Has the political class propelled or obstructed the advancement of an evaluation culture? 
a) Propelled 
-- 
8 
----------------- - bt Obstructed 
-------- - -- c) Neither 
7) How would you define the perception of the political class of the practice of monitoring 
and evaluation? 
a)... a useful instrument io im prose their activities 
ht... an obstacle to their activities 8 
c). ... neither an obstacle to nor a facilitator of their activities 77 
Questionnaire curried out in June 2005 
'5" Interview with an anonymous civil servant, Region of Sicily (Palermo: 27 June 2005) 
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Based on the answers to the interviews and questionnaire as well as my personal 
observation, I can conclude that a political class that is negligent of the importance of 
monitoring and evaluation activities can be held responsible for the lack of performance 
of these two instruments in a regional setting where they are crucial for the good 
management of the Structural Funds. 
6.4.3 Is the political class accountable in Basilicata? 
The analysis of the political model in Basilicata presented a significantly different 
picture than that of Sicily. Two main features have so far characterized the Basilicata 
regional government: (1) a balanced relationship between the political and the 
administrative classes; and (2) strong government stability. Consequently, if my model 
of analysis and hypothesis is correct, I would expect to find that the political class is 
more accountable in Basilicata than it is in Sicily. 
The main sources of information on the accountability of the political class in Basilicata 
are: (1) the field research carried out by Leonardi, Putnam and Nanetti in 1976,1981 and 
1983 for the completion of the book 11 Caso Baislicata (1987); and (2) the field research 
I carried out, using interviews and questionnaires, in June 2006. 
Leonardi, Putnam and Nanetti interviewed 35 people who had regular contact with the 
political class (mayors, NGO representatives, representatives of economic associations), 
and 58% defined it as honest (Leopardi et al., 1987: 30). The general opinion that 
emerged from the interviews was that people were trustful of the political class. The 
interviewees suggested that this trust came from the fact that the political class was 
perceived to be acting in the interest of the region and pursued the goal of the socio- 
economic development of the region (Leonardi et al., 1987: 95-116). Clearly, this 
analysis of the first fifteen years of the regional government by Leonardi et al. produced 
a positive picture of Basilicata's political class. 
In a similar way to Leonardi et al., I interviewed a sample of civil servants and 
politicians about political accountability (Table 6.8). Here, 65% of the sample felt that 
the political class was accountable, compared with a smaller percentage (42) in Sicily, 
whereas 25% and 10% respectively felt that there was only a partial level of 
accountability or an absence of accountability (question 1). In the same vein, 50% 
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declared that there were procedures in place to ensure accountability (question 2), and an 
impressive 90% declared that the accountability of the political class was related to 
government stability (question 3). During an interview, the former general manager of 
the MA said: 
"Political stability forces the political class to be accountable because they 
know they will be seen as responsible for the results of their actions and their 
names will be correlated to any success or failure. On the other hand if a 
politician knows he will soon be gone, then he will act irrespective of the 
consequences". 157 
Clearly, the responses confirm the validity of the findings of Leonardi et al. (1987) and 
suggest that we can define the political class in Basilicata as accountable. 
An analysis of the second set of questions (Table 6.8), which focused on understanding 
whether the political class had obstructed or encouraged monitoring and evaluation 
activities, substantiates the belief that the political class in Basilicata was supportive of 
those activities. Indeed, as reported in Table 6.8, when asked about whether there was a 
connection between the political will and the performance/improvement of the 
monitoring and evaluation activity, 75% of those interviewed identified a partial 
connection (question 4). Furthermore, in answer to the question of whether the political 
class supported or obstructed any form of monitoring and evaluation of Structural Funds, 
85% declared that the political class had supported those activities (question 5). At the 
same time, 90% said that the political class had contributed to the spread of a cultural 
evaluation within the regional organization (question 6). Unlike the image of political 
indifference and disregard towards monitoring and evaluation that emerged in Sicily, it 
appears that in Basilicata the political class considered these activities to be useful 
instruments in improving its own political strategies (question 7). 
157 Interview with Andrea Freschi, Region of Basilicata (Potenza: 7 June 2005) 
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Table 6.8 Questionnaire on political accountability in Basilicata 
Questions Answers (14) 
1) In your opinion, is the political class accountable? 
a) Yes 65 
hi Partially 25 
No 10 
21 Are there adequate procedures in place to ensure political accountability? 
a) Yes 50 
h) Partially 30 
No 20 
ý. z) In your opinion is the degree of political accountability related to the stability of the government? 
.ulr, 90 
hi Partially 10 
c) No 
Is the performancefimprovement of monitoring and evaluation activity related to political will? 
a) Yep IS 
h) Partially 75 
c) No It) 
Is the political class open to the practice of monitoring and evaluation? 
a) Yes 85 
ht No 0 
c) It is inditlerrnt 15 
6) Has the political class propelled or obstructed the advancement of an evaluation culture? 
a) Propelled 94) 
hi Oh, tructed 
-- 
tl 
---- I11 Neither -- 
_ 7) How would you define the perception of the political class of the practice of monitoring and evaluation? 
,u... a usrtul instrument to im ro%c their acti\ 
ine, 941 
b) ... an obstacle of their activities 
0 
C) ... neither an obstacle nor a 
facilitator of their activities 10 
Questionnaire curried out in Jana 2000 
6.5 Conclusion 
Following my second question - i. e. why does administrative capacity vary at the 
regional level? - the primary and secondary sources, and, most significantly, the 
interviews with policy makers both in the administrative and political arenas, have 
supported the second part of my central hypothesis, which is that three main political 
factors - i. e. political interference, government stability and political accountability - 
influence the features acquired by the four key components of administrative capacity. 
The findings that emerge from my study can be summarized under two main headings. 
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(1) A correlation exists between each of the political factors and each key administrative 
component 
A) Deficiency in management is influenced by strong political interference. 
Thus, a weak management system should be attributed not only to the skills and training 
of the administrative class, as the existing literature suggests, but also to the existing 
institutional structure, and more importantly to the practice of power sharing between 
the political and the administrative layers. The analysis has demonstrated that this is the 
case for Sicily, where a poor management system, measured in terms of the lack clarity 
of role among personnel and the lack of coordinated activities within each assessorati, 
can be traced back to the blurring between administrative and political responsibilities. 
The latter is characterized by strong political interference and a subordinate 
administrative class where the average civil servant bargains to accept political intrusion 
in exchange for personal rewards. This interference creates uncertainty in terms of "who 
does what" and leads to a lack of coordination, confusion, and the predictability of 
administrative action. 
Indeed, the result of the empirical investigation has undoubtedly supported my first 
hypothesised relationship, which was that between management of Structural Funds and 
political interference. Indeed, to improve the management of Structural Funds it was 
necessary to have better coordination among the different departments of the regional 
administration and a greater clarity of roles. Such conditions are strongly determined by 
the separation of powers and responsibility between the political and the administrative 
class. This scenario is exemplified in Basilicata. Here, data gathered through interviews 
and questionnaires and supported by documentary evidence revealed that the successful 
implementation of the Structural Funds depended on the existence of a strong centre of 
coordination for the formulation of strategy and management of the Funds. In Basilicata 
these conditions were supported by a healthy alliance between the political and 
administrative spheres. Although it experienced the inevitable difficulties along the way, 
the region has not only redefined its internal organizational structure but has also created 
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new bodies in charge of the Structural Funds. The creation of the Cabin of Direction, 
composed of a "Mixed Committee" representing the political level and the 
Interdepartmental Technical Commission, which incorporates the technical staff, was the 
key factor in achieving successful management because it created an arena for 
discussion and exchange between the political and technical levels of management. The 
two levels have worked with a full recognition of their own roles, powers and 
responsibilities, and this has led to a constructive relationship. The absence of 
interference in each other's spheres has allowed the administration to consolidate its role 
as the ultimate "implementator" of the policy. The reason for this outcome can be 
clearly traced back to the support provided by the political class, which saw in the EU 
Funds an opportunity to restructure the regional economy and innovation with regional 
programme. 
B) Poor programming performance is correlated to high government instability. 
The empirical research brought to light substantial evidence to support the suggestion 
that government stability has an important bearing on programming performance. 
Indeed, in Sicily governments have been highly unstable - there has been a different 
cabinet almost every year - whereas in Basilicata each cabinet has lasted for the entire 
legislative period. Regional governments that change constantly have more difficulty in 
maintaining a strong commitment to multi-annual programmes. In addition, unstable 
governments are more likely to witness changes not only in the political class but also in 
the civil servants responsible for the implementation of development programmes. 
Bureaucrats facing a continual change in political leaders have no incentive to take 
decisions in terms of programming that might then be changed all over again by new 
incoming politicians. Therefore, the safest way around a potential conflict with the 
political class is not to decide and to postpone decisions indefinitely (Cassese, 1984). 
Such behaviour is likely to cause significant discontinuity and delay in the overall 
administration of programmes. A multi-annual programme takes years to deliver results, 
while a cabinet that lasts for less than a year can only deal with short-term matters. 
In the case of Sicily, the frequent changes of government had repercussions on the 
programming activities in terms of the two indicators I have investigated: programme 
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design and programme approval. Indeed, programme design was robbed of coherence 
and continuity. The high instability allowed each government to act irrespectively of any 
long-term plan, because it "knew", according to past experience, that it would not last 
any longer than an year. Since 2001, with the change in the electoral system, Sicily has 
witnessed its first government to remain in power for the entire five years of the 
legislature. This has been identified as one of the reasons for the improvements recently 
registered in programming performance. 
The case of Basilicata is unlike the situations described above. Here, the governments 
have always been stable, and this has guaranteed the ability to implement long-term 
plans, to ensure coherence and continuity in the planning strategy, and to avoid delays 
in programme implementation. 
C) Monitoring and evaluation practices are affected by political accountability 
The test of this correlation was mainly based on the results of the data collected through 
the questionnaires and interviews, and on my personal observations. In Sicily an overall 
agreement on the existence of weak political accountability has emerged. As far as the 
eventual correlation between the latter and the under-utilized practice of monitoring and 
evaluation is concerned, the link seems to exist. However, in Sicily this link is not as 
strong as the one that emerged in Basilicata. 
Indeed, in Sicily it seems that the political class has not been interested in supporting 
monitoring or evaluation activities. Therefore, it cannot be said that the political class 
has obstructed those activities, but it could be speculated that the indifference shown by 
the political class might have contributed to the slow spread of an evaluation culture 
within the regional administration. 
Conversely, in Basilicata it is apparent that the political class is perceived as 
accountable, and that there is a correlation between the improved monitoring and 
evaluation activities and the supportive actions taken by the politicians. The hypothesis 
that is confirmed by such results is that if the political class is accountable it will be 
supportive of forms of monitoring or evaluation. On the other hand, if the political class 
acts in a clientelistic fashion, then it will have no interest in publicizing its activities. 
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(2) A correlation exists between the three political factors. 
Investigating the correlation between the political factors and the administrative key 
components has also revealed that not only does a correlation exist between this two 
areas, but also that a political model can be anticipated by looking at the features 
acquired by the three political dimensions. 
Indeed, in Sicily the strong government instability appears to have been liable for the 
following features: (i) the strong intervention of the political class in the administrative 
area; and (ii) the lack of accountability of the political class. An opposite situation 
emerges in Basilicata. Here the government stability seems to foster (i) the shared 
respect of the different roles of the political and administrative areas; and (ii) a more 
accountable political class (cf. 1igure 6.1). 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis began by observing some puzzling empirical evidence. Retrospective data on 
Structural Funds implementation rates over the past 16 years, presented in Chapter 1, 
show very different performance levels among Member States, and illustrate that Italy's 
performance has constantly lagged behind that of other EU Member States. However, an 
analysis of the Italian Objective 1 regions, which are all located in the southern part of 
the country known as the Mezzogiorno, clearly reveals that not all follow the same 
general trend. Retrospective data suggest that Structural Funds implementation over 
previous planning periods has differed markedly between regions. The spectrum of 
performance ranges from a very low implementation rate in Sicily to a high rate in 
Basilicata. 
Having observed that variation exists at the regional level, it remains to be seen whether 
a common set of causal factors can be found. The review of the existing literature 
presented in this thesis has clearly revealed that an exhaustive explanation for the 
observed differences in performances cannot be found (cf. Section 1.6). The focus of my 
research was an attempt to single out the variable(s) accountable for regional 
performance variations with regard to Structural Funds expenditure and implementation 
of the EU cohesion policy. 
This concluding chapter will review the findings of the thesis (ef. Section 7.2) and 
discuss the implications of these findings (cf. Section 7.3). There are three sets of 
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stakeholders with a potential interest in these findings: (i) EU policy makers; (ii) 
national government policy makers and (iii) regional governments. 
The penultimate section of the chapter (cf. Section 7.4) highlights the contribution made 
by this thesis to the existing literature. Three main aspects have emerged from the study: 
(i) a new definition of administrative capacity; (ii) the measurement of administrative 
capacity at the regional level; and (iii) the identification of a relationship between 
administrative capacity and political activities and characteristics. 
The final section of this chapter sets out an agenda for future research (Section 7.5). 
Three directions of future work are suggested: (i) further studies on variables that can 
determine administrative capacity variations and application of the administrative loop 
designed in Chapter 2 to investigate other regions; (ii) research on the impact of higher 
institutional performance on social capital formation; (iii) relation between quantitative 
and qualitative implementation. 
7.2 Summary of findings 
This thesis began with an empirical observation: implementation rates for Structural 
Funds vary significantly not just across Member States but also between regions within 
the same Member State. Therefore, the first part of my main research question was: what 
determines variation in regional implementation of Structural Funds? The first part of 
the central hypothesis that I put forward was that Structural Funds implementation is 
positively correlated to the degree of regional administrative capacity. 
The corollary question to such a hypothesis is: if it is true that Structural Funds 
implementation is determined by administrative capacity, then what is it that determines 
the variation in administrative capacity - i. e. why does administrative capacity vary 
between regions? The second part of the central hypothesis claims that the degree of 
administrative capacity is determined by political factors; namely political interference, 
government stability and political accountability. 
An inference of this second part of the central hypothesis is that a causal relationship 
exists between each of the key actions of administrative capacity - i. e. management, 
programming, monitoring, evaluation - and each of the three political factors. 
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To answer the two parts of my central question I proposed three additional research 
questions that helped me to structure the argument: 
1) How have the national and regional governments reacted to the innovations 
introduced by the CSF development approach, and have the national and regional 
institutions changed and reorganized their structures in order to comply with the 
rules of EU regional policy? 
2) Did the regional level possess an adequate level of capacity to perform its role in 
the multi-level system of governance? 
3) Was there a process of institutional, administrative and political adjustment, i. e. 
can we identify any virtuous/vicious pattern of interaction between the 
administrative and political areas that favours/compromises regional 
performance? 
Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 will summarize the answers to the first and second parts of the 
central research question respectively. 
7.2.1 What determines variation in regional implementation of Structural Funds? 
The first part of the central question was addressed in Chapters 1 and 2 and fully 
investigated in Chapter 5. Chapter 1 reviewed the existing literature on Structural Funds 
implementation in search for an explanation. It established the lack in the literature of an 
in-depth analysis of the implementation process, caused by the preoccupation of the vast 
majority of authors with the policy-making process or the final economic impact of the 
resources, which meant that they never fully take into account what happens to policies 
during the implementation phase. 
After demonstrating the importance of the implementation stage, I discussed how the 
observed regional variation in terms of expenditure is not fully explained by social 
capital theory, absorption capacity or economic factors, which omission constitutes a 
gap in the literature and leads to the need to find possible explanations. Towards this end 
I proposed a new variable that could account for differences in regional performance: 
administrative capacity. 
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Chapter 2 reviewed the literature on administrative capacity by examining the various 
definitions and approaches that have been suggested by other authors. However, what 
emerged was that in the literature there is neither a clear definition of administrative 
capacity nor a strong and coherent assessment model capable of use in analysing 
administrative behaviour and implementation processes. Therefore, I reviewed the 
literature on institutional capacity, which, although it is a broader concept, gave me a 
pattern to follow in suggesting a definition for administrative capacity. Based on a 
combination of the literature on institutional capacity, a thorough scrutiny of Structural 
Funds principles and structures, and the analysis carried out by Boijmans (2003), I 
proposed that administrative capacity is characterized by four key components: (1) 
Management; (2) Programming; (3) Monitoring; and (4) Evaluation. 
My definition of administrative capacity encompasses both the activities that the 
regional government should be performing, and the results it should be achieving. 
Taken as a whole these actions create a framework that operates as a system - i. e. the 
key components are related to each other so that the outcome of each is closely related to 
the others. This creates a loop where if each phase is performed well, a high level of 
Structural Funds implementation occurs (cf. Chapter 2, Figure 2.2). 
In order to assess the degree of administrative capacity in the two selected regions 
(Sicily and Basilicata) I suggested a number of indicators to measure and compare each 
key activity. The results of each four activities provided an overall indication of the 
degree of administrative capacity existing in the region. Data collection was based upon 
three techniques to ensure the reliability of findings: (1) analysis of primary 
documentary material; (2) interview data - in the form of questionnaires and semi- 
structured interviews; and (3) direct observation of regional administrative interactions 
(Johnson, 2005: 185-304). 
Chapter 5 presented the results of the extensive fieldwork conducted in the two regions 
and the assessment of administrative capacity according to the suggested indicators. By 
analysing the three periods (1989-1993,1994-1999 and 2000-2006) of the Structural 
Funds implementation I was able to investigate whether a relationship exists between the 
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level of administrative capacity and the rate of expenditure for each period. The 
relationship between the two variables emerged as strong and consistent. Indeed, in 
Sicily during the first period (1989-1993), administrative capacity was, according to my 
measurement, "absent" and the rate of expenditure was very poor. The region was only 
able to spend 57% of the allocated Structural Funds over five years, whereas in 
Basilicata the level of expenditure was much higher (92%) and the level of 
administrative capacity was measured to be "starting". During the second period, 
administrative capacity in Sicily registered some small improvements. According to my 
indicators, this appears to be at a "starting" level; interestingly, the rate of expenditure at 
the end of 1999 was 75% of the total allocation. Similar, parallel improvements were 
observed in Basilicata, where administrative capacity reached a "developing" level, and 
the Funds were completely spent. During the third period (2000-2006), which I have 
analysed until 2004, continued improvement was registered in Sicily in terms of both 
administrative capacity and expenditure of Structural Funds. After four years, Sicily had 
spent 23% of its allocation and Basilicata had spent 38%: clearly, the gap between the 
two regions has narrowed. The assessment of administrative capacity revealed 
improvements both in Sicily and in Basilicata, although in Sicily the situation appears 
worse when compared to Basilicata. 
In summary, the main findings emerging from the assessment of administrative capacity 
in the two regions are the following: 
1) Management has improved in Sicily only in recent years. However, it still appears to 
be weak according to both indicators illustrated in Table 2.3. First, the role of the 
administrative personnel in managing the policy is not yet clearly defined, and this often 
creates a duplication of workloads. Secondly, each administrative department acts in an 
uncoordinated fashion. Indeed, each assessorato acts as an independent unit, and tries to 
protect its autonomy from the "interference" of other regional administrative branches, 
even though this is at the cost of overall administrative efficiency. In Sicily, weak 
management has caused a slow down in the pace of implementation due to the general 
confusion over "who does what" and the duplication of efforts between the different 
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assessorati. By contrast, in Basilicata the driving factor towards a more efficient 
management, was the creation of a central coordination body responsible for optimising 
collaboration between different departments and clarifying individual roles. This 
collaborative attitude based both on formal and informal channels 
"is part of the regional administration policy, which since 1980 has always 
worked together towards implementing actions which were perceived as 
beneficial to the economic and social development of the regions, such was 
the case with the CSF'(Recorded interview). 
Both regions appear to have a vertical organizational structure, with the difference that 
in Basilicata there is a strong horizontal coordination of activities. 
2) The second key component of administrative capacity is programming. According to 
my analysis, both programme design and programme approval are still weak in Sicily. 
Here the development programmes appear to be extremely fragmented, although 
progress has been made in the use of the SWOT analysis to provide consistency to the 
development strategy. Indeed, over the first two periods of planning, the region's 
specific socio-economic characteristics were not fully considered. Due to the poor 
correspondence between planned interventions and real territorial needs, few well 
thought-out projects were put forward for funding. Consequently, this meagre funding 
request led to a great difficulty in spending the allocated resources. 
Programme approval, my second indicator, has consistently been delayed by at least two 
years in Sicily. A delay in the approval of the programmes by the EU level delayed the 
beginning of the programme at the regional level, thereby compromising the possibility 
of implementing the programme within the allocated time span. However, improvements 
in both indicators have been noted over the three periods of analysis. 
In contrast, the programme presented by the Basilicata region from the beginning closely 
adhered to the needs of the region and focused on projects that corresponded to the 
requested EU criteria and were in a position to mobilize the investment of resources by 
private firms. Furthermore no delays in programme approval occurred after the first 
planning period. 
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3) Monitoring is the third relevant element within the concept of administrative capacity. 
As emerged from my study, the monitoring system introduced in Sicily is not efficient 
mainly because its indicators are not adequate for measuring programme results. 
Furthermore, the necessary data has only recently become available in a systematic 
fashion. Sicily still suffers a gap between the gathering of data for monitoring purposes 
and programme management - i. e. monitoring systems satisfy accountability needs but 
fail to provide feedback into the management process. Conversely, the monitoring 
system set up in Basilicata appears to be both efficient and effective based on a complete 
and exhaustive set of indicators. Over the 1994-1999 period, Basilicata was the sole 
southern region to spend its entire Structural Funds allocation: 
"Among other factors, the achievement of such a successful result has been 
possible due to the existence of a complete and efficient monitoring system. 
The system has guaranteed the availability of both financial and physical 
measurement data that has allowed the Regional administration to keep the 
evolution of expenditure under constant control and to promptly intervene to 
correct any problems that arose" (Ecosfera et al., 2002: 144). 
4) Finally, as far as concerns the assessment of evaluation activities, when investigating 
the first indicator it emerged that both an ex-ante and a mid-term evaluation were carried 
out in both regions. This said, the ex ante evaluation report produced by the Basilicata 
region appears to be more thorough and extensive in nature. Indeed, it scrutinizes all 
areas of intervention and quantities possible results, whereas the ex ante evaluation in 
Sicily considers only a few areas of intervention. Focusing on the second indicator, 
interviews with some civil servants in Sicily revealed only until a few years ago the 
evaluation process was merely considered an extra workload whose beneficial effects 
were not understood. 
"Recently, the perceived value of evaluation has improved, although it is still 
far from becoming an instrument not only for the enhancement of Structural 
Funds expenditures but also for the overall public policy sphere" (cf 
quotation pag. 194). 
The situation in Basilicata is much more advanced; indeed the region is already familiar 
with the practice of evaluation and this culture has spread within the organization. Both 
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the administrative and political spheres pay great attention to the results that have 
emerged from the assessment in order to improve future implementation performances. 
The summary above shows that testing the first part of the central hypothesis revealed 
significant evidence to support the relevance of administrative capacity in terms of the 
four actions investigated in determining Structural Funds implementation rates. Once I 
had assessed the overall degree of administrative capacity present in Basilicata and 
Sicily, the second question in need of consideration asked what it is that can account for 
the variation in administrative capacity among the regions. Following the second part of 
the central hypothesis, I tested whether the features that constituted administrative 
capacity could be influenced by political factors. The results of this second test are 
summarized in the following section. 
7.2.2 Why does administrative capacity vary across regions? 
Part of the literature has suggested that regional administrative capacity might be 
influenced by three different variables: namely (1) education level of the administrators; 
(2) the centralized approach to policy making; and (3) levels of corruption among 
regional administrators and politicians. In Section 2.2.3 we saw that administrators in 
Sicily and Basilicata share the same level of education. In Chapters 3 and 4, I 
demonstrated that centralization was a variable that affected both regions before 1989 
and up until 1992, with regard to the national development regional policy. In sections 
2.3.3 and 3.4.2 I also analysed the presence of mafia and corruption. Mafia organisations 
exist in both regions, while the level of corruption is difficult, if not impossible, to 
measure with objective indicators in both case studies. 
Once we established that these three variables do not provide a sufficient level of 
differentiation or operationalisation, I had then to test the second part of the central 
hypothesis, which claims that the different degrees of administrative capacity might be 
influenced by political factors; namely political interference, government stability and 
political accountability. The fieldwork carried out in both regions, the review of primary 
source documents and the extensive interviews uncovered evidence that suggested each 
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political factor acts not only on administrative capacity in general but is linked with each 
specific administrative component. 
In the interviews, the people questioned in both Sicily and Basilicata made constant 
reference to the different ways in which the political class had influenced the four 
activities that constitute administrative capacity. Indeed, from the investigation three 
corollary relationships emerged: 
1) A weak/strong management performance is influenced by high/low political 
interference and a blurring/separation of powers between the political and administrative 
classes; 
2) Programming coherence, in terms of strategy continuity and time taken for approval, 
is compromised by an instable/stable government subject to frequent/infrequent changes 
in leadership; and 
3) The existence and functioning of a monitoring system and the spread of an evaluation 
culture within the regional government are both influenced by the high/low level of 
political accountability. 
These three relationships largely remain distinct, although they are not exclusive. In 
reality, the political and administrative factors are not so neatly correlated. Indeed, the 
analysis has revealed that political interference acts mainly on the management system 
but it also influences programming performance. Similarly, government instability 
affects the coherence of programming and the time needed to gain approval of the 
programmes from Brussels. It also seems, however, to have some bearing on 
management performance. Finally, both political interference and government instability 
characterize the political class, which does not appear to be politically accountable. 
The three political factors seem to have different features in Sicily and in Basilicata. 
Indeed, in the first region, they have the following characteristics: 
1) A disrupting political interference, where the political class dominates the 
administrative sphere, thus restricting the latter's ability to implement the programmes, 
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interfering with the management activities, and ultimately increasing the uncertainty of 
"who does what" and leading to an uncoordinated set of actions and a confusion of roles; 
2) A high level of government instability with constant change of leadership has caused 
a significant amount of discontinuity and delay in the overall administrative system and 
has had repercussions on programme coherence and delays in approval of the 
programmes; 
3) A lack of accountability of the political class has led to its closed attitude to any form 
of evaluation or monitoring of programmes. 
An opposite situation emerged in Basilicata, where I found that: 
1) There is a supportive political class, which has seen the EU Funds as an opportunity 
to reinforce the region's social and economic structure and renew programmatic 
interventions. The two levels, political and administrative, have been able to work 
together, with each in full recognition of the other's role, power and responsibility in 
creating a constructive relationship; 
2) The governments have always been very stable. This has enabled the implementation 
of a long-term plan, and has ensured coherence and continuity in the formulation of the 
development strategy, and the avoidance of undue delays in programme preparation or 
authorisation; 
3) The political class is perceived as accountable and favours the development of 
monitoring and evaluation practices. 
The above political factors seem to have had an important influence on the evolution of 
the four actions of administrative capacity measured in both Sicily and Basilicata. The 
findings support the second part of the central hypothesis - i. e. that the three political 
factors appear to account for the variation in administrative capacity between the two 
regions. 
Testing the second part of the central hypothesis also revealed that not only does a 
correlation exist between the political factors and the administrative key components, 
but that a political model can also be anticipated by looking at the features of the three 
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political dimensions. Indeed, in Sicily the strong government instability appears to be 
liable for the following features: (i) the political class intervenes heavily in the 
administrative area; and (ii) the political class is not accountable. An opposite situation 
emerges in Basilicata. Here the government stability seems to foster (i) the practice of 
respecting the division of actions between the political and administrative areas, and (ii) 
a more accountable political class. 
The implication of these findings is that elected politicians are far from unimportant in 
both Sicily and Basilicata. The commitment and support of the political party towards 
the elected leaders are indispensable conditions of the consolidation of the process of 
administrative capacity building induced by Structural Funds. This observation is valid 
both for northern and southern regions: where politicians are hostile or scarcely 
interested, the innovations promoted by Structural Funds - management, programming, 
and monitoring and evaluation of public intervention - risk being totally absent or, at 
best, remaining isolated in small sectors of the administrative machinery. Similarly, 
government stability plays a fundamental role in guaranteeing continuity in the process 
of capacity building, which takes time to be accomplished. 
Up until 1994 the same party ruled both regions (the Christian Democratic party), but 
the outcomes in terms of leadership stability and programme coherence were quite 
different. After 1994 the two regions were ruled by different political coalitions: the 
centre-left in Basilicata and the centre-right in Sicily. Basilicata continued to register its 
high level of performance and Sicily improved its level of performance. The 
improvements that took place in Sicily were not in my opinion attributable to the 
changes in the party coalition (form centre-left to centre-right) but rather to policy 
learning and the restrictions imposed by national legislation on political behaviour - i. e. 
the amount of interference that could be imposed by the political sphere on the 
administrative one was narrowed. Therefore, during the third cycles of the Structural 
Funds, the level of performance of Sicily improved because the level of political 
interference had decreased and the stability of the regional government had improved. 
These political features had repercussion on the administrative sphere. Indeed, they 
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allowed a more coordinated management and an improved coherent development 
programme. 
7.3 Policy implications 
The findings that have emerged from this thesis on the key components of administrative 
capacity and on the relevance of political factors in influencing the variation in capacity 
between the regions has policy implications for three sets of stakeholders: (i) EU policy 
makers; (ii) national policy makers; and (iii) regional policy makers. Indeed, a number 
of strategies emerge from these findings, which improve the degree of administrative 
capacity, increase the rate of Structural Funds expenditure, and improve overall levels of 
policy implementation. 
7.3.1 For EU policy makers 
EU policy makers"' have stressed the relevance of administrative capacity for 
improving levels of implementation of cohesion policy. '" However, as discussed 
extensively in Chapter 2, although administrative and institutional capacity were 
highlighted as vital elements with regard to this, neither a clear definition of 
administrative capacity nor a strong and coherent assessment model is to be found in the 
existing literature. 
The first accomplishment of this thesis is to have provided a definition of administrative 
capacity that can be replicated in other regions or Member States. 
isa Not just those involved with regional and cohesion policy based at the DG Regio. 
159 In previous programming periods, the EU has, through technical assistance, reinforced the management 
capacity of Member States and managing authorities in implementing the regulations. Beyond the 
management of the Funds, effective administrative capacity of public administrations and public services 
is a fundamental requirement for economic growth, private investments, and job creation. Thus, the Funds 
have supported investment in human capital and related ICT facilities of administrative and public 
services at all territorial levels (Council Regulation 1260/1999). 
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According to my definition, administrative capacity is no longer an abstract concept but 
can be broken down in four key actions, which can be easily operationalized. EU policy 
makers could benefit from such a characterization and suggest policies for building or 
strengthening each action. This could make their policies more concrete. Furthermore, I 
have suggested indicators that could be used to benchmark administrative capacity 
progressions. This will allow EU policy makers to control whether and how 
administrative capacity develops, and eventually to intervene if the situation stagnates, 
as it did in Sicily, where development in the four areas of administrative capacity were 
poor during the first and second planning periods. 
Unfortunately, EU policy makers seem to repeat the same mistakes. Indeed, the new 
Council regulation for cohesion policy over the forthcoming period (2007-2013) 
continues to be extremely vague. The aim of Structural Funds for the new Objective 1 
regions is laid out as follows: 
"In the case of regions and Member States eligible for support under the 
Convergence objective, the aim should be to stimulate growth potential, so 
as to achieve and maintain high growth rates, including addressing the 
deficits in basic infrastructure networks and strengthening institutional and 
administrative capacity" (Council Decision 18/08/2006: 5). 
In the subsequent pages we read that: 
"an appropriate amount of the European Social Fund (ESF) resources shall 
be allocated to capacity-building, which shall include training, networking 
measures, strengthening the social dialogue and activities jointly undertaken 
by the social partners" (Council Decision 18/08/2006: 42). 
Still there is no sign of a more concrete and operational definition of administrative 
capacity. 
For Cohesion countries and regions under the Convergence Objective (Objective 1), 
increasing productivity and quality at work in the public sector - especially in the 
economic, employment, social, educational, health, environmental and judicial areas - is 
essential in order to pursue and accelerate reforms, to raise productivity and growth in 
the wider economy and to promote social and territorial cohesion and sustainable 
development. The Structural Funds can play an important role in supporting effective 
policy design and implementation, which involves all relevant stakeholders, in a broad 
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range of fields. Thus, Member States are invited to conduct a comprehensive analysis to 
identify the policy areas requiring the most support with regard to administrative 
capacity (Council Decision 18/08/2006). 
In conclusion, the EU policy makers call upon Member States and regions falling under 
the Convergence Objective to build up public administrations and public services at 
national, regional and local levels, but still they do not give any specific definitions or 
indicators by which eventual progress may be benchmarked. My thesis has attempted to 
fill this gap, first by providing a model of administrative capacity that can be applied by 
member states to any region, irrespective of its administrative tradition; second, by 
suggesting objective indicators which would not only make it possible to measure 
improvements in a specific country over time, but also to make cross-country 
comparisons. 
7.3.2 For national government policy makers 
The experience of Member States of the management and implementation of Structural 
Funds demonstrates that there is no single, universally applicable model that holds true 
for all cases and situations. The context of regional administrative structures and 
political culture has a significant bearing on the actual model that is adopted in a 
particular location. It would therefore be a mistake to study the efficiency of Structural 
Funds implementation without taking full account of this diversity of context. 
The case of Italy has demonstrated that the precondition which meant that the regions 
operated under a system of strong centralized national intervention has left them very 
weak in terms of their capacity in policy making and policy implementation. The 
retrospective look at the establishment of the regions as administrative units and of the 
different phases of the Italian regional policy within the European scenario, addressed in 
Chapters 3 and 4, clearly revealed that the system of multilevel governance was not 
established in Italy until relatively recently. Indeed, it is only in the last 20 years that the 
national government has recognized the regional authority and has taken a more 
decentralized approach to regional policy, allowing the regions to grow and build their 
own capacity. Of course, the delay in complying with the EU dictate for cohesion policy 
251 
left a gap, not only between Italy and other Member States (as exemplified by the delay 
in the rate of Structural Funds expenditure), but also within the Italian boundaries. 
In this respect, the achievement of this thesis is to have demonstrated that a centralized 
approach is not adequate for the implementation of cohesion policy. Member States need 
to develop a multilevel framework approach to both policy making and implementation 
process. 
According to EU policy makers, Member States should ensure that the need to increase 
efficiency and transparency in public administrations and to modernize public services is 
adequately addressed. Guidelines for action under this heading are the following: 
"(i) Support good policy and programme design, monitoring, evaluation and 
impact assessment, through studies, statistics, expertise, and foresight, 
support for interdepartmental coordination and dialogue between relevant 
public and private bodies; (ii) Enhance capacity building in the delivery of 
policies and programmes, especially through mapping of training needs, 
career development review, evaluation, social audit procedures, 
implementation of open government principles, managerial and staff training 
and specific support to key services, inspectorates and socio-economic 
actors" (Council Decision of 6 October 2006: 18). 
As I have already stated, these guidelines appear to be very generic. What in practice do 
national governments have to do? How can they enhance capacity building? The 
question that has been at the centre of part of this thesis returns: which capacity are we 
referring to? How do we measure the progress of these capacities? 
By reading the EU official documents we can deduce what the Commission means by 
the phrase "administrative capacity". In general terms, the Commission has sought the 
following reforms in the public administrations of the applicant states: legislation, 
specifically that regarding the civil service; the establishment of a civil service career; 
political neutrality of the civil service; and pay reform designed to bring public sector 
pay closer to that in the private sector. Behind, and below, these broad horizontal 
measures the Commission has now routinely reviewed the capacity of applicant states to 
implement the acquis in different areas. 
New Member States, which have dealt with the issue of administrative capacity since the 
negotiations started, have been trying to implement actions to promote administrative 
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capacity at the national level and also to assist the sub-national level in doing so, 
following the above EU guidelines. The EU-1S Member States, however, started their 
programmes of capacity building more recently. Some countries, such as Spain, England 
and Italy, invested in capacity building activity during the period 2000-2006. National 
policy makers play an important role in this area because they can allocate part of the 
budget to implement programmes of regional assistance for improving capacity. To do 
this, however, they need a clear idea of which capacity aspects to be improved. Again, 
my thesis fills this gap by studying the regional dimension: I have suggested which 
administrative area needs to be strengthened. National policy makers aware of the 
specific regional deficiencies could suggest more effective and targeted interventions. 
Furthermore, a forum for exchanging experience between regions could be created. 
7.3.3 For regional governments 
The extensive fieldwork conducted during my research in the two selected case studies 
allows me to provide the regional governments with some useful indication of how to 
improve Structural Funds implementation. Regions need: 
" to set up a structure for improving centralized management that guarantees 
horizontal coordination and clarity of role among personnel, mainly when several 
departments are involved. This will support the programming, monitoring and 
implementation process for the whole period by maintaining a constant vision of 
the whole process; 
" to develop a programme based on a coherent SWOT analysis whose strategy of 
development responds to the real territorial needs. It should be possible to carry 
out the development plan within the time period set out by the multi-annual 
European time span. Both an effective programme design and efficient 
programme approval time will allow the implementation process to be speeded 
up; 
" to provide a punctual and accurate monitoring system which directly feeds 
information into the management unit, in order that interventions may be made 
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where necessary. This will allow the management unit to intervene when 
monitoring data indicates that problems have appeared; 
" to support the spread of evaluation activities within the regional administration, so 
that programming of future interventions can be improved. An evaluation carried 
out in three stages - ex-ante, initinere and ex post - will highlight qualitative 
problems, which not always are captured by the monitoring indicators. 
My research revealed that administrative activities are mostly influenced by some 
political factors. Therefore, bearing this in mind, the regional government should aim to 
do the following: 
" Reduce political interference in the administrative arena. This has been the 
subject of both national and regional legislation that aims to differentiate the two 
spheres of action. However, the formal legislation can only do so much; it is up to 
the political class to respect the administration and to give it space to operate. It is 
the responsibility of these two spheres to work together in order to promote the 
successful implementation of development programmes. 
" Promote government stability, not only in terms of keeping the same President for 
the entire legislation, but also in not reshuffling the assessori midway through the 
government's tenure. Regional governments that change constantly have more 
difficulty in maintaining a strong commitment to multi-annual programmes. 
Unstable governments are also more likely to witness change in the civil servants 
responsible for sustaining development programme as well as in the political 
class. This is likely to cause a significant amount of discontinuity and delay in the 
overall administrative system. 
" Increase political accountability, so that monitoring and evaluation activities are 
not perceived as a threat but as supportive elements of any decision-making 
process. 
The above implications for administrative and political actors, although deduced through 
a thorough investigation of Structural Funds policy implementation, could also be 
expanded to other policy area of regional concern. 
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7.4 Contribution to the literature 
The thesis has made a contribution to the existing literature in: (i) providing a new 
definition of administrative capacity; (ii) operationalizing the measurement of 
administrative capacity at the regional level; and (iii) suggesting how administrative 
capacity is linked to political characteristics and activities. 
As mentioned in Section 7.3.1, the first accomplishment of the thesis is to have filled a 
gap in the existing literature with a definition of administrative capacity that can be 
operationalized and applied in any region or Member State, therefore allowing cross- 
country comparison. In addition, I have also suggested some indicators against which 
administrative capacity and the influence of the process of policy learning in changing 
administrative behaviour patterns can be benchmarked over time. 
The second accomplishment of the thesis is to have performed a novel investigation into 
whether the regions of the EU-15 Member States possessed an adequate level of 
administrative capacity to implement the Funds according to the stipulated rules and 
regulations. This analysis and the related extensive fieldwork have not previously been 
tackled in the literature, which in the past has significantly overlooked the whole issue of 
EU policy implementation. Indeed, while there is a rich case study literature that looks at 
the CEECs, there is a lack of systematic comparative research testing the administrative 
capacity explanation among the EU-15. This thesis attempted to fill this research gap, 
first by identifying the component elements and measures of administrative capacity, 
and then by testing the existence of this capacity in two selected case studies. 
My research has revealed that administrative capacity is a central issue not only in the 
new Member States but also in the old ones. Indeed, the case studies of Sicily and 
Basilicata revealed that administrative capacity building is a process that encountered 
difficulties in the former, but went smoothly in the latter. The evidence gathered in both 
regions allowed the identification of impeding factors and provides indications of what 
needs to be done in the future by both new and old Member States in order to improve 
current implementation strategies and avoid the mistakes that have cropped up in the 
past (cf. Section 7.3.3). 
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The third accomplishment of my research is to have provided a theoretical model of 
interaction between the administrative and the political variables (cf. Section 2.3.2). This 
model has been tested in the two selected case studies and the evidence gathered seems 
to back up the hypothesis that if a government has a high level of instability, it is more 
likely that the political class is interfering and lacks accountability. Such a political 
model has negative repercussions on administrative performance. Indeed, in that 
political context, the management in unclear and not coordinated, the programme lacks 
of a coherent long-term strategy and monitoring and evaluation activities are limited. 
Such and administrative performance ultimately slows down the rate of Structural Funds 
expenditures. This scenario has emerged in Sicily. 
In conclusion, multilevel governance provides a framework for policy making and 
policy implementation and can deliver great results. However, it requires that all the 
actors involved at different levels possess the adequate capacity to administer the policy, 
whether it is regional or otherwise. A process of decentralization within the Member 
States is deemed necessary in order that the sub-national regions may emerge in the EU 
arena. However, this is not sufficient to develop administrative capacity. Two different 
but complementary arenas, political and administrative, constitute regional government. 
They need to find equilibrium in the way they interact, where each respects the other's 
roles and responsibilities without limiting or interfering in its arena. 
It is through a proactive cooperation between the administrative and political bodies that 
regional institutions can achieve the goal of effectively implementing their policy, and 
therefore deliver results. 
7.5 Agenda for future research 
Three directions of future work are suggested: (i) further studies on variables that can 
determine administrative capacity variations and application of the administrative loop 
designed in Chapter 2 to investigate other regions; (ii) research on the impact of higher 
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institutional performance on social capital formation; (iii) relation between quantitative 
and qualitative implementation. 
My research supports the hypothesis that three political factors determine variation in 
administrative capacity. However, further studies that might identify other intervening 
variables are encouraged. The existing literature points at education and/or corruption as 
potential independent variables. These were not relevant in my selected case studies, but 
the spectrum of regional examples is so vast that it would be worth testing those 
variables in other regions. 
Similarly, the administrative capacity loop designed in this thesis needs further testing. I 
advocate that four activities constitute the successful implementation of Structural 
Funds. This is consistent in the case studies that I have investigated, but testing the loop 
in other regions would further validate its relevance. 
This thesis started by considering social capital being similar in both regions as 
suggested by Putnam et al (1993). It would be interesting to investigate the impact of 
higher institutional performance on civil society, in terms of increasing trust in 
intuitions, networking and association and therefore, ultimately increasing social capital. 
Finally, a question for future research relates to the correlation between quantitative and 
qualitative expenditures - i. e. does higher implementation rate correspond to higher 
quality of projects? Does spending more means spending better? My future research 
will focus on both the last two questions. 
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Annex I 
List of Interviews in Sicily and Basilicata 
PART I. Fieldwork carried out in Sicily 
List of people interviewed 
A recorded interview of almost 1 hour was conducted with the key actors of both the 
political and administrative arena between the 28th of June and the 30d' of July 2005. The 
list below shows, the name, the role, the departmentlassessorato, eventually the 
office/area of each interviewed and the date. The list follows an alphabetical order 
grouped by assessorati. 
A. Political role 
Name Role Assessorato/ department Office/Area Date 
1) Innocenzo 
Leontini 
Assessore Agriculture and Forest 28/06/2005 
2) Alessandro 
Pagano 
Assessore Cultural Resources 28/06/2005 
3) Michele Cimino Assessore Programming Department 28/06/2005 
B. Administrative area. 
B 1. General managers and managers: 
Name Role Assessorato/ Office/ Area Date 
Department 
1) Giuseppe Morale General Infrastructure 04/07/2005 
Manager Intervention in 
Agriculture 
2) Giovanni Geraci Manager Programming Local Development 28/06/2005 
Department 
3) Francesca Marino Manager Programming Informatics system, 27/06/2005 
Department coordination, monitoring 
and communication 
4) Milena Ribaudo Manager Programming Local Development 28/0612005 
Department 
5) Giuseppe Manager Programming Coordination and 27/06/2005 
Scorciapino Department technical assistance 
6) Gabriella Palocci General Programming 27/06/2005 
Manager of MA Department 
7) Emanuele Villa Manager Programming Human Resources and 29/06/2005 L Department Research 
W. U 
The above list of people also filled out the questionnaire 
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List of people who submitted the questionnaire between the 281h of June 2005 and the 
10`h of July 2005. 
A. Political role 
Name Role Assessoratol Office/ Area Date 
Department 
1) Francesco Cascio Assessore Territory and 04/07/2005 
Environment 
B. Administrative Area 
B 1. Managers: 
Name Role Assessorato/ Office/ Area Date 
Department 
1) Antonino General Manager Cultural Resources 29/06/2005 
Lumia 
2) Daniela Manager Cultural Resources Estates and Property 2906/2005 
Mazzarella 
3) Giuseppe General Manager Industry 29/06/2005 
Incardona 
4) Giuseppe di Manager Industry Entrepreneurship 29/06/2005 
Gaudio Promotion 
5) Osvaldo La Manager Programming Evaluation Unit 28/06/2005 
Rosa Department 
6) Rodolfo General Manager Public Works 29/06/2005 
Casarubea 
7) Calogero Manager Public Works Water Reosurces 29/06/2005 
Fazio 
8) Antonio Manager - Transport 28/06/2005 
Grasso 
I I 
B2. Civil servants: 
Name Role Assessoratol Office/ Area Date 
Department 
1) Lucia Callace Civil Servant Programming 30/06/2005 
Department 
2) Benedetto Civil Servant Programming Local Development 30/06/2005 
Caorradino Department 
3) Giovanna Fiore Civil Servant Programming Human Resources 30/06/2005 
Department 
4) Silvio di Civil Servant Programming Area of coordination 30/06/2005 
Giorgio Department and technical assistance 
5) Salvatore Civil Servant Programming 30/06/2005 
Milazzo Department 
6) Maria Cristina Civil Servant Programming Area of Monitoring and 28/06/2005 Patti Department regional organization 
for structural fund 
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management. 
7) Massimo Civil Servant Programming Area of informatics 30/06/2005 
Piccione Department system, coordination, 
monitoring and 
communication 
8) Anna Maria Civil Servant Programming 28/06/2005 
Renna Department 
9) Guido Speciale Civil Servant Programming Secretariat of the 26/06/2005 
Department Monitoring Committee 
10)Gaetano Cimb Civil Servant Structural Area of Programming 28/06/2005 
Intervention in and Coordination 
Agriculture 
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PART II. Fieldwork carried out in Basilicata 
List of people interviewed 
A recorded interview of almost 1 hour was conducted with the following people between 
the 5th of June and the 30th of June 2006: 
A. Political role 
Name Role Assessoratol Department Office/ Area Date 
1) RoccoColangelo Assessore Health and Social Policy 14/06/2006 
2) Gaetano Fierro Assessore Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
14/06/2006 
B. Administrative area: 
B 1. General managers and managers: 
Name Role Assessorato/ Office/Area Date 
Department 
1) Maria Teresa General Cabinet of Presidency Office for European Policy 07/06/2006 
Lavieri Manger of (Presidenza della and Programme (Struttura 
the MA Giunta) di Staff Politiche e 
Prn rammi Comunitari) 
2) Giuseppe General Health and social Policy 05/06/2006 
Montagano Manger 
3) Adrian Manager Health and social Policy Office for promoting social 05/06/2006 
Abiusi economy and development 
of social and health 
services 
4) Andrea General Territory and 07/06/2006 
Freschi Manager Environment 
5) Aniello General Infrastructures and Public 13/06/2006 
Vietro Manager works 
6) Ernesto Manager Infrastructures and Public Building trade 13/06/2006 
Mancino works 
7) Rocco Cutro Manager Infrastructures and Public Infrastructure 13/06/06 
works 
8) Rocco Rosa General Agriculture and Rural 06/06/2006 
Manager Development 
9) Angelo Di Manager Agriculture and Rural Agriculture and Rural 06/06/2006 
Mauro Development Development Policy 
10) Francesco Manager Agriculture and Rural Natural Resources 13/06/2006 
Pesce Development 
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11) Giuseppe Manager Agriculture and Rural Quality and Services 06/06/2006 
D'Agrosa Development 
12) Antonio Manager Agriculture and Rural Monitoring system for 14/06/2006 
Amato Development EAGGF 
13) Giuseppe General Policy for enterprises 08/06/2006 
Esposito Manager 
14) Emilio Manager Policy for enterprises Internationalisation, 08/06/2006 
Libutti Research and Technology 
Innovation 
15) Lorenzo Manager Policy for enterprises Industry and manufactory 09/06/2006 
Affinito sector 
16) Gerardo General Training, Culture and 12/06/2006 
Calvello Manager Sport 
17) Parrella Manager Training, Culture and Training and Territory 14/06/2006 
Francesco Sport 
B2. Civil Servants: 
Name Role Assessoratol Office/Area Date 
Department 
1) Chiara Civil Servant Cabinet of Presidency Office for European 09/06/2006 
Diana Policy and Programme 
2) Luisa Civil Servant Cabinet of Presidency Monitoring system for 14/06/2006 
Lomio ERDF 
3) Franco Civil Servant Training, Culture and Monitoring system for 14/06/2006 
Giorgio Sport ESF 
4) Salvatore Civil Servant 08/06/2006 
Panzanaro 
5) Michele Civil Servant 08/06/2006 
Recine 
6) Giuseppe Civil Servant 08/06/2006 
Bernardo 
7) Donato Civil Servant Cabinet of Presidency Information Society 08/06/2006 
Pafundi 
The above list of people also filled out the questionnaire 
List of people who submitted the questionnaire between the 50' of June 2006 and the 
16th of June 2006 
A. Administrative Area 
Al. Managers: 
Name Role Assessoratol Otrce/Area Date 
Depart ent 
1) Luigi Manager Territory and Water Supply 12/06/2006 
Gianfranceschi Environment 
2) Rosa Manager Territory and Territory protection 15/06/2006 
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Pietragalla Environment 
3) Nicola Manager Territory and Enviroment protection 07/06/2006 
Vignola Environment 
4) Antonio Manager Territory and Nature protection 
D'Ottavio Environment 
5) Rocco De Manager Agriculture and Rural Vegetable production 05/06/2006 
Canio Development 
6) Gaetano Manager Agriculture and Rural Aids 08/06/2006 
Giordano Development 
7) Giuseppe Manager Agriculture and Rural Services of Rural 15/06/2006 
Eligiato Development community 
8) Rocco Manager Policy for enterprises Energy 13/06/2006 
Frontuto 
9) Cartnela M. Manager Policy for enterprises Aids 13/06/2006 
Panetta 
10)Renata Manager Training, Culture and Postgraduate training 13/06/2006 
Falcinelli Sort 
A2. Civil servants: 
Name Role Assessorato/ Office/Role Date 
Department 
1) Michele Claps Civil servant Cabinet of Office for European 07/06/2006 
Presidency Policy and Programme 
2) Maurizio Civil servant Cabinet of Office for European 25/05/2006 
Carnpagna Presidency Policy and Programme 
3) Angela Civil servant Cabinet of Office for European 13/06/2006 
Carissimi Presidency Policy and Programme 
4) Maria Rosaria Civil servant Cabinet pf Office for European 01/06/2006 
Picciano Presidency Policy and Programme 
5) Carmela Civil servant Cabinet of Office for European 
Pietrafesa Presidency Policy and Proamme 
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PART III. Interviews with key actors external to both regions 
Name Role Organization Date 
1) Fabrizio Barca Head of Department Dipartimento Politiche di 20/01/2005 
Sviluppo e Coesione (DPS - 
Department for Development and 
cohesion Policies) 
2) Laura Tagle Economist Dipartimento Politiche di 20/01/2005 
Sviluppo e Coesione 
3) Paola Casavola Economist Dipartimento Politiche di 20/01/2005 
Sviluppo e Coesione 
4) Laura Raimondo Economist Dipartimento Politiche di 20/01/2005 
Sviluppo e Coesione 
5) Tito Bianchi Economist Dipartimento Politiche di 20/01/2005 
Sviluppo e Coesione 
6) Simona De Luca Economist Dipartimento Politiche di 20/01/2005 
Sviluppo e Coesione 
7)Francesco Sbattella Senior Consultant Ernst & Young 17/04/2005 
8) Antonella Scotese Junior Consultant Ernst & Young 1704/2005 
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Annex II 
Questionnaire 
By Simona Milio 
s. milio@lse. ac. uk 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
WC2A 2AE Londra 
Gran Bretagna 
The following questionnaire aims to collect your opinion on the regional administrative 
capacity related to the Structural Funds (SF) implementation, in order to collect as much 
information as possible to assess four administrative key actions: management, 
programming, monitoring and evaluation 
The questionnaire is divided in three parts: 
1) PART I aims at assessing SF management and the separation of political and 
administrative powers; 
2) PART II focuses on the features of SF programming and political stability; 
3) PART III tackles SF monitoring and evaluations in relation to political accountability. 
Mark with a cross the box which correspond to your answer 
********************* 
NAME ............................................................................................... 
SURNAME ......................................................................................... . 
POSMON ............................................................................................ . 
DATE .................................................................................................. 
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PART I 
Section A. The questions aim to understand the clarity of role among personnel and 
degree of coordination among the various departments. 
Section B. The questions aim to establish whether there is a relationship between the 
management of SF and the separation of responsibilities among the political and the 
administrative class. 
Section A. SF Management: clarity of role among personnel and coordination 
among departments. 
1) How would you define the coordination activity implemented by the Managing 
Authority (MA) ? 
a) Excellent 
b) Satisfactory 
c) Unsatisfactory 
2) Which are the major obstacle faced by the MA in managing the SF ? 
a) Political class resistance and/or interference 
b) Weak coordination among the different assessorati 
c) Resistance with in the various departments. 
3) Do( s the MA carr out an efficient activity of horizontal coordination? 
yes 
not enou h 
no 
4) How would you define the vertical hierarchy in your regional government? 
a) strong 
b) weak 
c) there is not vertical hierarchy 
5) Do you think that the vertical hierarchy are an impediment to the correct horizontal 
coordination of activities? 
a) es 
b) no 
6) Do you think that there is clarity of role between the different assessorati and within 
the councillorship as far as concern SF? 
a) Yes. The role are clearly divided. 
b) There is not enough clarity in the division of roles 
c) There is not division of role and this causes that the work is 
267 
duplicated 
7) The different assessorati involved work....: 
a) .... in a coordinated fashion between each other 
b) .... in an isolated way 
c) .... independently one 
form the other 
8) Is the MA structured and organized in order to carry out its duties? 
a) Yes, it is fully structured 
b) Partially, it still need improvement 
c) No, it is not adequately structured 
9) Is the number and quality of the MA staff adequate to carry out the MA duties as 
listed in art. 34 Council Reg 1260/99? 
a) Yes, the number and quality of staff is ade uate 
b) No, the number and quality of staff is not adequate 
c) Partially, the number of staff is not adequate 
d)" Partially, the quality of staff is not adequate 
10) The physical location and the financial resources of the MA are adequate to fulfil its 
goals? 
a) Yes, the physical location and the financial resources are 
adequate 
b) No, the physical location and the financial resources are not 
adequate 
c) Partially, the physical location is not adequate 
d) Partially, the financial resources are not adequate 
11) Does the MA work in consultation with the socioeconomic partners? 
a) Yes 
b) Not frequently 
c) Not at all 
12) Does the MA work in consultation with the local authorities? 
a) Yes 
b) Not frequently 
c) Not at all 
13) Does the MA work in consultation with the national level? 
a) Yes 
b) Not frequently 
c) Not at all 
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14) Does the MA work in consultation with the European level? 
a) Yes 
b) Not frequently 
c) Not at all 
Section B. Separation of responsibilities and powers between the political and 
administrative class (i. e. Regional Law L. R. 12/1996 in Basilicata and Regioanl 
Law 10/2001 in Siciliy) 
1) How would you define the interaction/relation between the MA and the political 
class? 
a) Collaborative with respect of eachother roles 
b) In contrast 
c) There are major interferences by the political level in the MA role 
2) Has the separation of powers between the political and the administrative sphere had 
any impact on the SF management? 
a) Yes, it has had a positive impact 
b) No it has had a negative impact 
c) It did not have any impact 
3) Before Regional Law (12/1996 Basilicata or 10/2001 Sicily)the weight of political 
power in SF management was... 
a) .... strop and more 
influential than the administrative power. 
b) .... in equilibrium with the administrative power 
c) .... weak compared to the administrative power 
4) Which level is more adequate for managing the SF? 
a) The administrative level 
b) The political leve 
c) A balanced collaboration between the two levels 
5) Although the formalized separation of powers, it is still there a political interference 
in SF management? 
Yes, there still is a strong political interference 
Political interference is quite limited 
There is not any political interference 
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PART II 
Section A. The questions aim to understand the characteristic of the programme design 
and the timing of the programme approval. 
Section B. The questions aim to establish whether there is a relationship between the 
programming of SF and the government stability. 
Section A. SF programming design and approval 
1) Which are the major limits of multiannual SF programming in your region? 
a) Lack of flexibility in order to adapt to socioeconomic contest 
changes 
b) Weak strategic coherence with ordinary programming 
c) Delays in approving implementation procedure 
2) Is regional planning integrated and coherent with the national contest? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Parlial, ly 
3) Is regional planning integrated and coherent with the European Commission 
Guidelines? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Partially 
4) The allocation of the resources among the different priorities is.... 
a) .... substantial with the needs of the regional territory 
b). . . determined by political issues which not always take in 
account the real territory needs 
c).... not responding to the territory needs due to a lack of capacity 
in among those who are in charge of programming 
5) The number of measures in which he programme is divided are... 
a) ... too many and the programme is extremely fragmented 
b) ... few and not enough to face the territorial needs 
c) ... enough to answer the territorial needs 
d) ... independently from the number they are inadeguate to 
answer the territorial needs 
6) Are the measures described so to clearly identify the actors involved and the project 
required? 
a) Yes the measures are clearly described 
b) No, the measures are not clearly described and do not identify 
the actors and project involved. 
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7) The four SF are..... 
a) .... planned in a coordinated and synergic fashion among each 
other 
b) .... planned in a independent and not coordinated 
8) What is the main cause that account for the delay in the approval of the Regional 
Operative Programme (ROP)? 
a) Government instability 
b) Lack of clarity in the procedures 
c) Other (specify) 
Section B. Government stability 
1) Government instability produces an effect on SF programming that is: 
a) negative 
b) positive 
c) indifferent 
2) Government stability influences.... 
a) ..... the strategic coherence of the programme 
b) ..... the availability of the budget to be allocated to the 
programme 
c) ..... the continuity of the programme 
* ************************ 
PART III 
Section A. The questions aim to understand the degree of monitoring and evaluation in 
terms of availability of data, functioning of system and spreading on evaluation culture. 
Section B. The questions aim to establish whether there is a relationship between the 
monitoring /evaluation of SF and the political accountability 
Section A. Monitoring and Evaluation of SF 
1) The prior obiective of the ROP are.... 
a) .... specifics and quantifiable 
b) .... difficult to assess because of they are not specific or 
quantifiable_ 
2) Is an adequate system of monitoring indicators and procedure been introduced in the 
region, in order to monitor the ROP results? 
T a) Yes, it has been introduce at the beginning of the planning 
period 
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b) Yes, it has been introduced but with strong delays and it is 
still in phase of running in 
c) The system of indicators and procedure is not adequate to 
monitor the ROP results 
3) Does the monitoring system guarantee availability of financial, physical and 
procedural data updated? 
a) Yes, the data are constantly updated 
b) The data are partially updated with delays 
c) No, most of the data are not available 
4) The procedures and structures which are in charge of monitoring are..... 
a) Adequate 
b) Adequate but still need to be improved 
c) Inadequate 
5) The procedures and structures which are in charge of evaluating are..... 
a) Adequate 
b) Adequate but still need to be improved 
c) Inadequate 
6) Is the culture of evaluation spreading within the regional government? 
a) yes 
b) slowly and partially 
c) no 
7) The Monitoring Committee should guarantee that all the actors involved in the SF can 
monitor the progress of the ROP. Is this the case? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Partially 
8) Is the staff that carries out the activities of monitoring and evaluating adequate for the 
tasks? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c Partially 
9) Have the recommendation of the intermediate evaluation been implemented? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Partially 
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10) Is there a link between the Structural Funds implementation and the trend of the 
regional economy - i. e. GDP growth, unemployment reduction? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Partially x 
Section B. Political Accountability 
1) Is the improvement of monitoring and evaluation activity related to the political will? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Partially 
2) Is the political class open to support the practice of monitoring and evaluating? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Partially 
3) Has the political class propelled or impeded the diffusion of evaluation culture? 
a) The political class has propelled the diffusion of evaluation 
culture 
b) The political class has impeded the diffusion of evaluation 
culture 
c) The political class has not propelled or impeded the diffusion 
of evaluation culture 
4) How would you define the perception by the political class of the practice of 
monitoring and evaluation? 
a) ... a useful instrument to improve their activities 
b) .... an obstacle for their activities 
c) .... neither and obstacle or an instrument for their activities 
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Annex III 
Interview Guide 
By Simona Milio 
s. milio@lse. ac. uk 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
WC2A 2AE Londra 
Gran Bretagna 
The following interview guide aims to collect your opinion on the regional 
administrative capacity related to the Structural Funds (SF) implementation, in order to 
collect as much information as possible to assess four administrative key actions: 
management, programming, monitoring and evaluation 
The interview guide is divided in three parts: 
1) PART I aims at assessing SF management and the separation of political and 
administrative powers; 
2) PART If focuses on the features of SF programming and political stability; 
3) PART III tackles SF monitoring and evaluations in relation to political accountability. 
********************* 
NAME ................................................................................................ 
SURNAME ......................................................................................... . 
POSITION .......................................................... .................................. 
DATE .................................................................................................. 
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PART I 
Section A. The questions aim to understand the clarity of role among personnel and 
degree of coordination among the various departments. 
Section B. The questions aim to establish whether there is a relationship between the 
management of SF and the separation of responsibilities among the political and the 
administrative class. 
Section A. SF Management: clarity of role among personnel and coordination 
among departments. 
1) At the beginning of the 1989/1993 period, the Region dealt for the first time with 
novel financing instruments -i. e. Structural Funds. How did the regional administration 
organized the management of the SF? Who was responsible for the MA? 
2) Which have been the major change of the MA over the three planning periods? 
3) Which have been the major difficulties faced by the MA and how they have been 
solved? 
4) How did the coordination activity carried out by the MA changed over time? 
5) How would you define the coordination activity implemented by the MA? 
6) Does the MA carry out an efficient activity of horizontal coordination - i. e. among 
different department and assessorati? 
7) Do you think that the vertical hierarchy are an impediment to the correct horizontal 
coordination of activities? 
8) Do you think that there is clarity of role between the different councillorships and 
within the councillorship as far as concern SF? Do you think that there is clarity of role 
among the personnel? 
9) Do you think that the dimension of a regional government in terms of number of 
departments and assessorati has an influence on the SF management? 
Section B. Separation of responsibilities and powers between the political and 
administrative class ( i. e. Regional Law L. R. 12/1996 in Basilicata and Regloanl 
Law 10/2001 in Siciliy) 
I) How would you define the interaction/relation between the MA and the political 
class? 
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2) Has the separation of powers between the political and the administrative sphere had 
any impact on the SF management? 
3) How would you define the weight of political power on SF management before the 
Regional Law that formally separated it (12/1996 Basilicata or 10/2001 Sicily)? 
4) After the mentioned Regional Law the administrative responsibilities have increased? 
Which level is more adequate for managing the SF? 
5) Although the formalized separation of powers, it is still there a political interference 
in SF management? 
*************************** 
PART II 
Section A. The questions aim to understand the characteristic of the programme design 
and the timing of the programme approval. 
Section B. The questions aim to establish whether there is a relationship between the 
programming of SF and the government stability. 
Section A. SF programming design and approval 
1) Which were the features of the SF programming over the period 1989/1993? Was the 
programme supported by a SWOT analysis? Are there previous experiences, which have 
supported the regional administration in learning the multiannaul planning approach 
introduced by SF? 
2) How has the programming capacity evolved over the three different periods 
1989/1993,1994/1999,2000/2006? 
3) Do you think that the regional planning is integrated with the territory and coherent 
over the length of the years? 
4) At the same time, do you think the programming activities are flexible enough to 
capture eventual structural changes? 
5) Which are the major limits of multiannual SF programming in your region? 
6) In your opinion the allocation of the resources among the different priorities is 
substantial with the needs of the regional territory or it is determined by political issues 
which not always take in account the real territory needs? 
7) Do you judge the number of measures in which he programme is divided too many 
and the programme is extremely fragmented or enough to answer the territorial needs 
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8) In your opinion the four SF are planned in a coordinated and synergic fashion among 
each other or they act separately form eachother? 
9) What is the main cause that account for the delay in the approval of the Regional 
Operative Programme (ROP)? 
Section B. Government stability 
1) Do you think that government stability produces an effect on SF programming? What 
kind of effect? 
2) Which are the major problems in terms of SF programming related to eventual 
changes of government? 
3) In you opinion, is the programme coherence strictly related to the government 
stability and continuity? 
*** ********************** 
PART III 
Section A. The questions aim to understand the degree of monitoring and evaluation in 
terms of availability of data, functioning of system and spreading on evaluation culture. 
Section B. The questions aim to establish whether there is a relationship between the 
monitoring /evaluation of SF and the political accountability 
Section A. Monitoring and Evaluation of SF 
1) How the monitoring system has evolved during the three planning periods? 
2) Which have been the major difficulties encountered in the set up of a monitoring 
system? 
3) Have an adequate system of monitoring indicators and procedures been introduced? If 
yes, which one? 
4) Does the monitoring system guarantee availability of financial, physical and 
procedural data updated? 
5) Which are the internal structures/offices in charge of monitoring? Are these latter 
adequate? 
6) Each planning period should be supported by an ex-ante, ex-post and intermediate 
evaluation. Have these report been produced accordingly? 
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7) Which are the internal structures/offices in charge of evaluation? Are these latter 
adequate? 
8) Is the culture of evaluation spreading within the regional government? 
9) Have the recommendation of the intermediate evaluation been implemented? 
10) Is there a link between the Structural Funds implementation and the trend of the 
regional economy - i. e. GDP growth, unemployment reduction? 
Section B. Political Accountability 
1) In your opinion, is the political class accountable? 
2) Are there adequate procedure in place to ensure political accountability? 
3) In your opinion the degree of political accountability is related to the instability of the 
government 
4) Is the improvement of monitoring and evaluation activity related to the political will? 
5) Is the political class open to support the practice of monitoring and evaluating? 
6) Has the political class propelled or impeded the diffusion of evaluation culture? 
7) How would you define the perception by the political class of the practice of 
monitoring and evaluation? 
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Annex IV 
Italian Governments 1946-2006 
Years of the Repubblic: 56 years 
Government: 57 
Average of government per year: 0.9 
Shortest government: Andreotti (1972), 9 days 
Longest government: Craxi (1983), 1058 days 
Days of government: 17741 
Days of government crisis: 1693 (4.6 years) 
Government under provisional law 
1. Government Pam (21.06.1945 - 8.12.1945); Political coalition: DC, PCI, PSIUP, PLI, DL, 
Partito d'Azione; 157 days; Crisi: 3days 
2. Government De Gasperl (10.12.1945 - 1.07.1946); Political coalition: DC, PCI, PSI, PLI, DL, 
Partito d'Azione; Lasted: 203 days; Crisis: 12 days 
First Government officially Republican after the election of the 2nd of June 1946. 
1. Government De Gasperi (13.07.1946 - 20.01.1947); Political coalition: DC, PCI, PSI, PRI; 
Lasted: 191days.; Crisis: 13days. 
2. Government De Gasperi (2.02.1947 - 13.05.1947); Political coalition: DC, PCI, PSI; Lasted: 
100days.; Crisis: 18 
3. Government De Gasperi (31.05.1947 - 12.05.1948); Political coalition: DC, PLI, PSLI, PRI; 
Lasted: 347days.; Crisis: 11 days. 
Beginning of first legislature after the election of the 8`h of May 1948. 
I Leeislature (8 may 1948.24-lone 1953) 
4. Government De Gasperi (23.05.1948 - 12.01.1950); Political coalition: DC, PLI, PSLI, PRI; 
Lasted: 599days.; Crisis: 15days. 
5. Government De Gasperi (27.01.1950 - 16.07.1951); Political coalition: DC, PSLI, PRI; 
Lasted: 535days.; Crisis: 10days. 
6. Government De Gasped (26.07.1951 - 29.06.1953); Political coalition: DC, PRI; Lasted: 
704days.; Crisis: 17days. 
II Legislature (25 tune 1953 - 11 june1958) 
7. Government De Gasperi (16.07.1953 - 28,07.1953); Political coalition: DC; Lasted: 12days.; 
Crisis: 20days. 
8. Government Pella (17,08.1953 - 5.01.1954); Political coalition: DC; Lasted: 141days.; Crisis: 
13days. 
9. Government Fanfani (18.01.1954 - 30.01.1954); Political coalition: DC; Lasted: l2days.; 
Crisis: Idays. 
10. Government Scelba (10.02.1954 - 22.06.1955); Political coalition: DC, PSDI, PLI; Lasted : 
497days.; Crisis: 14days. 
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11. Government Segni (6.07.1955 - 6.05.1957); Political coalition: DC, PSDI, PLI; Lasted: 
670days.; Crisis: 13days. 
12. Government Zoli (19.05.1957 - 19.06.1958); Political coalition: DC; Lasted: 396days.; 
Crisis: 12days. 
III Legislature (12 
_iune 
1958 - 15 may1963) 
13. Government Fanfani (1.07.1958 - 26.01.1959); Political coalition: DC, PSDI; Lasted: 
209days.; Crisis: 20days. 
14. Government Segni (15.02.1959 - 24.02.1960); Political coalition: DC; Lasted: 374days.; 
Crisis: 30days. 
15. Government Tambroni (25.03.1960 - 19.07.1960); Political coalition: DC; Lasted: 116days.; 
Crisis: 7days. 
16. Government Fanfani (26.07.1960 - 2.02.1962); Political coalition: DC; Lasted: 556days.; 
Crisis: l9days. 
17. Government Fanfani (21.02.1962 - 16.05.1963); Political coalition: DC, PSDI, PRI; Lasted: 
449days.; Crisis: 36days. 
IV Lezislature (16 may 1963 - 14 may 1968) 
18. Government Leone (21.06.1963 - 5.11.1963); Political coalition: DC; Lasted: 137days.; 
Crisis: 29days. 
19. Government Moro (4.12.1963 - 26.06.1964); Political coalition: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI; Lasted: 
205days.; Crisis: 26days. 
20. Government Moro (22.07.1964 - 21.01.1966); Political coalition: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI; 
Lasted: 548days.; Crisis: 33days. 
21. Government Moro (23.02.1966 - 5.06.1968); Political coalition: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI; lasted: 
833days.; Crisis: 19days. 
V Legislature (5 Tune 1968.24 may 1972) 
22. Government Leone (24.06.1968 - 19.11.1968); Political coalition: DC; Lasted: 148days.; 
Crisis: 23days. 
23. Government Rumor (12.12.1968 - 5.07.1969); Political coalition: DC, PSU, PRI: Lasted: 
205days.; Crisis: 3ldays. 
24. Government Rumor (5.08.1969 - 7.02.1970); Political coalition: DC; Lasted: 186days.; 
Crisis: 48days. 
25. Government Rumor (27.03.1970 - 6.07.1970); Political coalition: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI; 
Lasted: 101 days.; Crisis: 31 days. 
26. Government Colombo (6.08.1970 - 15.01.1972); Political coalition: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI; 
Lasted: 527days.; Crisis: 33days. 
27. Government Andreotti (17.02.1972 - 26.02.1972); Political coalition: DC; Lasted: 9days.; 
Crisis: 121days. 
VI Legislature (25 may 1972.4 iuMy1976) 
28. Government Andreotti (26.06.1972 - 12.06.1973); Political coalition: DC, PSDI, PGI; 
Lasted: 351 days.; Crisis: 25days. 
29. Government Rumor (7.07.1973 - 2.03.1974); 
Lasted: 230days.; Crisis: 12days. 
30. Government Rumor (14.03.1974 - 3.10.1974); 
203days.; Crisis: 5ldays. 
31. Government Moro (23.11.1974 - 7.01.1976); 
Crisis: 36days. 
Political coalition: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI; 
Political coalition: DC, PSI, PSDI; Lasted: 
Political coalition: DC; Lastcd: 410days.; 
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32. Government Moro (12.02.1976 - 30.04.1976); Political coalition: DC; Lasted: 78days.; 
Crisis: 90days. 
VII Legislature (5iuly 1976 - 19 iune1979) 
33. Government Andreotti (29.07.1976 - 16.01.1978); Political coalition: DC; Lasted: 536days.; 
Crisis: 54days. 
34. Government Andreotti (11.03.1978 - 31.01.1979); Political coalition: DC; Lasted: 326days.; 
Crisis: 48days. 
35. Government Andreotti (20.03.1979 - 31.03.1979); Political coalition: DC, PRI, PSDI; 
Lasted: 11 days.; Crisis: 126days. 
VIII Legislature (20_iune 1979 - 11 July 1983) 
36. Government Cossiga (4.08.1979 - 19.03.1980); Political coalition: DC, PLI, PSDI; Lasted: 
228days.; Crisis: 16days. 
37. Government Cossiga (4.04.1980 - 27.09.1980); Political coalition: DC, PSI, PRI; Lasted: 
176days.; Crisis: 2ldays. 
38. Government Forlani (18.10.1980 - 26.05.1981); Political coalition: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI; 
Lasted: 220days.; Crisis: 33days. 
39. Government Spadolini (28.06.1981 - 7.08.1982) Political coalition: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI, 
PLI; Lasted: 405days.; Crisis: l6days. 
40. Government Spadolini (23.08.1982 - 13.11.1982); Political coalition: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI, 
PLI; Lasted: 82days.; Crisis: 18days. 
41. Government Fanfani (1.12.1982 - 29.04.1983); Political coalition: DC, PSI, PSDI, 
PLI; Lasted: 149days.; Crisis: 97days. 
IX Legislature (12 July 1983 -1° July 1987) 
42. Government Craxi (4.08.1983 - 27.06.1986); Political coalition: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI, PLI; 
Lasted: 1058days.; Crisis: 34days. 
43. Government Craxi (1.08.1986 - 3.03.1987); Political coalition: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI, PLI; 
Lasted: 214days.; Crisis: 45days. 
44. Government Fanfani (17.04.1987 - 28.04.1987); Political coalition: DC, Indipendenti; 
Lasted: I ldays.; Crisis: 9ldays. 
X Legislature (2 July 1987 - 22 Aprile 1992) 
45. Government Goria (28.07.1987 - 11.03.1988); Political coalition: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI, PL!; 
Lasted: 227days.; Crisis: l3days. 
46. Government De Mita (13.04.1988 - 19.05.1989); Political coalition: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI, 
PLI; Lasted: 401 days.; Crisis: 64days. 
47. Government Andreotti (22.07.1989 - 29.03,1991); Political coalition: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI, 
PLI; Lasted: 615days.; Crisis: 14days. 
48. Government Andreotti (12.04.1991 - 24.04.1992); Political coalition: DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI; Lasted: 378days.; Crisis: 65days. 
XI Legislature (23 Aprile 1992.14 aprile 1994) 
49. Government Amato (28.06.1992 - 22.04.1993); Political coalition: DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI; Lasted: 298days.; Crisis: 6days. 
50. Government Ciampi (28.04.1993 - 16.04.1994); Political coalition: DC, PSI, PSDI, PLI; Lasted: 353days.; Crisis: 24days. 
XII Legislature (15 sprite 1994 -8 may 1996 
. 6. 
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51. Government Berlusconi (10.05.1994 - 22.12.1994); Political coalition: FI, LN, AN, CCD, 
UDC; Lasted: 226days.; Crisis: 26days. 
52. Government Dini (17.01.1995 - 17.05.1996); Political coalition: Indipendenti; Lasted: 
486days. 
XIII Legislature (9 may 1996 - 29 may 2001) 
53. Government Prodi (18.05.1996 - 9.10.1998); Political coalition: PDS, PPI, Lista Dini, UD, 
Verdi; Lasted: 876days.; Crisis: 17days. 
54. Government D'Alema (27.10.1998 - 18.12.1999); Political coalition: Ulivo, PDCI, UDEUR; 
Lasted: 423days. Crisis: 4days. 
55. Government D'Alema (22.12.1999 - 19.4.2000); Political coalition: DS, PPI, Democratici, 
UDEUR, PDCI, VERDI. Rinnovamento; Lasted: 119 days. 
56. Government Amato (25.04.2000 - 11.06.2001); Political coalition: DS, PPI, Democratici, 
UDEUR, SDI, PDCI, VERDI, Rinnovamento, Indip.; Lasted: 398 days 
XIV Legislature (30 may 2001 -2006 ) 
57. Government Berlusconi (12.06.2001 - 23.04.2005); Political coalition: Forza Italia, AN, 
Lega Nord Nord, Biancofiore (Ccd - Cdu), Indipendenti, Partito repubblicano; Lasted: 1414 days 
58. Government Berlusconi ( 23-4-2005 - 16-5-2006); Lasted: 372 days 
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bilancio e della programmazione economica e riordino delle competenze del CIPE, a 
norma dell'articolo 7 della legge 3 aprile 1997, n. 94, G. U. n. 293 del 17 dicembre 1997. 
Decreto Legislativo 23 dicembre 1997, n. 469, Conferimento alle region! e agli enti 
locali di funzioni e compiti in materia di mercato del lavoro, a nornna dell'articolo 1 
della legge 15 marzo 1997, n. 59, G. U. n. 5 dell'8 gennaio 1998. 
(1998) 
Decreto legislativo 31 marzo 1998 n. 80, Nuove disposizioni in materia di 
organizzazione e di rapporti di lavoro nelle amministrazioni pubbliche, di giurisdizione 
nelle controversie di lavoro e di giurisdizione amministrativa, emanate in attuazione 
dell'articolo 11, comma 4, della legge 15 matzo 1997, n. 59, G. U. n. 82 dell'8 aprile 
1998, s. o. 
Decreto Legislativo 31 marzo 1998, n. 112, Conferimento di funzioni e conlpiti 
amministrativi dello Stato alle regioni ed agli enti locali, in attuazione del capo 1 Bella 
legge 15 marzo 1997, n. 59, G. U. n. 92 del 21 aprile 1998 - Supplemento Ordinario n. 
77. 
Legge 16 giugno 1998, n. 191, Modifiche ed integrazioni alle leggi 15 marzo 1997, n. 
59, e 15 maggio 1997, n. 127, nonche' norme in niateria di formazione del personale 
dipendente e di lavoro a distanza nelle pubbliche amministrazioni. Disposizioni in 
materia di edilizia scolastica, G. U. n. 142 del 20 giugno 1998 - Supplemento Ordinario 
n. 110. 
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(1999) 
Legge 8 marzo 1999, n. 50, Delegificazione e testi unici di norme concernenti 
procedimenti amministrativi - Legge di semplificazione 1998, G. U. n. 56 del 9 marzo 
1999. 
Decreto legislativo 30 luglio 1999 n. 286, Riordino e potenziamento dei meccanismi e 
strumenti di monitoraggio e valutazione dei costi, dei rendimenti e dei risultati 
dell'attivita'svolta dalle amministrazioni pubbliche, a norma dell'articolo I1 della Legge 
15 marzo 1997, n. 59, G. U. n. 193 del 18 agosto 1999. 
Decreto legislativo 30 luglio 1999 n. 300, Riforma dell'organizzazione del governo, a 
norma dell'articolo 11 della legge 15 marzo 1997, n. 59, G. U. de130 agosto 1999, n. 203 
S. O. 
Legge 3 agosto 1999, n. 265, Disposizioni in materia di autonomia e ordinamento degli 
enti locali, nonche modifiche alla legge 8 giugno 1990, n. 142, in SO n. 149 alla GU n. 
183 del 6 agosto 1999. 
Legge costituzionale 22 novembre 1999, n. 1, Disposizioni concernenti 1'elezione Biretta 
del Presidente della Giunta regionale e l'autonomia statutaria delle Regioni, G. U. n. 299 
del 22 dicembre 1999 
(2000) 
Legge 21 luglio 2000 n. 205, Disposizioni in materia di giustizia amministrativa, G. U. n. 
173 del 26 luglio 2000. 
Decreto Legislativo 18 agosto 2000, n. 267, Testo unico delle leggi sull'ordimmnento 
degli enti locali, G. U. n. 227 del 28 settembre 2000 - Supplemento Ordinario n. 162 
Legge 24 novembre 2000, n. 340, Disposizioni per la delegificazione di norme e per la 
semplificazione di procedimenti amministrativi - Legge di semplificazione 1999, G. U. n. 
275 del 24 novembre 2000. 
(2001) 
Legge cost. 23 gennaio 2001, n. 1, Modifiche agli articoli 56 e 57 della Costituzione 
concernenti il numero dei deputati e senatori in rappresentanza dcgli italiani 
all'estero, G. U. n. 19 del 24 gennaio 2001. 
Legge cost. 31 gennaio 2001, n. 2, Disposizioni concernenti l'elezione diretta dei 
presidenti delle regioni a statuto speciale e delle province autonome di Trento e 
Bolzano, G. U. n. 26 del 1 febbraio 2001. 
Decreto Legislativo 30 marzo 2001, n. 165, Norme generali sull'ordinamento del lavoro 
alle dipendenze delle amministrazioni pubbliche, G. U, n, 106 del 9 maggio 2001- 
Supplemento Ordinario n. 112 
Legge cost. 18 ottobre 2001, n. 3, Modifiche al titolo V della parte seconda della 
Costituzione, G. U. n. 248 del 24 ottobre 2001 
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(2002) 
Legge 15 luglio 2002, n. 145, Disposizioni per il riordino della dirigenza statale e per 
favorire lo scanzbio di esperienze e l'interazione tra pubblico e privato, G. U. n. 172 del 
24 luglio 2002 
(2003) 
Legge 5 giugno 2003, n. 131, Disposizioni per l'adeguamento dell'ordinamento della 
Repubblica alla legge costituzionale 18 ottobre 2001, n. 3, G. U. n. 132 del 10 Giugno 
2003 
(2005) 
Legge 11 febbraio 2005, n. 15, Mod (fiche ed integrazioni alla legge 7 agosto 1990, n. 
241, concernenti norme generali sull'azione amministrativa, G. U. n. 42 del 21 febbraio 
2005. 
Sicily 
Documents and Reports 
Arthur Andersen (1995), Valutazione finale Progetti Integrati Mediterranei- Sicilia 
1986-1992. 
Arthur Andersen (1996), Valutazione finale Programma Operativo Plurifaulo Sicilia 
1989-1993. 
CENSIS, Vision and Value (2001), Rapporto di Valutazione Intermedia POP Sicilia 
1994/1999 
CENSIS, Vision and Value (2002), Rapporto Finale di Valutazione Intermedia POP 
Sicilia 1994/1999 
Ernst & Young (2003a), Rapporto di Valutazione Intermedia POR Sicilia 2000-2006, 
Palermo: Regione Sicilia 
Regione Sicilia (Document obtained by the Programming Department of the Region): 
(1986) Programma Integrato Mediterraneo 
(1990) Programma Operativo Plurifondo - POP- 1989/1993 
(1996) Programma Operativo Plurifondo - POP- 1994/1999 
(2000a) Programma Operativo Regionale- POR- 2000/2006 
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(2000b) Complemento di Programmazione -POR- 200012006 
(2000d) Rapporto di Valutazione ex-ante -POR -2000/2006 
(2000d) Rapporto Annuale di Esecuzione 1997-1999 
Semaforo (1962), n. 19 del 12 maggio 
Legislation 
(1946) Testo coordinato dello Statuto speciale della Regione Sicilians approvato con 
R. D. L 15 niaggio 1946, n. 455 (pubblicato nella G. U. del Regno d'Italia n. 133-3 del 10 
giugno 1946), convertito in legge costituzionale 26 febbraio 1948, n. 2 (pubblicata nella 
GURI n. 58 del 9 marzo 1948), modificato dalle leggi costituzionali 23 febbraio 1972, n. 
1 (pubblicata nella GURT n. 63 del 7 marzo 1972), 12 aprile 1989, n. 3 (pubblicata nella 
GURI n. 87 del 14 aprile 1989) e 31 gennaio 2001, n. 2 (pubblicata nella GURI n. 26 
dell' I febbraio 2001). 
(1997) Legge Regionale del 7 marzo 1997, n. 6 
(1999) Legge Regionale del 27 aprile 1997, n. 10, Misure difinanza regionale e norme in 
materia di programmazione, contabilitä e controllo. Disposizioni vane aventi rifiessi di 
natura finanziaria. Gazzetta Ufficiale della Regione n. 20 del 1999 
(2000) Legge Regionale del 15 maggio 2000, n. 10, Nonne sulla dirigenza e sui rapporti 
di impiego e di lavoro alle dipendenze della Regione siciliana. Conferimento di fiinzioni 
e compiti agli enti locali. Istituzione dello Sportello unico per Ic attivitk productive. 
Disposizioni in materia di protezione civile. Norme in materia di pensionamento. 
Gazzetta Ufficiale della Regione n. 23 del 2000 
(2001) Legge Regionale del dicembre 2001, n. 20. Disposizioni sullordinamento 
dell'Amministrazione regionale. Gazzetta Ufficiale della Regione n. 59 del 2001 
(2001) Legge Regionale del 3 maggio 2001, n. 6, Disposizioni programmatiche e 
finanziarie per l'anno 2001. Gazzetta Ufficiale del ]a Regione n. 21 del 2001. 
(2001) Decisione della Giunta n. 332 del 18/09/2001 a document of commitment of each 
structure by specifying the person accountable for the implementation of each 
intervention. 
(2004) Direttiva Presidenziale del 8 ottobre 2004,1ndiri-zi per la programma: ione 
strategica e la formula-lone delle direttive generali degli Assessori per l'attivith 
amministrativa e la gestione per l'anno 2005. 
(2004) Direttiva Presidenziale 2 novembre 2004, Atto di indirizzo per Putiliz o dei fondi 
attribuiti con il Programma operativo regionale 2000/2006. 
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Basilicata 
Documents and reports 
Ecosfera S. P. A., Reconta Ernst and Young S. P. A., Ernst and Young Corporate Finance 
Srl (1999), Primo Rapporto di Valutazione Intermedia POP Basilicata 1994-1999 
(online). Available from: 
httl2: //www. regione. basilicata. it/sportelloeuropa/default. cfm? fuseaction=dir&dir=326&d 
oc=&link= 
(2000), Secondo Rapporto di Valutazione Intermedia POP Basilicata 1994-1999 
(online). Available from: 
http: //www. reRione. basilicata. it/sportelloeuropi/default. cfm? f iseaction=dir&dir-326&d 
oc=&link= 
(2001), Terzo Rapporto di Valutazione Intermedia POP Basilicata 1994-1999 (online), 
Available from: 
http: //www. reRione. basil icata. it/sportelloeurol2a/default. cfm? fuseacti on=dir&dir=326&d 
oc=&link 
(2002), Rapporto di Valutazione Finale POP Basilicata 1994-1999 (online). Available 
from: 
httn: //www. regione. basilicata. it/snortelloeuropa/default. cfm? f iseaction=dir&dir=326&d 
oc=&Iink 
Ernst & Young (2003b), Rapporto di Valutazione Intermedia POR Basilicata 2000- 
2006, Potenza: Regione Basilicata. 
Regione Basilicata (Document obtained by the Programming department of the Region): 
(1986) Programma Integrato Mediterraneo - PIM -1986/1992 
(1989) Programma Operativo Plurifondo - POP- 1989/1993 
(1995a) Rapporto finale di esecuzione POP 1989/1993 
(1995b) Programma Operativo Plurifondo - POP- 1994/199 
(1996b) Rapporto di Esecuzione annuale 1994-1996 
(1996c) Rapporto Finale di Valutazione PIM 1986/1992 
(1997) Rapporto finale di Esecuzione POP 1989/1993 
(1999) Rapporto di Valutazione exante POR 2000/2006 
(2000a) Regional Operative Programme- POR- 200012006 
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(2000b) Complemento di Programmazione POR 200012006 
(2001 a) Rapporto di Esecuzione Annuale 2001 
(2001 b) Trent'anni di attivita. Speciale n. 100 
Speech of Gaetano Michetti during the inauguration of the Cabinet on the 19th of June 
1985 
Speech of Filippo Margiotta during the insediazione of the Cabinet on the 19th of june 
1985 
Legislation 
(1996) Legge Regionale (L. R. ) del 2 marzo 1996 n. 12, Riforma dell' organi; zazione 
amministrativa regionale. Bollettino Ufficiale della Regione Basilicata N. 13 del 8 
marzo 1996 
(1996) Risoluzione dells Giunta n. 502 of 19/02/1996, Creazione della Cabina di Regia 
(1997) Decreto dell Giunta n. 7523 del 10/11/1997, Creazione della Commissione 
Tecnica Interdipartimentale 
(1998) Delibera della Giunta Regionale n. 11 of 13/01/1998, Potenza: Bollettino 
Ufficiale della Regione Basilicata 
(1998) Risoluzione della Giunta n. 11 del 13/01/1998 has identified the actions of 
competence of the political direction, which are separate from those attributed to the 
administrative managers. 
(2002) Delibera della Giunta n 600/2002 has set the criteria and parameters for the 
evaluation of the general managers performance. 
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